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Golan v. Holder 
10-545 
Ruling Below: Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (lOth Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 
(2011). 
In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, restoring copyright protection to 
a number of foreign works previously in the public domain. Lawrence Golan, a music conductor, 
director, and professor, along with a number of educators, performers, publishers, film archivists, 
and motion picture distributors brought suit, arguing URAA §514 is unconstitutional because it 
. violates their First Amendment rights by removing works from the public domain. The district 
court first granted summary judgment to the government, holding that private censorship via 
copyright does not implicate the First Amendment. On appeal, the 10th Circuit remanded, 
directing the lower court to apply an appropriate level of First Amendment scrutiny. The parties 
agreed to a characterization of the URAA as a content-neutral restriction on speech subject to 
intermediate scrutiny. The district court then granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding 
that the URAA violated their First Amendment rights. In 2010, the 10th Circuit reversed the 
ruling, holding that URAA §514 satisfies intermediate scrutiny and that enacting §514 lay within 
Congress's Article I powers. 
Questions Presented: (l) Does the Progress Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, 
§ 8, cl. 8, prohibit Congress from taking works out of the public domain? (2) Does Section 514 
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act violate the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution? 
Lawrence GOLAN; Estate of Richard Kapp; S.A. Publishing Co., Inc., doing business as 
ESS.A.Y. Recordings; Symphony of the Canyons; Ron Hall, doing business as Festival 
Films; John McDonough, doing business as Timeless Video Alternatives International, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States; 
Marybeth Peters, in her official capacity as Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office of the 
United States, Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees. ·Motion Picture Association of 
America, Inc.; International Coalition for Copyright Protection; The AmericanSociety Of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers; The American Society of Media Photographers; The 
Association of American Publishers; Broadcast Music, Inc.; The Music Publishers . 
Association of the United States; The Software and Information Industry Association; The 
Recording Industry Association of America; Reed Elservier, Inc.; Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt Publishing Co.; Professor Daniel Gervais, Amici Curiae. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
Filed June 21,2010 
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[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
BRISCOE, Chief Judge. 
Plaintiffs brought this action challenging the 
constitutionality of Section 514 of the 
Uruguay. Round Agreements Act 
("URAA"), which granted copyright 
protection to various foreign works that 
were previously in the public domain in the 
United States. The district cOUli granted 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, 
concluding that Section 514 violates 
plaintiffs' freedom of expression under the 
First Amendment. In Case No. 09-1234, the 
government appeals the district cOUli's order 
granting plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment and denying the government's 
motion, arguing that Section 514 is a valid, 
content-neutral regulation of speech. In Case 
No. 09-1261, plaintiffs cross-appeal, 
contending that the statute is facially invalid 
and that they are entitled to injunctive relief. 
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, we reverse the judgment of the 
district court and conclude that Section 514 
of the URAA is not violative of the First 
Amendment. 
I. Statutory Background 
In 1989, the United States joined the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Atiistic Works ("Berne Convention"). 
The Berne Convention requires each 
signatory to provide the same copyright 
protections to authors in other member 
countries that it provides to its own authors. 
Pursuant to Article 18, when a country joins 
the Convention, it must provide copyright 
protection to preexisting foreign works even 
when those works were previously in the 
public domain in that country. However, 
when the United States joined the Berne 
Convention, the implementing legislation 
did not extend copyrights to any foreign 
works that were already m the public 
domain in the United States. 
In April .1994, the United States signed 
various trade agreements in the Uruguay 
Round General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Included in this round of agreements 
was the Agreement on Trade Related· 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs). The TRIPs agreement required, in 
part,that its signatories comply with Article 
18 of the Berne Convention, and thus, 
extend copyright protection to all works of 
foreign origin whose term of protection had 
not expired. Unlike the Berne Convention,. 
the TRIPs agreement provided for dispute 
resolution before the World Trade 
Organization. 
In order to comply with these international 
agreements, Congress enacted the URAA. In . 
particular, Section 514 of the URAA 
implements Article 18 of the Berne 
Convention. Section 514 "restores" 
copyrights in foreign works that were 
formerly in the public domain in the United 
States for one of three specified reasons: 
. failure to comply with formalities, lack of 
subject matter protection, or lack of national 
eligibility. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a), 
(h)(6)(C). Section 514 does not restore 
copyrights in foreign works that entered the 
public domain through the expiration of the 
term of protection. 
In addition to restoring copyrights in 
preexisting foreign works, Section 514 
provides some· protections for reliance 
parties such as plaintiffs who had exploited 
these works prior to their restoration. In 
order to enforce a restored copyright against 
a reliance party, a foreign copyright owner 
must either file notice with the Copyright 
Office within twenty-four months of 
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restoration, or serve actual notice on the 
reliance patiy. A reliance party is liable for 
infringing acts that occur after the end of a 
twelve month grace period, starting from 
notice of restoration. Reliance parties may 
sell or otherwise dispose of restored works 
during this grace period, but they cannot 
make additional copies during this time. 
Section 514 provides further protections for 
reliance parties Who, prior to restoration, 
created a derivative work that was based on 
a restored work. Under Section 514, "a 
reliance patiy may continue to exploit that 
derivative work for the duration of the 
restored copyright if the reliance party pays 
to the owner of the restored copyright 
reasonable compensation. . . ." If the parties 
are unable to agree on· reasonable 
compensation, a federal court will determine 
the amount of compensation. 
II. Factual and Procedural Background 
The factual background is not in dispute. 
Plaintiffs are orchestra conductors, 
educators, performers, publishers, film 
archivists, and motion picture distributors 
who have relied on artistic works in the 
public domain for their livelihoods. They 
perform, distribute, and sell public domain 
works. The late plaintiff Kapp created a 
derivative work-a sound recording based 
on several compositions by Dmitri 
Shostakovich. Section 514 of the URAA 
provided copyright protection to these 
foreign works, removing them from the 
public domain in the United States. As a 
result, plaintiffs are either prevented from 
using these works or are required to pay 
licensing fees to the copyright holders-fees 
that are often cost-prohibitive for plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs filed this action, challenging the 
constitutionality of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act, and Section 514 of the 
URAA, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief. Initially, the district court granted 
summary judgment to the government. On 
appeal, we concluded that plaintiffs' 
challenge to the Copyright Term Extension 
Act was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's 
decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
123 S.Ct. 769, 154 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003). We 
also held that "[Section] 514 of the URAA 
ha[ d] not exceeded the limitations inherent 
in the Copyright Clause" of the United 
States Constitution. We recognized that 
"legislation promulgated pursuant to the 
Copyright Clause must still comport with 
other express limitations of. the 
Constitution," and concluded that plaintiff~ 
had "shown sufficient free expression 
interests in works removed from the public 
domain to require First Amendment scrutiny 
of [Section] 514," We then remanded the 
case to the district court to "assess whether 
[Section] 514 is content-based or content-
neutral," and to apply the appropriate level 
of constitutional scrutiny. 
On remand, the parties filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment. The government and 
plaintiffs agreed that Section 514 is a 
content-neutral regulation of speech, and 
thus should be subject to intermediate 
scrutiny. The district court concluded that 
"to the extent Section 514 suppresses the 
right of reliance parties to use works they 
exploited while the works were in the public 
domain," Section 514 was unconstitutional. 
Consequently, the district cOUli granted 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, 
and denied the government's motion. 
The government timely appealed the district 
court's order, arguing that Section 514 of the 
URAA does not violate the First 
Amendment. Plaintiffs cross-appealed, 
arguing that the district court failed to 
provide all of the relief that they requested. 
Specifically, plaintiffs request that we 
adjudicate their facial challenge to Section 
514, direct the district court to enjoin 
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Attorney General Holder from enforcing the 
statute, and order the Register of Copyrights 
Marybeth Peters to cancel the copyright 
registrations of restored works. 
III. Government's Appeal 
"We review de novo challenges to, the 
constitutionality of a statute." Because this 
case implicates the First Amendment, "we 
have 'an obligatiOIi to make an independent 
examination of the whole record in order to 
make sure that the judgment does not 
cons,titute a forbidden intrusion on the field 
of free expression.'" 
The parties agree that Section 514 of the 
DRAA is a content-neutral regulation of 
speech, and thus, is subject to intermediate 
scrutiny. Although their position is "not 
controlling given Our special standard of de 
novo review," we agree that Section 514 is a 
content-neutral regulation of speech. 
In determining whether a regulation is 
content-neutral or content-based, "'the 
government's purpose in enacting the 
regulation is the controlling consideration.'" 
The primary inquiry "is whether the 
government has adopted a regulation of 
speech because of disagreement with the 
message it conveys." "If the regulation 
serves purposes unrelated to the content of 
expression it is considered neutral, even if it 
has an incidental effect on some speakers or 
messages but not others." On its face, 
Section 514 is content-neutral. Moreover, 
there is no indication that the government 
adopted Section 514 "'because of agreement 
or disagreement with the message [that the 
regulated speech] conveys.'" Congress 
primarily enacted Section 514 to comply 
with the United States' international 
obligations and to protect American authors' 
rights abroad. Therefore, we agree that it is a 
content-neutral regulation. 
In reviewing the constitutionality of a 
content-neutral regulation of speech, we 
apply "an intern1ediate level of scrutiny, 
because in most cases [such regulations] 
pose a less substantial risk of excising , 
certain ideas or viewpoints from the public 
dialogue." Applying intermediate scrutiny, a 
content-neutral statute "will be sustained , 
under the First Amendment if 'it advances 
important governmental interests unrelated 
to the suppression of free speech and does 
not burden substantially more speech than 
necessary to further those interests." 
The government argues on appeal that 
Section 514 is narrowly tailored to 
advancing three impOliant governmental 
interests: (1) attaining indisputable 
compliance with international treaties and 
multilateral agreements, (2) obtaining legal 
protections for American copyright holders' 
interests abroad, and (3) remedying past 
inequities of foreign authors who lost or 
never obtained copyrights in the United 
States. 'We hold that. the government has 
demonstrated a substantial interest in 
protecting American copyright holders' 
interests abroad, and Section 514 is 
narrowly tailored to advance that interest. 
Consequently, the district court erred in 
concluding that Section 514 violates 
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 
A. Governmental Interest 
1. Section 514 addres($es a substantial or 
important governmental interest. 
In order for a statute to survive intermediate 
scrutiny, the statute must be directed at an 
important or substantial governmental 
interest unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression. See Turner L 512 U.S. at 662, 
114 S.Ct. 2445. We have no difficulty in 
concluding that the government's interest in 
securing protections abroad for American 
275 
copyright holders satisfies this standard. 
Copyright serves to advance both the 
economic. and expressive interests of 
. American authors. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 
211-13, 123 S.Ct. 769. In addition to 
creating economic incentives that further 
expression, copyright also serves authors' 
First Amendment interests. "[F]reedom of 
thought and expression 'includes both the 
right to speak freely and the right to refrain 
from speaking at all. '" "Courts and 
commentators have recognized that 
copyright ... servers] this countervailing 
First Amendment value" of the freedom not 
to speak. 
Plaintiffs c.ontend that the government does . 
not have an important interest in a 
"reallocation of speech interests" between 
American reliance parties and American 
copyright holders. However, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that not all First 
Amendment interests are equal. "The First 
Amendment securely protects the freedom 
to make-or decline to make-one's own 
speech; it bears less heavily when speakers 
assert the right to make other people's 
speeches." Although plaintiffs have First 
Amendment interests, so too do American 
authors. 
Securing foreign copyrights for American 
works preserves the authors' economic and 
expressive interests. These interests are at 
least as important or substantial as other 
interests that the Supreme Court has found 
to be sufficiently important or substantial to 
satisfy intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, 
Section 514 advances an important or 
substantial governmental interest unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression. 
2. Section 514 addresses a real harm. 
The government's asserted interest cannot 
be merely important in the abstract-the 
sti:ltute must be directed at a real, and not 
merely conjectural, harm. Thus, we must . 
examine whether Section 514 was "designed 
to address a real harm, and whether [it] will 
alleviate [that harm] in a material way." In 
undertaldng this review, we "must accord 
substantial deference to the predictive 
judgments of Congress. Our sole obligation 
is to assure that, in formulating its 
judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable 
inferences based on substantial evidence." 
"[S]ubstantiality is to be measured in this 
context by a standard more deferential than 
we accord to judgments of an administrative 
agency." This deferential standard is 
warranted for two important reasons. First, 
Congress is "far better equipped" as an 
institution "to amass and evaluate the vast 
amounts of data bearing upon the legislative 
questions." Second, we OWIe Congress "an 
additional measure of deference out of 
respect for its authority to exercise the 
legislative power." 
. Even in the . realm of First 
Amendment questions where 
Congress must base. its conclusions 
upon substantial evidence, deference 
must be accorded to its findings as to 
the harm to be avoided and to the 
remedial measures adopted for that 
end, lest we infringe on traditional 
legislative authority to make 
predictive judgments .... 
Additionally, the other branches' judgments 
tegarding foreign affairs walTant special 
deference from the courts. The Supreme 
Court has "consistently acknowledged that 
the nuances of the foreign policy of the 
United States are much more the province of 
the Executive Branch and Congress than of 
[the courts]." As such, we apply 
considerable deference to Congress and the 
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. Executive in making decisions that require 
predictive judgments in the areas of foreign 
affairs. 
To be clear, we do not suggest that 
Congress's decisions regarding foreign 
affairs are entirely immune from the 
requirements of the First Amendment. 
Rather, we merely acknowledge that in 
undertaking our constitutional review of a 
content-neutral statute, Congress's 
predictive judgments are entitled· to 
"substantial deference," and in this 
particular context, our review of Congress's 
predictive judgments is fmiher informed by 
the special deference that Congress and the 
Executive Branch deserve in matters of 
foreign affairs. 
Turning to the issue at hand, pnor to· 
enacting Section 514 of the URAA, 
Congress heard testimony addressing the 
interests of American copyright holders. In 
particular, American works were 
unprotected in several foreign countries, to· 
the detriment.of the United States' interests. 
By some estimates, billions of dollars were 
being lost each year because foreign 
countries were not providing copyright 
protections to American works that were in 
the public domain abroad. 
Congress had substantial evidence from 
which it could reasonably conclude that the 
ongoing harms to American authors were 
real and not merely conjectural. Around the 
globe, American works were being exploited 
without the copyright owners' consent and 
without providing compensation. Thus, there 
was a "substantial basis to support 
Congress' conclusion that a real threat 
justified enactment of' Section 514 of the 
URAA. 
3. Substantial evidence supported the 
conclusion that Section 514 would alleviate 
these harms. 
Next, we must determine whether there was 
. substantial evidence from which Congress 
could conclude that Section 514 would 
alleviate these harms to American copyright 
holders. At the Joint Hearings, Congress 
heard testimony that by refusing to restore 
copyrights in foreign works in the public 
domain, the. United States was not in 
compliance with its obligations under the 
Berne Convention. In addition, the United 
States' refusal to restore foreign copyrigh~s 
was harming American authors' interests 
abroad: foreign countries were following the 
United States' example of refusing to restore 
copyrights in works in the public domain. 
Further, the United States' trading partners 
had represented that they would restore 
American copyrights only if the United 
States restored foreign copyrights. Foreign 
countries were willing to provide, at most, 
reciprocal copyright protections to American 
works. Moreover, the United States had an 
opportunity to set an example for copyright 
restoration for other countries. Thus, if the 
United States wanted certain protections for 
American authors, it had to provide those 
. protections for foreign authors. 
Plaintiffs aver that Congress was presepted 
with evidence regarding the need to restore 
copyrights generally, but that there was no 
evidence that Congryss needed to provide 
. limited protections for reliance parties. 
According to plaintiffs, there is "no support 
for the conclusion that enacting more 
stringent measures against reliance parties .. 
. would have any impact whatsoever on the 
behavior of foreign countries." To the 
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contrary, Congress heard testimony that the 
United States' chosen method and scope of 
copyright restoration would impact other 
hations that were similarly deciding how to 
restore copyrights. 
In particular, Congress heard testimony that 
the United States could set an example 
regarding copyright restoration, and other 
countries might mirror the United States' 
approach. For example, Ira Shapiro, General 
Counsel of the Office of the United States ' 
Trade Representative, testified that "the 
choices made in our implementation of the 
TRIPs agreement will set an example for 
other countries as governments decide on 
their own implementing legislation as well 
as influence future disputes over the 
obligations of the Agreement." Additionally, 
Eric Smith, spealdng on behalf of a 
consortium of trade associations whose 
members represented both American 
copyright industries and reliance parties, 
testified as follows: 
The fact is that what the United 
States does' in this area will carry 
. great weight in the international 
community. If we. interpret Article 
18 and the TRIPS provisions to deny 
protection or significantly limit its 
scope, our trading partners-just 
now considering their. own 
implementing legislation-will feel 
free to simply mirror our views. If 
the largest exporter of copyrighted 
material in the world takes the 
position that we have no, or only 
limited, obligations, the United 
States will have little credibility ih 
convincing particularly the new 
nations with whom we are just 
starting copyright relations to give us 
the expansive protection that we 
need. 
Joint Hearings at 247 (emphasis added). 
Thus~ Congress heard testimony from a 
number of witnesses that the United States' 
position on the scope of copyright 
restoration-which necessarily includes the 
enforcement against reliance parties-was 
critical to the United States' ability to obtain 
similar protections for American copyright 
holders. 
Further, Congress squarely faced the need to 
balance the interests of American copyright 
holders and American reliance parties. In his 
opening remarks, Senator DeConcini stated: 
The conventional wisdom within the 
U.S. copyright community is that 
through the restoration of copyright 
protection to foreign authors we will 
get more than we give because U.S. 
authors will be able to retrieve far 
more works in foreign countries than 
foreign authors will retrieve here in 
the United States. 
. [I]f we set out t,o restore 
copyright protection to foreign 
works, we must provide protection 
that is complete and meaningful. By 
the same token, we must ensure that 
copyright restoration provides 
reliance users a sufficient 
opportunity to recoup their 
investment. 
fd. at 81-82 (Statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
Congress also heard from Eric Smith, who 
testified that the' bills under consideration 
would 
provide' a careful balance between 
the need, on the one hand, to 
establish a "model" provision which 
other countries could follow in order 
to secure effective restoration of our 
copyrights abroad and the need, on 
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the other hand, to balance the rights 
of foreign authors whose works are 
restored in the u.s. with the 
domestic users that may have relied 
on the public domain status of the 
work in making investments. 
Id. at 252. 
In spite of this testimony, plaintiffs contend 
that the government's interest is too 
speculative to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. 
Although we require "substantial evidence" 
in order to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, the 
evidentiary requirement is not as onerous as 
plaintiffs would have us impose. The 
Supreme Court has cautioned that imposing 
too strict of an evidentiary requirement on 
Congress is "an improper burden for courts 
to impose on the Legislative Branch." An 
overly demanding "amount of detail is as 
unreasonable in the legislative context as it 
is constitutionally unwarranted. Congress is 
not' obligated, when enacting its statutes, to 
make a record of the type that an 
administrative agency or court does to 
accommodate judicial review." 
"Sound policymaking often requires 
legislators to forecast future events and to 
anticipate the likely impact of these events 
based on deductions and inferences for 
which complete empirical support may be 
unavailable." Past conduct may be, the 
best-and sometimes only-evidence 
available to Congress in making predictive 
judgments. We think that this is especially 
'true in areas that involve predictions of 
foreign relations and diplomacy, where 
empirical data will rarely be available, and 
to which considerable deference is owed to 
Congress and the Executive. 
Plaintiffs direct our attention to evidence in 
the Congressional record that contradicted 
the, view that other ,countries would follow 
the United States' approach to copyright 
restoration. More specifically, Irwin Karp 
stated: 
When these countries grant 
retroactivity, the theory goes, they' 
will deny their reliance interests real 
protection-if we do so now. But this 
is only a theory, and an unlikely one. 
Most foreign countries, including the 
Commonwealth countries, already 
grant us retroactivity. They will not 
change their laws to restrict 
protection of their reliance patiies. 
Nor will the few important countries 
who presently. do not retroactively 
protect U.S. works [.J When they do 
grant retroactivity they can decide 
what protection they will grant to 
their reliance interests. There is 
nothing to stop them from adopting 
the British et al buy-out provision. 
Joint Hearings at 231. 
However, as detailed above, this was not the 
only evidence, in the record regarding the 
potential effect of the United States' position 
on copyright restoration. Congress also 
heard testimony that if it wanted foreign 
countries to provide strong protections for 
American authors, Congress needed to 
provide like protections for foreign authors. 
Although Congress was presented with 
evidence that its position on copyright 
restoration might not guarantee 
reciprocation, it does not follow that Section 
514 is unconstitutional. "The Constitution 
gives to Congress the role of weighing 
conflicting evidence in the legislative 
process." Thus, we must determine 
"whether, given conflicting views ... , 
Congress had substantial evidence for 
making the judgment that it did." In other 
words, "[tJhe question is not whether 
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Congress, as an objective matter, was 
correct to determine" that limited 
protections for reliance parties were 
"necessary" to gamer similar protections 
from foreign countries. "Rather, the question 
is whether the legislative conclusion was 
reasonable and supported by substantial 
evidence in the record before Congress." 
In making that determination, we are 
not to reweigh the evidence de novo, 
. or to replace Congress' factual 
predictions with our own. Rather, we 
are simply to determine if the 
standard is satisfied. If it is, summary 
judgment for [the govelnment] is 
appropriate regardless of whether the 
evidence is in Qonfiict. 
Id. (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
Considering the deference that Congress is 
owed, particularly in areas of foreign 
relations, we conclude that Congress's 
judgments were supported . by substantial 
evidence. The testimony before Congress 
indicated that the United States' historically 
lax position on copyright restoration had 
been an obstacle to the protection that the 
United States was seeking for its own 
copyright owners. Witnesses further testified 
that many countries would. provide no 
greater protections to American authors than 
the United States gave to their foreign 
counterparts. There was also testimony that 
the chosen method of restoring foreign 
copyrights would have great weight in the 
international community and could induce 
other countries to follow the United States' 
lead, although Congress heard some 
testimony that other countries would not 
necessarily follow the United States' 
approach. Consequently, Congress was 
presented with substantial evidence that 
Section 514 would advance the 
government's interest in protecting 
American copyright holders "in a direct and 
effective way." The United States' ability to 
protect American works abroad would be 
achieved less effectively absent Section 514, 
and therefore, the government's interest is 
genuinely advanced by restoring foreign 
copyrights with limited protections for 
reliance parties such as plaintiffs. 
B. Section 514 does not burden substantially 
more speech than necessary. 
Under intermediate scrutiny, we must also 
determine whether Section 514 is narrowly 
tailored to further the governinent's 
interests. "Content-neutral regulations do 
not pose the same inherent dangers to free 
expression that content-based regulations 
do," and therefore, the government has a 
degree of latitude in choosing how to further 
its . asselied interest. Accordingly, "the 
[g]overnment may employ the means of its 
choosing so long as the regulation promotes 
a substantial governmental interest that 
would be achieved less effectively absent 
the regulation and does not burden 
substantially more speech than is necessary 
to further that interest. " Further, the 
regulation need not be the least-restrictive 
alternative of advancing the government's 
interest. 
1. Section 514 is narrowly tailored. 
The "[g]overnment may not regulate 
expression in such a manner that a 
substantial portion of the burden on speech 
does not serve to advance its goals." "[T]he 
essence of narrow tailoring" is when a 
regulation "focuses on the source of the 
evils the [government] seeks to eliminate ... 
without at the same time banning or 
significantly restricting a substantial 
quantity of speech that does not create the 
same evils." That is, when "the burden 
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imposed by [ a regulation] is congruent to the 
benefits it affords," that regulation is 
narrowly tailored. 
In the case at bar, the burdens imposed on 
the reliance parties are congruent with the 
benefits . Section 514 affords American 
copyright holders. As discussed above, the 
govemment has a substantial interest in 
securing protections for American works in 
foreign countries. Further, Congress heard 
testimony that the United States could 
expect foreign countries to provide only as 
much protection to. American copyright 
holders as the United States would provide 
to· foreign copyright holders, and other 
countries might follow the United States' 
example. In other words, the United States 
needed to impose the same burden on 
American reliance parties that it sought to 
impose on foreign reliance parties. Thus, the 
benefit that the govemment sought to 
provide to American authors is congruent 
with the burden that Section 514 imposes on 
, reliance parties. The burdens on speech are 
therefore directly focused to the harms that 
the govemment sought to alleviate: "This is 
the essence 6fnarrow tailoring." 
2. Alternatives do not undermine the narrow 
tailoring of Section 514. 
Plaintiffs contend that "the Govemment 
could have complied with the Beme 
Convention while providing· significantly 
stronger protection for the First Amendment 
interests of reliance parties like the Plaintiffs 
here." According to plaintiffs, Article 18 of 
the Beme Convention provides considerable. 
discretion that allows the govemment to 
provide greater protections for reliance 
parties. The government responds that the 
Beme Convention requires only transitional 
protections for reliance parties. 
The parties' arguments about what the Beme 
Convention requires and permits are beside 
the point. As discussed above, the 
govemment's interest is not limited to 
. compliance with the Beme Convention. 
Rather, its interest includes securing 
protections for American copyright owners 
in foreign countries, which includes 
providing copyright protection against 
. foreign reliance parties. Thus, it is 
immaterial whether, as plaintiffs contend, 
the govemment could have complied with 
the minimal obligations of the Berne. 
Convention and granted stronger protections 
for American reliance parties. If Congress 
had provided stronger protections to 
American reliance parties such as plaintiffs, 
many foreign countries may have provided 
similar· protections for. their own reliance 
parties, thereby providing less protection for 
American authors. Thus, even assuming for 
purposes of this appeal that the United 
States could have provided stronger 
protections for American reliance parties 
while complying with the mInImum 
requirements of the Beme Convention, 
Section 514 does not burden substantially 
more speech than necessary to further the 
govemment's interest. 
Moreover, in concluding that Section 514 is 
not narrowly tailored, the district court and 
plaintiffs relied on other countries' 
approaches to implementing the Beme 
Convention, specifically, the United 
Kingdom model. However, we are not 
persuaded that the constitutionality of 
Section 514 is undermined by the 
availability of the United Kingdom model. 
First, the "less restrictive-altemative 
analysis has never been a part of the inquiry 
into the validity of content-neutral 
regulations on speech." A statute must be 
"narrowly tailored to serve the govemment's 
legitimate, content-neutral interests," but it 
"need not be the least restrictive or least 
intrusive means of doing so." As long as the 
govemment does not burden substantially 
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more speech than necessary to advance an 
important interest, we will not invalidate a 
statute simply because "the government's 
interest could be adequately served by some 
less-speech -restrictive altemati ve." 
Second, to the extent that the United 
Kingdom model is relevant to our .inquiry, it 
is not such an obvious and substantially less-
speech-restrictive altemative that it 
undermines the validity of Section 514. 
Although not necessary to the intermediate 
scrutiny analysis, the existence of less-
speech-restrictive altematives may be 
relevant to determining whether Section 514 
is nan-owly tailored. '''The availability of 
less burdensome' altematives to reach the 
stated goal signals that the fit between the 
legislature's ends and the means chosen to 
accomplish those ends may be too imprecise 
to withstand First Amendment scrutiny.' 
This is particularly true when such 
altematives are obvious and restrict 
substantially less speech." We do not 
suggest that the existence of a less restrictive 
altemative is dispositive. "We merely 
recognize the reality that the existence of an 
obvious and substantially less restrictive 
means for advancing the desired government 
objective [may] indicate[ ] a lack of nan-ow 
tailoring." 
With this in mind, we turn to plaintiffs' 
suggestion that there were less restrictive 
means of restoring foreign copyrights. 
Although no country has provided full, 
permanent exemptions for reliance parties, 
other countries have provided limited 
protections for reliance' parties. The chief 
altemative discussed by plaintiffs and the 
district court is the United Kingdom model. 
See Golan, 611 F.Supp.2d at 1174 However, 
the United Kingdom model is not an 
obvious and substantially less restrictive 
altemative. 
* * * 
The United Kingdom model is not 
substantially less restrictive of speech. than 
Section 514 of the URAA. In the United 
Kingdom, a copyright owner cannot enforce 
the copyright against a reliance party unless 
the owner "buys out" the reliance party. 
Under Section 514, a copyright owner 
cannot enforce the copyright against a 
reliance party unless the owner files notice 
with the Copyright Office or serves notice 
on a reliance party. Moreover, under Section 
514, reliance parties have twelve months to 
continue exploiting the works, although they 
cannot continue to' make copies . of the 
restored work. Under the United Kingdom 
model, however, the reliance party's 
interests are immediately terminated upon 
buy-out. Thus, under both systems, reliance 
parties receive qualified protection insofar 
as a reliance party can continue to exploit a 
work until the copyright owner does 
something: either buyout the reliance party 
(United Kingdom model) or file notice 
(Section 514). Ultimately, both approaches 
provide the copyright owner with the ability 
to terminate the reliance party's interests. 
The only significant difference is that under 
the United Kingdom model, the reliance 
party . receives compensation from the 
owner, while under Section 514, the reliance 
party has a twelve month grace period to 
continue exploiting the work. 
Further, the United Kingdom model is not 
far more protective of speech interests of 
reliance parties who have created derivative 
works, . such as' the late plaintiff Kapp. 
Section 514 allows these reliance parties to 
continue to use a derivative work as long as 
they pay "reasonable compensation" to the 
copyright owner. The United Kingdom 
model, on the other hand, apparently 
provides no such protection for creators of 
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derivative works. In a sense, the two models 
are mirror images of each other. Under 
Section 514, a reliance party can continue to 
exploit a derivative work as long as he pays 
compensation to the owner of the original 
copyright. In the United Kingdom, an author 
of a derivative work can continue to exploit 
the new work until the owner pays 
compensation to the reliance party. 
We cannot say that one approach is clearly 
more protective. of speech interests than the 
other. Although the United Kingdom model 
is arguably more protective of reliance 
parties' economic interests, we cannot say 
that it is substantially more protective of 
reliance parties' expressive interests. 
Moreover, even if the United Kingdom 
model is marginally more protective of 
speech interests, 
when . evaluating a content-neutral 
regulation which incidentally 
burdens speech, we will not 
invalidate the preferred remedial 
scheme because some alternative 
solution is marginally less intrusive 
on a speaker's First Amendment 
interests. So long as the means 
chosen are not substantially broader 
than necessary to achieve the 
government's interest, the regulation 
will not be invalid simply because a 
court concludes that the 
government's interest could be 
adequately served by some less-
speech-restrictive alternative. 
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 217-18, 117 S.Ct. 
1174. (internal citations, quotations, and 
ellipses omitted). 
At its core, plaintiffs' challenge to Section 
514 "reflect[ s] little more than disagreement 
over the level of protection" that reliance 
parties should receive .. Congress sought to 
balance the interests between American 
copyright holders and American reliance 
parties. In so doing, Congress crafted a 
nuanced statute that offered some 
protections for both of these competing 
interests. It is not our role to opine on the 
best method of striking this balance. A 
statute's "validity does not tum on a 
[court's] agreement with the responsible 
decisionmaker concerning the most 
appropriate method for promoting 
significant government interests." Plaintiffs 
may have preferred a different method of 
restoring copyrights in foreign works, but 
that is not what the Constitution requires; as 
long as the government has not burdened 
substantially more speech than necessary to 
further an important interest, the First 
Amendment does not permit us to second 
guess Congress's legislative choice. "We 
cannot displace Congress' jUdgment 
respecting content-neutral regulations with 
our own, so long as its policy is grounded on 
reasonable factual findings supported by 
evidence that is substantial for a legislative 
determination. " 
We . conclude that because Section 514 
advances a substantial government interest, 
and it does not burden substantially more 
speech than necessary to advance that 
interest, it is consistent with the First 
Amendment. Accordingly, the district court 
erred in ruling that Section 514 violates 
plaintiffs' freedom of expression. 
IV. Plaintiffs' Cross-Appeal 
Plaintiffs have cross-appealed, arguing that 
Section 514 is unconstitutional on its face. 
More specifically, "[p]laintiffs contend that 
removing works from the public domain of 
copyright (as distinct from patents) is an 
illegitimate means regardless of the end or 
the importance of the interest." Facial 
challenges to statutes are generally 
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disfavored as "[fJacial invalidation is, 
manifestly, strong medicine that has been 
employed by the [Supreme] Court sparingly 
and only as a last resort." As such, plaintiffs 
bear a "heavy burden" in raising a facial 
constitutional challenge. They have not met 
this burden, as their arguments on appeal are 
largely foreclosed by our conclusion that 
Section 514 does not violate their freedom 
. of expression, as well as by our previous 
decision in Golan L which we are not free to 
revisit, as law of the case. 
Plaintiffs assert that "there must be a 'bright 
line' drawn around the public domain .... " 
But in Golan L we rejected plaintiffs' 
argument "that, in the context of copyright, 
the public domain is a threshold that 
Congress may not traverse in both 
directions." Golan L 501 F.3d at 1187 
(quotation omitted). We stated that 
[t]he clear import of Eldred is that 
Congress has expansive powers 
when it . legislates under the 
Copyright Clause, and this court may 
not interfere so long as Congress has 
rationally exercised its authority. 
Here, we do. not believe that the 
decision to comply with the Berne 
Convention, which secures copyright 
protections for American works 
abroad, is so inational or so 
unrelated to the aims of the 
Copyright Clause that it exceeds the 
. reach of congressional power. 
Id. (internal citation omitted).· 
We held that Section 514 was within 
Congress's Article I powers, and therefore, 
Congress had the authority to extend 
copyright to works that were in the public 
domain. 
. Of course, while Congress may have the 
authority under Article I to enact Section 
514, it "must still comport with other 
express limitations of the Constitution." 
Plaintiffs have cast their facial challenge to 
Section 514 in terms of "the First 
Amendment, the contours of which may be 
informed by the Progress [or Copyright] 
Clause." However, plaintiffs have provided 
no legal support for their claim that the First 
Amendment--either by itself or informed by 
any· other provision of the Constitution-
draws such absolute, bright lines around the 
public domain, and we are aware of no such 
authority .. 
Plaintiffs' only legal authority is Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 
L.Ed. 884 (1954), but their reliance on 
Bolling is without merit. In Bolling, the 
Supreme Court announced that 
"[s]egregation in public education [wa]s not 
reasonably related to any proper 
governmental objective" arid held "that 
racial segregation in the public schools of 
the District of Columbia [wa]s a denial of 
the due process of law guaranteed by the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." The 
Due Process analysis in Bolling does not 
inform plaintiffs' argument that the First 
Amendment makes the public domain of 
copyright absolutely inviolable. Instead, the 
First Amendment places the same 
restrictions on copyright restoration under 
Section 514 that it imposes on all other 
content-neutral regulations of speech. 
In sum, Congress acted within its authority 
under the Copyright Clause in enacting 
Section 514. Further, Section 514 does not 
violate plaintiffs'· freedom of speech under 
the First Amendment because it advances an 
important governmental interest, and it is 
not substantially broader than necessary to 
advance that interest. Accordingly, we 
REVERSE the judgment of the district court 
. and REMAND with instructions to grant 
summary judgment in favor of the 
government. 
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"Can Congress Restore Foreign Public Domain 
Copyright Protections" 
The National Law Journal 
May 11,2011 
COlynne McSherry 
Does Congress have the power to "restore" 
copyright protection to public domain 
works? The U.S. Supreme COUli will shortly 
consider the question in Golanv. Holder, 
the first case since Eldred v. Ashcroft to 
address the constitutional limits on 
Congress' power to expand copyright 
protection. 
At issue is § 514 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, which granted copyright 
protection to certain works by foreign 
authors that, for a variety of reasons, had 
entered the public domain. As a result, 
. public domain works potentially numbering 
in the millions-including Prokofiev's Peter 
and the Wolf, literature by Maxim Gorky, 
paintings by Picasso and music by 
Stravinsky, for example-were newly 
eligible for copyright protection. If the 
copyright owner decides to enforce its 
rights, those using or planning to use the 
works must either pay hefty license fees or 
cease use of the works. The law includes 
some protections for existing users, such as 
providing immunity for prerestoration uses 
and a one-year grace period. 
The appellants are Lawrence Golan, a 
symphony conductor whose orchestra 
performs a wide variety of public domain 
works, and S.A. Publishing and Ron Hall, 
who publish and distribute public domain 
compositions and feature films. They argue 
that removing works from the public domain 
inserts potentially paralyzing uncertainty to 
. the system and harms the public's First 
Amendment rights to receive and share 
information. For its part, the govemment 
defends the law as a reasonable means of 
complying with U.S. treaty obligations. 
The case has had a somewhat tortured 
history: In April 2005, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Colorado rejected 
Golan's speech arguments as misplaced 
because "private censorship via copyright 
enforcement does not implicate First 
Amendment concerns." On appeal, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 10th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that, while Congress 
had not exceeded its authority under the 
copyright clause, § 514 did implicate First 
Amendment interests. Specifically, the court 
found that, after Eldred, copyright 
legislation is subject to First Amendment 
review if it alters the "traditional contours" 
of copyright protection and that the 
"bedrock principle of copyright law that 
works in' the public domain remain there" 
means that removing works from the public 
domain calls for First Amendment scrutiny. 
On remand, the District of Colorado 
invalidated the statute, holding that it was 
not sufficiently related to a significant 
govemment interest. This time, the 
government appealed, and won: Also 
applying intermediate scrutiny, the 10th 
Circuit found the law narrowly tailored to 
the govemment's "substantial interest in 
protecting American copyright holders' 
interests abroad" because restoring 
protections for foreign works might induce 
other nations to provide reciprocal 
protections for American authors. 
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The Supreme Court has certified two 
questions for consideration: (1) Does the 
Constitution's progress clause prohibit 
Congress from taking works out of the 
public domain? And (2) does § 514 violate 
the First Amendment? 
For the appellants, the answer is yes on both 
counts. In their petition for certiorari, the 
appellants argued that the progress clause, in 
particular the. requirement that copyright 
protection be time-limited, embodies the 
central purpose of copyright: to encourage 
the public release, dissemination and use of 
creative works. During oral arguments in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, the government's own 
lawyer suggested there was a "bright line" 
around works. that had already entered the 
public domain. Section 514, the appellants 
contend, impermissibly transforms a "bright 
line" into a slippery slope: 
"The Tenth Circuit's decision 
invit[ es] Congress to restore 
copyright in Public Domain works 
any time there is an important 
interest in doing so. Yet reducing the 
federal deficit, demonstrating good 
will to a foreign nation or helping an 
aging museum would all appear to be 
sufficient reasons,· by the 
Government's account, to give away 
pieces of the Public Domain." 
Appellants' petition at 11. 
Moreover, the appellants argue, Congress 
impermissibly sacrificed public speech 
rights~the vested interest in public domain 
works-to create private economic windfalls 
for foreign authors. The appellants can no 
longer freely express themselves, e.g., 
perform various works formerly in the· 
public domain, or distribute celiain films. 
More broadly, they argue, the public domain 
is a kind of cultural commons that provides 
the building blocks for all kinds of speech. 
Thus, any interference with its contents must 
impinge on free speech interests. That 
interference cannot be justified by mere 
speCUlation that it might lead to greater 
protections for American authors abroad. 
Indeed, the appellants note that even if 
American authors do receive reciprocal 
rights, the usual public-benefit theory for 
copyright protection-that granting 
economic benefits to authors encourages the 
creation of new works-does not apply 
because the "windfall" in question would 
apply only to the authors of works created 
decades ago. Thus, § 514 cannot, by 
definition, benefit the public by encouniging 
the creation of new works. 
The government, of course, has another 
view. With respect to the copyright clause's 
reference to "limited times," the government 
argues that § 514 is perfectly consistent: 
Protection ends when it would have anyway 
if the author had complied with appropriate 
formalities. Moreover, removal of works 
from the public domain is not 
unprecedented; in fact, it has occurred 
several times, beginning with the first U.S. 
Copyright Act in 1790. And, following 
Eldred, . the Court should accept Congress' 
determination that § 514 would ultimately 
help American authors obtain rewards for 
their creative efforts, in keeping with the 
economic philosophy behind the copyright 
clause. 
As for the alleged effects on speech, the 
government argues that the number of works 
affected is relatively small, and that nothing 
forbids secondary users from using the 
works subject to reasonable compensation 
or, when appropriate, making fair use of 
them. At the same time, § 514 was intended 
to accomplish not one, but three important 
government interests: to "ensure 
indisputable compliance" with the United 
States' obligations under the Berne 
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Convention; to encourage other countries to 
restore the rights of American authors 
abroad; and to remedy what it views as the 
inequitable treatment of foreign authors who . 
lost U.S. copyright protection based on prior 
laws. 
Again, the government stresses, the courts 
should not second-guess Congress' 
judgment as to the best way for the. United 
States to comply with its international 
commitments. 
In its opposition to the petition for certiorari, 
the government also contended that the law 
should never have been subjected to First 
Amendment scrutiny because it did not alter 
. copyright law's traditional First Amendment 
safeguards: the idea/expression dichotomy 
and the doctrine of fair use. 
The Comi's ruling may have profound 
consequences, both legally and practically. 
First, the Court is likely to provide 
additional guidance as to when and how 
Congress may tinker with copyright law. 
Second, if the Court approves § 514, it may 
send a chilling message to the myriad 
individuals and institutions that reproduce 
and distribute public domain works, from 
orchestras and publishers to libraries and 
other archives. 
For example, libraries seeking to provide 
online access to their collections need 
reliable conclusions as to whether those 
collections are in the public domain. 
Libraries follow a statutory e4ception that 
allows them to lend out material that may be 
covered by valid copyright. 17 U.S.C. 108. 
However, it is not always clear that this 
exception applies to digitally preserving and 
providing access to some materials, leaving 
libraries and archives at potential risk when 
they provide access to digital materials for 
which they do not have explicit rights or 
about which they are not certain as to the 
materials' public domain status. 
Amicus filers in support of the appellants 
argue that a stable public domain helps 
librarians to do the crucial work of 
preserving and promoting access to the 
cultural commons. They point out that new 
technologies are sputTing that progress by 
allowing libraries and other archivists to 
make more works more accessible to more 
people than ever before, and they warn that 
newly unstable public domain would inhibit 
such development. 
For copyright lawyers, librarians or the 
many musicians, artists, writers, publishers 
andlor readers who use public domain 
works, this case will be one to watch. 
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"Once in the Public's Hands, 
Now Back in Picasso's" 
New York Times 
March 22,2011 
Adam Liptak 
Supreme Court arguments often concern not 
just the narrow issue in the case but also the 
implications of a ruling. You sometimes 
catch the justices squinting, trying to see 
over the legal horizon. 
Nine years ago, for instance, the court heard 
. arguments in a case about whether Congress 
was free to add 20 years of copyright 
protection for works that had not yet entered 
the public domain. 
Several justices asked about a different and 
even tougher question: Was Congress also 
free to restore copyright protection to works 
that had entered the public domain and 
become public property? 
"If Congress tomorrow wants to give a 
copyright to a publisher solely for the 
purpose of publishing and disseminating 
Ben Jonson, Shakespeare, it can db it?" 
Justice Stephen G. Breyer asked a lawyer for 
the government. 
"It may," said the lawyer, Theodore B. 
Olson, who was United States solicitor 
general at the time. But he did not sound too 
sure. 
A little later, Justice David H. Souter 
pressed Mr. Olson on the same point and 
elicited the concession that restoring a 
copyright presented a much harder case. 
"There is a bright line there" for "something 
that has already gone into the public 
domain," Mr. Olson said. 
Justice Souter seemed satisfied. "If· you 
don't throw out a line there," he said, "then 
Ben Jonson certainly gets recopyrighted." 
The court ended up ruling, by a 7-to-2 vote 
in 2003 in Eldred v. Ashcroft, that 
extensions for works still under copyright 
are allowed. 
This month, the court agreed to hear a case 
on the question Justices Breyer and Souter 
anticipated, one that will test whether there 
is indeed a constitutional line Congress may 
not cross when it comes to the public 
domain. 
The new case asks whether Congress acted 
constitutionally in 1994 by restoring 
copyrights in foreign works that had 
belonged to the public, including films by 
Alfred Hitchcock and Federico Fellini, 
books by C. S. Lewis and Virginia Woolf, 
symphonies by Prokofiev and Stravinsky 
and paintings by Picasso, including 
"Guernica." 
"The works that qualify for copyright 
restoration probably number in the 
millions," Marybeth Peters, the United 
States register of copyrights, said in 1996. 
The plaintiffs in the new case, Golan v. 
Holder, are orchestra conductors, teachers 
and film archivists who say they had relied 
for years on the free availability of works in 
the public domain that they had performed, 
adapted and distributed. 
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The 1994 law,they told the justices, "did 
something unprecedented in the history of 
American intellectual property law and 
constitutionally profound." 
Lawrence Golan, the lead plaintiff, teaches 
conducting at the University of Denver and 
is the music director .and conductor of the 
Yakima Symphony Orchestra in Washington 
State. He said the 1994 law made it very 
difficult for smaller orchestras to play some 
seminal 20th-century works that had once 
been a standard part of their repertories. 
"Once you own a Beethoven symphony, you 
own it till it falls apart," he said. "That used 
to be the case with Stravinsky, Shostakovich 
and Prokofiev. Now an orchestra that wants 
to play, say, Shostakovich's Fifth has to rent 
it for $800 for one performance." 
He said he had no quarrel with providing 
financial incentives to people who create art. 
"Obviously, current composers need to be 
encouraged to create their works, and they 
should be getting royalties," Mr. Golan said. 
But he said withdrawing works from the 
. public domain did great harm to the cultural 
life of small communities for no good 
reason. 
That analysis, Mr. Golan's lawyers say, is 
consistent with the constitutional .balance 
between property and speech. The 
Constitution authorizes Congress "to 
promote the progress of science and llseful 
mis, by securing for limited times to authors 
and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries." 
In other words, said Anthony T. Falzone of 
the Stanford Law School Center for Internet 
and Society, which represents the plaintiffs, 
the Constitution meant to create incentives, 
not monopolies. "The whole point wasn't to 
protect stuff," he said. "It was to encourage 
people to make stuff, and ev~rybody' s lost 
sight of that." 
The government counters that nothing in the 
1994 law did damage to the constitutional 
structure or to free speech rights. 
The government adds that the 1994 law 
applies to foreign works "previously 
ineligible for protection or whose authors 
were unfamiliar with the technicalities of 
United States law." Every work brought 
back· into. copyright protection, the 
government says, "expires on the same day 
as if the work had been protected since its 
creation. " 
The federal appeals court in Denver, in 
upholding the law, said there were important 
First Amendment interests at stake on both 
sides. It concluded that there was reason to 
think that American authors and artists 
would be better off abroad if foreign authors 
and artists received expanded copyright 
protection here. 
That economic calculation rankled Mr. 
Falzone. "You're selling public property," 
he said. "Congress literally took the public's 
property and handed it over to foreign 
copyright owners." 
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"Supreme Court Takes Up Scholars' Rights" 
The Chronicle of Higher Education 
May29,2011 
Marc Parry 
When Lawrence Golan picks up his baton 
here at the University of Denver, the 
musicians in his student orchestra see a 
genial conductor who corrects their mistakes 
without raising his voice in frustration. 
Yet Mr. Golan is frustrated, not with the 
musicians, but with a copyright law that 
does them harm. For 10 years, the music 
professor has been quietly waging a legal 
campaign to overturn the statute, which 
makes it impossibly expensive for smaller 
orchestras to play certain pieces of music. 
Now the case is heading to the u.s. 
Supreme Court. The high-stakes copyright 
showdown affects far more than sheet 
music. The outcome will touch a broad 
swath of academe for years to come, 
dictating what materials scholars can use in 
books and courses without jumping through 
legal hoops. The law Mr. Golan is trying to 
overturn has also hobbled libraries' efforts 
. to digitize and share books, films, and 
music. 
The conductor's fight centers on the concept 
of the public domain, which scholars depend 
on for teaching and research. When a work 
enters the public domain, anyone can quote 
from it, copy it, share it, or republish it 
without . seeking permission or paying 
royalties. 
The dispute that led to Golan v. Holder 
dates to 1994, when Congress passed a law 
that moved vast amounts of material from 
the public domain back behind the firewall 
of copyright protection. For conductors like 
. Mr. Golan, that step limited access to 
canonical 20th-century Russian pieces that' 
had been freely played for years. 
"It was a shocking change," Mr. Golan says 
over dinner at a tacos-and-margaritas dive 
near the University of Denver's mountain-
framed campus. "You used to be able to buy 
Prokofiev, Shostakovich, Stravinsky. All of 
a sudden, on one day, you couldn't 
anymore." 
Other works once available but now 
restricted include books by H.G. Wells, 
Virginia Woolf, and C.S. Lewis; films by 
Alfred Hitchcock, Federico Fellini, and Jean 
Renoir; and artwork byM.C. Escher and 
Pablo Picasso. The U.S. Copyright Office 
estimated that the works qualifying for 
copyright restoration "probably number in 
the millions." 
Congress approved the recopyrighting, 
limited to foreign works, to align U. S. policy 
with an international copyright treaty. But 
the Golan plaintiffs-. a group that includes 
educators, performers, and film archivists-
argue that bigger principles are at stake. 
Does Congress have the constitutional right 
to' remove works from the public domain? 
And if it does, what's stopping it from 
plucking out even more freely available 
works? 
"If you can't rely on the status of something 
in the public domain today-that is, if you 
never know whether Congress is going to 
act again and yank it out-you're going to 
be a lot more cautious about doing anything 
with these materials," says Mr. Golan's 
lawyer, Anthony Falzone, executive director 
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of the Fair Use Project and a lecturer in law 
at Stanford Law School. "You really destroy 
the value and the usefulness of the public 
domain in a profound way if the rug can be 
pulled out from under you at any time." 
The Radicalization of Golan 
Before the rug was yanked out from under 
hUn, Mr. Golan had no experience as an 
activist. He still doesn't seem like one. 
Outside the orchestra pit, the conductor 
could pass for an off-duty businessman: trim 
build, clean-cut dark hair, slacks,waist-
length tan jacket. The tenured professor has 
taught conducting and led the 80-student 
Lamont Symphony Orchestra at this private 
university since 2001. Yet he has done little 
to publicize his cause on campus, at least 
jUdging from the reactions of others in the 
music school one recent evening as the halls 
buzzed with costumed nuns· rehearsing 
Pucci!}i's Suor Angelica. 
"No!" said one professor after hearing that 
Mr. Golan's case was going to Washington. 
"Are you making it up?" asked another. 
Mr. Golan keeps a low profile as.a plaintiff 
because his life is about music, not 
litigation. "1 would love to have my name go 
down in history like Arturo Toscanini, for 
being the greatest conductor of all time," he 
says. 
But because his quest for that glory 
coincides with a broad shift in the reach of 
copyright law, he has a better shot at going 
down in history as the capitalized name atop 
a Supreme Court opinion studied by future 
generations of law students. 
The· son of a violinist in the Chicago 
Symphony Orchestra, Mi. Golan was just 
starting his own professional career when 
Congress passed the copyright restoration. 
The change was surprising from a 
philosophical point of view: Under 
copyright law, the Constitution grants 
authors a limited monopoly over their works 
as an incentive to promote creativity. Over 
the years, Congress has often delayed the 
passage of works into the public domain by 
lengthening the duration of copyright terms. 
But removing pieces· already there was 
different, Mr. Golan's lawyers argue, a 
radical change in what one scholar describes 
as the basic "physics" of the public domain. 
That may sound abstract, but the impact on 
Mr. Golan was direct. When a work is in the 
public domain-that Puccini opera, say-an 
orchestra can buy the sheet music. 
Symphonies typically costabout $150. And 
the orchestra can keep those pages forever, 
preserving the instructions that librarians 
laboriously pencil into scores. But works 
under copyright are typically available only 
for rent. And the cost is significantly higher: 
about $600 for one performance. With the 
flip of a switch, the new law restored 
copyright to thousands of pieces. 
For big-city orchestras like the New York 
Philharmonic, that change is like a 
"mosquito bite," Mr. Golan says. But Mr. 
Golan's university ensemble gets only about 
$4,000 to rent and buy music each year. 
That means it can perform some copyrighted 
works but must rely on the public domain 
for about 80 percent of its repertoire. And 
$4,000 is relatively generous. Other colleges 
might have only $500 to spend on music. 
When the Conductors Guild surveyed its 
1,600 members, 70 percent of respondents 
said they were now priced out of performing 
pieces previously in the public domain. 
Teaching suffers, too. Every year, for 
example, University of Denver students 
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compete for the honor of playing a concerto, 
a piece in which the orchestra accompanies 
a solo instrument. But when a pianist wanted 
to audition with a piano concerto by 
Prokofiev, a Russian composer who died in 
1953, Mr. Golan was forced to tell her no. 
"It's one that any aspiring pianist needs to 
learn, and to have the experience of actually 
playing it with orchestra is phenomenal," 
Mr. Golan says. But "we just didn't have the 
money in the orchestra budget to pay the 
rental price." 
The problem soon got worse. In 1998, after 
lobbying by entertainment groups like the 
Walt Disney Company, Congress passed 
another law, extending copyrights by 20 
years. This Copyright Term Extension 
Act-mocked by. critics as the Mickey 
Mouse Protection Act-meant that a work 
would not enter the public domain until up 
to 70 years after its cn;ator's death. 
That legal one-two punch made it hard for 
Mr. Golan to' play both foreign and 
American works, like Gershwin's Rhapsody 
in Blue. 
In response to those changes, reform-minded 
academics at top law schools fought back 
with multiple lawsuits challenging the 
constitutionality of the statutes. The 
conductor's tale made him an ideal poster 
child for their war to protect the public 
domain. 
Reformers suffered a defeat in 2003, when 
the Supreme Court rejected an online book 
publisher'S challenge of the 20-year 
extension. In that case, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
the court found the change acceptable in part 
because it had not "altered the traditional 
contours of copyright protection." 
Think of the Golan case as "Eldred, the 
Sequel." Only this time the question isn't 
whether Congress can delay works' from 
entering the public domain. It's whether' 
removing works already there is a "bright 
line" Congress can't cross. 
'Fairly Horrible' 
If . that bright line dims, scholars and 
librarians will have problems. To understand 
why, consider the copyright confusion faced 
by Elizabeth Townsend-Gard. 
Ms. Townsend-Gard is an associate 
professor at Tulane University Law School. 
As' a graduate student in the 1990s, she 
studied history at the University . of 
California at Los Angeles. Her dissertation 
. was a biography of Vera Brittain, a British 
author known for her W orId War I 
autobiography, Testament of Youth. Ms. 
Townsend-Gard mined letters, diaries, 
photos, and other texts for her research. But 
she worried about getting permission to 
publish' materials she needed, because Ms. 
Brittain's literary executor, too, was writing 
a biography of the author. 
In 1996 the ground shifted under Ms. 
Townsend-Gard's feet. At the outset of her 
research, almost all the works she needed 
had been in the public domain. When she 
finished, because of the restoration now 
under attack by Mr. Golan, almost all those 
works were under copyright. 
She ultimately diversified her project so that 
it became a comparative biography of many 
subjects rather than just one. But she also 
grew fascinated with the copyright 
complexities surrounding the daily work of 
historians. Ms. Townsend-Gard ended up 
going to law school after finishing her 
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Ph.D., and invented a software tool, called 
the Durationator, designed to tell users the 
copyright status of any work. 
The market of scholars who might need that 
tool is large. The law at stake in Golan alone 
potentially affects anyone studying works 
created or published by non-U.S. authors or 
publishers from 1923 to 1989. Most of those 
materials were in the public domain before. 
Now they are covered by a complicated 
copyright statute, says Ms. Townsend-Gard. 
"For people who work on the 20th century, 
it's fairly horrible," she says. 
Now pull back from the view of an 
individual scholar, and imagine you are 
working on one of the numerous projects to 
make millions of digital books available 
online. Libraries, archives, Google: 
Copyright restoration has big consequences 
for their digitization efforts. Most of those 
ventures will· not publish the full texts of 
works online unless they are clearly in the 
public domain in the United States. 
But when it comes to a foreign book, 
figuring out its copyright status can require a 
mammoth investigation. That's because a. 
work must have been under copyright in its . 
home country to qualify for restoration in 
the United States, says Kenneth D. Crews, 
director of the copyright advisory office at 
Columbia University Libraries. So, for 
example, when Columbia considers 
digitizing a rare trove of Chinese books, 
including many from the 1920s and 1930s of 
great interest to scholars, its staff must grasp 
the legal nuances of a country that has gone 
through a revolution-and a transformation 
of copyright law-since the books were 
published. Or must try to, anyway. 
And if the law is unclear, the university 
must decide whether digitization is worth 
risking a potentially expensive lawsuit 
should a rights-holder turn up later. 
"It's deterring digitization on anything 
foreign," Ms. Townsend-Gard . says, 
"because people can't figure it out." 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th 
Circuit took a different view. In a 2010 
ruling backing the government, it stressed 
the argument that recopyrighting foreign 
works that had fallen into our public domain 
was crucial to protecting American authors ' 
interests abroad. Our restoration of those 
copyrights could drive other countries to 
grant retroactive copyrights to contemporary 
American works that had fallen into their 
public domains. 
And big money is at stake. The court quoted 
Congressional testimony from the mid-
1990s in which a group representing 
publishers, record companies, and other 
copyright-based industries estimated that 
billions were being lost each year because 
foreign countries were failing to provide 
copyright· protections to u.S.-originated 
works. The recording industry told 
lawmakers that there were "vastly more U.S. 
works currently unprotected in foreign 
markets than foreign ones here." 
The government, in its Supreme Court brief, 
. pointed out that the copyright restorations 
were limited in scope. They applied to 
foreign works whose creators weren't 
familiar with U:S. copyright procedures, for 
example. Other works restored were 
previously ineligible for protection. 
The Supreme Court is· expected to decide the 
case during the term that begins in October. 
Mr. Golan hopes to be in Washington to 
watch. Unless, that is, he has a concert to. 
conduct. 
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"Tenth Circuit Victory for 
Copyright Owners" 
LexisNexis Communities Copyright & Trademark Law Blog 
June 22, 2010 
Henry Z. Horbaczewski 
A maj or victory for copyright owners was 
rendered today by the Tenth Circuit u.s. 
Court of Appeals in Golan v. Holder, in 
which Reed Elsevier participated in a friend-
of-court brief supporting the us 
Government. 
The case involved the constitutionality of 
Section 514 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act ("URAA") (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109) a 
federal statute restoring copyright to works 
of other treaty partners that were still in 
copyright in their c'ountries of origin but had 
fallen into the public domain in the United 
States. The plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutionality of the law as a restriction 
on free speech, asserting that the law should 
be subjected to a "strict standard" or review, 
that compliance with the Berne Convention 
was an insufficiently important public 
purpose to justify the restraints on their use 
of the foreign works at issue, and, most 
importantly, that the public domain was a 
form of Constitutional sanctuary from which 
works could not be removed once they had 
entered it. 
Originally the District COUli rejected the 
Constitutional challenge, but on appeal the 
Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded to the 
District Court to consider the free speech 
(First Amendment) issue. The District COUli 
then dutifully ruled the statute 
unconstitutional as violative of the First 
Amendment. This time, the Tenth Circuit 
reversed the second ruling and upheld the 
statute. 
For US copyright owners, the most 
significant points of the decision are: 
Compliance with the Berne Convention is a 
"substantial" government interest. 
In balancing the free speech equities, 
"Copyright also serves authors' First' 
Amendment interests." The free speech 
argument is not a one-way street. 
The "inviolable" public domain argument 
was squarely rejected: "[P]laintiffs have 
provided no legal support for their claim that 
the First Amendment-either by itself or 
informed by any other provision of the 
Constitution-draws such absolute, bright 
lines around the public domain, and we are 
aware of no such authority." 
The Tenth Circuit did not confront the 
Supreme Court's language in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft that copyright law does not conflict 
with the First Amendment so long as the 
"traditional contours of copyright," are 
preserved, language with the some 
academics have interpreted as prohibiting an 
material change, from the structure of 
copyright in the 1790's including, for 
example, the elimination of formalities 
under the Berne, Convention, but finessed 
the issue as follows: "We note that copyright 
includes several "built-in" First Amendment 
protections. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20. The 
idea/expression dichotomy ensures that only 
particular expressions, and not ideas 
themselves, are subject to copyright 
protection. Id Additionally, the fair use 
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defense allows individuals to use 
expressions contained in a copyrighted work 
under certain circumstances, including 
"criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching ... scholarship, or research ... and 
even for· parody." Id. (quotations and 
citation omitted). Section 514 does not 
disturb these, traditional, built-in 
protections[ empahis supplied], and thus, 
such protected speech remains unburdened." 
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Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC 
10-553 
Ruling Below: E.E.o.c. v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, 597 F.3d 
769 (6th Cif. 2010), cert granted, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011). 
Plaintiff Cheryl Perich was a 'called' teacher at defendant Hosanna-Tabor, a religiously affiliated 
school, until academic year 2004-2005 when she went on disability and was diagnosed with 
narcolepsy. Her duties as a teacher included teaching secular subjects using secular materials and 
approximately forty-five minutes of teligious activities each· day. Halfway through academic 
year 2004-2005, Perich was medically cleared to return to work. Perich attempted to do so but 
was informed her position had been filled by a substitute the school had contracted with through 
the end of the year. Perich refused to leave the building until she was given a letter indicating she 
had appeared for work. The school offered her a deal whereby she would resign her call and they 
would pay a portion of her insurance premiums through December of 2005. Perich refused this 
deal and was eventually terminated. The school cited disruptive behavior and characterized 
Perich's conduct as regrettable. Perich filed a complaint with the EEOC under the ADA and the 
EEOC filed suit against Hosanna-Tabor· on her behalf, alleging discrimination and retaliation. 
The District Court awarded summary jUdgment to Hosanna-Tabor, holding that Perich's duties 
placed her under the ministerial exception of the ADA. On appeal, the 6th Circuit vacated and 
remanded, applying a primary duties test and finding that Perich's duties were primarily secular 
and thus the ministerial exception did not apply. 
Question Presented: Whether the ministerial exception, which prohibits most employment-
related lawsuits against religious organizations by employees performing religious· functions, 
applies to a teacher at a religious elementary school who teaches the full secular curriculum, but 
also teaches daily religion classes, is a commissioned minister, and regularly leads students in 
prayer and worship. 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cheryl 
Perich, Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH AND SCHOOL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
Filed March 09,2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
CLAY, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiffs, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC") and Cheryl Perich, 
.appeal from the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School ("Hosanna-
Tabor") in this action alleging 
discrimination in violation of the Americans 
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with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 
12117(a) (the "ADA"). For the reasons set 
forth below, we VACATE the district 
court's order and REMAND the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this 
OpInIOn. 
BACKGROUND 
This case arises out of Perich's employment 
relationship with Hosanna-Tabor, which 
terminated Perich from her teaching position 
on April 11, 2005. Hosanna-Tabor, an 
ecclesiastical corporation affiliated with the 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (the 
"LCMS"), operates a church and school in 
Redford, Michigan. The school teaches 
kindergarten through eighth grades. The 
faculty consists of two types of teachers: (1) 
"lay" or "contract" teachers, and (2) "called" 
teachers. Contract teachers are hired by the 
Board of Education for one-year renewable 
terms of employment. Called teachers are 
hired by the voting members of the 
Hosanna-Tabor church congregation upon 
the recommendation of the Board of 
Education, Board of Elders, and Board of 
Directors. Called teachers are hired on an 
open-ended basis and cannot be summarily 
dismissed without cause. They can also 
apply for a housing allowance on their 
income taxes provided that they are 
conducting activities "in the exercise of the 
ministry." 
To be eligible for a "call," a teacher must 
complete the colloquy classes required by 
the LCMS, which focus on various aspects 
of the Christian faith. After completing the 
colloquy, a teacher receives a certificate of 
admission into the teaching ministry, and the 
Michigan District of the LCMS places the 
teacher's name on a list that can be accessed 
by schools that need teachers. Once selected 
by a congregation, a called teacher receives 
the title of "commissioned minister." 
In July 1999, Hosanna-Tabor hired Perich as 
a contract teacher to teach kindergarten on a 
one year contract from August 15, 1999 to 
June 15, 2000. After Perich completed the 
required colloquy classes at Concordia 
College in February 2000, Hosanna-Tabor 
hired Perich as a called teacher on March 
29, 2000.. Perich continued teaching 
kindergarten until the end of the 2002-2003 
year. She taught fourth grade during the 
2003-2004 school year, and she was 
assigned to teach third and fourth grades for 
the 2004-2005 school year. From the time 
she was hired as a called teacher until her 
termination, Perich was listed as a 
commissioned minister in the LCMS. At 
least once during her tenure, Perich claimed 
the housing allowance on her income taxes. 
After Perich was hired as a called teacher, 
her employment duties remained identical to 
the duties she performed as a contract 
teacher. Perich taught math, language arts; 
social studies, science, gym, art, and music. 
Language arts instruction included reading, 
English, spelling, and handwriting. Music 
instruction included secular music theory 
and playing the recorder, using the same 
music book as the local public school. 
During the 2003-2004 school year, Perich 
taught computer training as well. 
Perich also taught a religion class four days 
per week for thirty minutes, and she 
attended a chapel service with her class once 
a week for thirty minutes. Approximately 
twice a year, Perich led the chapel service in 
rotation with other teachers. Perich also led 
each class in prayer three times a day for a 
total of approximately five or six minutes. 
During her final year at Hosanna-Tabor, 
Perich's fourth grade class engaged in a 
devotional for five to ten minutes each 
morning. In all, activities devoted to religion 
consumed approximately forty-five minutes 
of the seven hour school day. 
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Hosanna-Tabor's website indicates that the 
school provides a "Christ-centered 
education" that helps parents by "reinforcing 
bible principals [sic] and standards." 
Hosanna-Tabor describes its staff members 
as '·'fine Christian role models who integrate 
faith into all subjects." Perich valued the 
freedom a sectarian school afforded to 
"bring God into every subject taught in the 
classroom." However, Perich taught secular 
subjects using secular textbooks commonly 
used in public schools,and she can only 
recall two instances in her career when she 
introduced religion into secular subjects. 
. Furthermore, Hosanna-Tabor does not 
require teachers to be called or even 
. Lutheran. Non-Lutheran teachers have 
identical responsibilities as Lutheran 
teachers, including teaching religion classes 
and leading chapel service. Members of the 
custodial staff and at least one teacher who 
worked at Hosanna-Tabor were not 
Lutheran. 
At a church golf outing in June 2004, Perich 
suddenly became ill and was taken to the 
hospital. She underwent a series of medical 
tests to determine the cause. Perich's doctors 
had not reached a definitive diagnosis by 
August, and Hosanna-Tabor administrators 
suggested that Perich apply for a disability 
leave of absence for the 2004-2005 school 
year. The principal of Hosanna-Tabor, Stacy 
Hoeft, informed Perich that she would "still 
have ajob with [Hosanna-Tabor]" when she 
regained her health. Perich agreed to take a 
disability leave and did not return to work at 
the beginning of the 2004-2005 school year. 
Throughout her leave, Perich regularly 
provided Hoeft with updates about her 
condition and progress. 
On December 16, 2004, Perich informed 
Hoeft by email that her doctor had 
confirmed a diagnosis of narcolepsy and that 
she would be able to return to work in two to 
three months once she was. stabilized on 
medication. On January 19, 2005, Hoeft 
asked Perich to begin considering and 
discussing with her doctor what she might 
be able to do upon return. Perich responded 
the same day that she· had discussed her 
work day and teaching responsibilities with 
her doctor, and he had assured her that she 
would be fully functional with the assistance 
of medication. Perich reiterated this 
sentiment with additional explanation on 
January 21, 2005. 
Also on January 21, 2005, Hoeft informed 
Perich that the school board intended to 
amend the employee handbook to request 
that employees on disability for more than 
six months resign their calls to allow 
Hosanna-Tabor to responsibly fill their 
positions. Such resignations would not 
necessarily prevent reinstatement of these 
employees' calls upon their return to health. 
Perich had been on disability for more than 
five months when she received this email. 
On January27, 2005, Perich wrote to Hoeft 
that she would be able to return to work 
between February 14 and February 28,2005. 
Hoeft· responded with surprise, because 
Perich had indicated a few days before that 
she . had been unable to complete her 
disability forms because of her condition. 
Hoeft expressed concern that Perich's 
condition would jeopardize the safety of the 
students in her care. Hoeft also indicated 
that Perich would not be teaching the third 
and fourth grades upon return, because the 
substitute teacher had a contract that ran 
through the end of the school year.! 
Furthermore, she indicated that the third and 
fourth grade students had already had two 
teachers that year and having a third would 
not provide a good learning environment for 
them. 
Three days later, at the annual 
congregational "shareholder" meeting, Hoeft 
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and the school board ~xpressed their opinion 
that it was unlikely that Perich would be 
physically capable of returning to work that 
school year or the next. Consequently, the 
congregation adopted the Board's proposal 
to request that Perich accept a peaceful 
release agreement wherein Perich would 
resign her call in exchange for the 
congregation paying for a portion of her 
health .. insurance premiums through 
December 2005. On February 7, 2005, the 
Board selected Chairman Scott Salo to 
discuss this proposal with Perich. 
On February 8, 2005, Perich's doctor gave 
her a written release to return t6 work 
without restrictions on February 22, 2005. 
The next day Salo contacted Perich to 
discuss her employment. Perich instead 
requested to meet with the entire school 
board. At the meeting on February 13,2005, 
the Board presented the peaceful release 
proposal, and Perich responded by 
presenting her work release note. The Board 
continued . to express· concerns about 
Perich's ability to supervise students for the 
entire day. Perich explained that, as of her 
doctor's release on February 22, 2005, she 
would no longer be eligible for disability 
coverage and would be required to return to 
work. The Board, however, continued to 
request that Perich resign and asked her to 
respond to the peaceful release proposal by 
February 21,2005. 
Shortly after 9:00 p.m. on February 21, 
2005, Perich emailed Hoeft to confirm that 
she had decided not to resign from her 
position and that she planned to return to 
work in the morning. When Perich reported 
to work on February 22, 2005, the school 
did not have a job for her. Because the 
school handbook states that failure to return 
to work on the first day following the 
expiration of an approved medical leave 
may be considered a voluntary termination, 
Perich refused to leave school grounds until 
she received a letter acknowledging that she 
appeared for work. Perich received a letter 
signed by Hoeft and Salo, which said that 
Perich had provided improper notification of 
her return to work and asked that she 
continue her leave to allow the congregation 
a chance to develop a possible plan for her 
return. Perich took the letter and left the 
premises. 
Later that day, Perich spoke with Hoeft over 
the phone. Hoeft told Perich that she would 
likely be fired, and Perich told Hoeft that 
she would assert her legal rights against 
discrimination if they were unable to reach a 
compromise. Perich asked Hoeft to transmit 
that information to the Board. Perich also 
. sent Hoeff an email stating that her doctor 
had reaffirmed that she was healthy and 
ready to return to work. Following the 
~oard's meeting on February 22, 2005, Salo 
sent Perich a letter describing Perich's 
conduct as "regrettable" and indicating that 
the Board would review the process of 
rescinding her call based on her disruptive 
behavior. 
On March 19, 2005, Salo sent Perich a 
follow-up letter stating that, based on 
Perich's insubordination and disruptive 
behavior on February 22, 2005, the Board 
would request rescinding Perich's call at the 
next voter's meeting on April 10, 2005. The 
letter also stated that Perich had "damaged, 
beyond repair" her working relationship 
with Hosanna-Tabor by "threatening to take 
legal action," and it laid out the voting 
procedure by which the congregation could 
depose a called minister. Finally, the letter 
again proposed the peaceful release offer 
and gave Perich until April 8, 2005 to accept 
the offer. 
On March 21, 2005, Perich's lawyer sent a 
letter to Hosanna-Tabor' s lawyer stating that 
Hosanna-Tabor's actions amounted to 
unlawful discrimination. The letter asked 
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Hosanna-Tabor to respond seeking an 
amicable resolution to the matter, or else 
Perich would be forced to bring a lawsuit or 
file a complaint with the EEOC. On April 
10, 2005; the congregation voted to rescind 
Perich's call. The next day, Salo informed 
Perich of her termination. 
On May 17, 2005, Perich filed a charge of 
discrimination and retaliation with the 
EEOC alleging that Hosanna-Tabor had 
discriminated and retaliated against her in 
violation of her rights under the ADA. On 
September 28, 2007, the EEOC filed a 
complaint against Hosanna-Tabor in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan alleging one count of 
retaliation in violation of the ADA. Perich 
and Hosanna-Tabor each filed motions for 
summary judgment on July 15, 2008. On 
October 23, 2008, the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Hosanna-
Tabor, dismissing the claim on the grounds 
that the court could not inquire into her 
claims of retaliation because they fell within 
the "ministerial exception" to the ADA. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews de novo a district court's 
order of dismissal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1). Although the district 
court issued its decision in the context of a 
summary judgment motion, the court 
dismissed Perich's claim based on a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction and did not reach 
the merits of the claim. In addition, this 
Circuit has treated the "ministerial 
exception" as jurisdictional in nature and an 
appropriate ground for a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Accordingly, this 
Court should review the claim using the 
same analysis as it does for an order entered 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). 
In response to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proving 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, "unlike Rule 
12(b )( 6) analysis, under which the existence 
of genuine issues of material fact warrants . 
denial of the motion to' dismiss, 'the court is 
empowered to resolve factual disputes when 
subject matter jurisdiction is challenged.'" If 
the district court makes its jurisdictional 
ruling based on the resolution of both legal 
and factual disputes, this Court reviews the 
legal findings under a de novo standard and 
the factual findings under a clearly 
erroneous standard. 
Perich argues that no facts relevant to the 
determination of subject matter jurisdiction 
were in dispute and, thus, this Court should 
review de novo all of the district court's 
findings .. Hosanna-Tabor argues the district 
court made a number of factual findings in 
determining that the court had no subject 
matter jurisdiction, including Hosanna-
Tabor's status as a "religious institution" 
and Perich's status as a "minister" and 
"ministerial employee." Thus, according to 
Hosanna-Tabor, this Court should review 
these factual findings under the clearly. 
erroneous standard. 
The district court made both factual and 
legal findings in determining whether the 
court had subject matter jurisdiction. The 
district court's determinations concerning 
Perich's primary duties throughout her work 
day were factual. Accordingly, this Court 
must accept these factual findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous. However, its 
decision as to whether Perich classified as a 
ministerial employee remains a legal 
conclusion subject to de novo review. 
II. The ADA's Application to Religious 
Organizations 
The ADA generally prohibits an employer 
with fifteen or more employees from 
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discriminating against a qualified individual 
with a disability on the basis of that 
disability in regard to all conditions of. 
employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5), § 
12112(a). The retaliation provision of the 
ADA prohibits employers from 
"discriminat[ing] against any individual 
because such individual has opposed any act 
or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or 
because such individual made a charge ... 
under [the ADA]." Title I of the ADA 
includes an exception-known as the 
"ministerial exception"-which allows 
religious entities to give "preference in 
employment to individuals of a particular 
religion" and to "require that all applicants 
and employees conform to the religious 
tenants of such organization." 42 U.S.C. § 
121 13 (d). 
However, the legislative history makes clear 
that Congress intended the ADA to broadly 
protect employees of religious entities from 
retaliation on the job, subject only to a 
narrowly drawn religious exemption. The 
House Report provides the following 
illustrative hypothetical example: 
[A]ssume that a Mormon 
organization wishes to hire only 
Mormons to perform certain jobs. If 
a person with a disability applies for 
the job, but is not a Mormon, the 
organization can refuse to hire him 
or her. However, if two Mormons 
apply for a job, one with a disability 
and one without a disability, the 
organization cannot discriminate 
against the applicant with the 
disability because of that person's 
disability. 
H.R.Rep. No. 485 part 2, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 76-77 (1990). 
III. The Ministerial Exception 
The ministerial exception is rooted in the 
First Amendment's guarantees of religious 
freedom. 
A. Interference in Church Governance 
As applied by this Circuit, the doctrine 
"precludes subject matter jurisdiction over 
claims involving' the employment 
relationship between a religious institution 
and its ministerial employees, based on the 
institution's constitutional right to be free 
from judicial interference in the selection of 
those employees." 
As the Fifth Circuit noted in McClure v. 
Salvation Army, one of the first cases to 
analyze the ministerial exception, "[t]he 
relationship between an· organized church 
and its ministers is its lifeblood. The 
minister is the chief instrument by which the 
church seeks to fulfill its purpose." 460 F.2d 
at 558-59. 
While the ministerial exception was first 
applied in the context of suits brought 
against religious employers' under Title VII, 
the exception has been extended to suits 
brought against religious employers under 
the ADA. 
For the ministerial exception to bar an 
employment discrimination claim, two 
factors must be present: (1) the employer 
must be a religious institution, and (2) the 
employee must be a ministerial employee. 
To qualify as a' religious institution under 
the first prong, the employer need not be a 
traditional religious organization, such as a 
church, diocese, or synagogue, nor must it 
be an entity operated by a traditional 
religious organization. Rather, a religiously 
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affiliated entity is considered a religious 
institution if its "mission is marked by clear 
or obvious religious characteristics." This 
Circuit has applied the ministerial exception 
to a religiously affiliated hospital, and it has 
explicitly approved of applying the doctrine 
to religiously affiliated schools and 
corporations. 
To determine whether an employee is 
ministerial under the second prong, this 
Circuit has instructed courts to look at the 
function, or "primary duties" of the 
employee. As a general rule, an employee is 
considered a minister if "the employee's 
primary duties consist of teaching, spreading 
the faith, church governance, supervision of 
a religious . order, or superViSIOn or 
participation in religious ritual and 
worship." In extending the ministerial 
exception beyond ordained ministers, this 
Circuit has instructed courts to look at the 
function of the plaintiffs employment 
position rather than the fact of ordination. 
Other circuits have further instructed that 
. courts must "determine whether a position is 
important to the spiritual and pastoral 
mission of the church." The parties in the 
instant case do not dispute that "religious 
institutions" include religiously affiliated 
schools and that Hosanna-Tabor meets this 
requirement. Thus, the first requirement 
under the ministerial exception is present, 
and the primary issue is whether Perich 
served as a ministerial employee. 
The question of whether a teacher at a 
sectarian school classifies as a ministerial 
employee is one of first impression for this 
Court. However, the overwhelming majority 
of courts that have considered the issue have 
held that parochial school teachers such as 
Perich, who teach primarily secular subjects, 
do not classify. as ministerial employees for 
purposes of the exception. 
By contrast, when courts have found that 
teachers classify as ministerial employees 
for purposes of the exception, those teachers 
have generally taught primarily religious 
subjects or had a central role in the spiritual 
or pastoral mission of the church. 
The district court's factual detelminations 
concerning Perich's primary duties 
throughout her work day were not clearly 
erroneous. The record supports the finding 
that Perich's employment duties were 
identical when she was a contract teacher 
and a called teacher and that she taught 
math, language arts, social studies, science, 
gym, art, and music using secular textbooks. 
Furthermore, the record indicates that Perich 
taught a religion class four days per week 
for thirty minutes and that she attended a 
chapel service with her class once a week 
for thirty minutes. Perich also led each class 
in prayer three times a day for a total of 
approximately five or six minutes. The 
record also indicates that Perich seldom 
introduced religion during secular 
discussions. Approximately twice a year, 
Perich led the chapel service in rotation with 
other teachers. However, teachers leading 
chapel or teaching religion were not required 
to be called or even Lutheran, and, in fact, at 
least one teacher was not. In all, the record 
supports the district court's finding that 
activities . devoted to religion consumed 
approximately forty-five minutes of the 
seven hour school day. 
However, given these factual findings 
relating to Perich's primary duties, the 
district court erred in its legal conclusion 
classifying Perich as a ministerial employee. 
Perich spent approximately six hours and 
fifteen minutes of her seven hour day 
teaching secular subjects, using secular 
textbooks, without inco['porating religion 
into the secular material. Thus, it is clear 
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· that Perich's primary function was teaching 
secular subjects, not "spreading the faith, 
church governance, supervision of a 
religious order, or supervision or 
participation in religious ritual and 
worship." 
The fact that Perich participated in and led 
some religious activities throughout the day 
does not make her primary function 
religious. This is underscored by the fact 
that teachers were not required to be .called 
or even Lutheran to conduct these religious 
activities, and at least one teacher at 
Hosanna-Tabor was not Lutheran. 
In addition, that Hosanna-Tabor has a 
generally religious character-as do all 
religious schools by d~finition-and 
characterizes its staff members as "fine 
Christian role models" does not transform 
Perich's primary responsibilities in the 
classroom into religious activities. This is 
underscored by the fact that Perich can only 
recall twice in her career when she 
introduced the topic of religion. during 
secular discussions. Similarly, Perich's extra 
religious training as a result of completing 
her colloquy did not affect the duties she 
performed in the classroom on a daily basis. . 
In finding that Perich was a ministerial 
employee, the district court relied largely on 
the fact that Hosanna-Tabor gave Perich the 
title of commissioned minister and held her 
out to the world as a minister by bestowing 
this title upon her. However, the title of 
commissioned minister does not transform 
the prim.ary duties of these called teachers 
from secular in nature to religious in nature. 
The governing primary duties analysis 
requires a court to objectively examine an 
employee's actual job function, not her title, 
in detennining whether she is properly 
classified as a minister. In this case, it is 
clear from the record that Perich's primary 
duties were secular, not only because she 
spent the overwhelming majority of her day 
tea.ching secular subjects using secular 
textbooks, but also because nothing in the 
record indicates that the Lutheran church 
relied on Perich as the primary means to 
indoctrinate its faithful into its theology. By 
contrast, in Clapper, the defendant schools 
envisioned their teachers as having a 
primarily religious role. The teachers were 
required to be "tithe paying members of the 
Seventh-day Adventist Church and' are 
expected to participate in church activities, 
programs, and finances." See Clapper, 1998 
WL 904528, at· *2. The Fourth Circuit 
observed that "[t]he purpose of this 
requirement is obvious-the Chesapeake 
Conference desires to insure that the minds 
of its youth are shaped by model members 
of the Seventh-day Adventist faith." 
Furthermore, the district court in the instant 
case found that the primary duties of called 
teachers are identical to those of contract 
teachers, who do· not have the title of 
minister, and at least one contract teacher 
who taught at the school was not Lutheran. 
Given the undisputed evidence that all 
teachers at Hosanna-Tabor were assigned 
the same duties, a finding that Perich is a 
"ministerial" employee would compel the 
conclusion that all teachers at the school-
called, contract, Lutheran, and non-
Lutheran-are similarly excluded from 
coverage under the ADA and other federal 
fair employment laws. However, the intent 
of the ministerial exception is to allow 
religious organizations to prefer members of 
their own religion and adhere to their own 
religious interpretations.· Thus, applying the 
exception to non-members of the religion 
and those whose primary function is not 
religious in nature would be both illogical 
and contrary to the intention behind the 
exception. 
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B. Interpretation of Church Doctrine 
In addition to being motivated by the 
concern of government interference in 
church governance, the ministerial exception 
is also motivated by the concern "that 
secular authorities would be involved in 
evaluating or interpreting religious 
doctrine. " 
In the instant case, Hosanna-Tabor has 
attempted to reframe the underlying dispute 
from the question of whether Hosanna-
Tabor fired Perich in violation of the ADA 
to the question of whether Perich violated 
church doctrine by not engaging in internal 
dispute resolution. However, contrary to 
Hosanna-Tabor's assertions, Perich's claim 
would not require the court to analyze any 
church doctrine; rather a trial would focus 
on issues such as whether Perich was 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA, 
whether Perich opposed a practice that was 
·unlawful under the ADA, and whether 
Hosanna-Tabor violated the ADA in its 
treatment of Perich. As Plaintiff notes, the 
LCMS personnel manual, which includ()s 
EEOC policy, and the Governing Manual 
for Lutheran Schools clearly contemplate 
that teachers are protected by employment 
discrimination and contract laws. In 
addition, none of the letters that Hosanna-
Tabor sent to Perich throughout her 
termination process reference church 
doctrine or the LCMS dispute resolution 
procedures. 
Furthermore, this Court would not be 
precluded from inquiring into whether a 
doctrinal basis actually motivated Hosanna-
Tabor's actions. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the ministerial exception does not, 
bar Perich's claims against Hosanna-Tabor, 
we VACATE the district court's order 
entering summary judgment on behalf of 
Defendant and REMAND with instructions 
that the district court make a finding on the 
merits of Perich's retaliation claim under the 
ADA. 
HELENE N.. WHITE, Circuit Judge, 
concurring. 
I agree that the ministerial exception does 
not bar this ADA action. I write separately 
because I read the relevant cases as more 
evenly split than does the majority. 
As the majority notes, whether a teacher at a 
sectarian school is properly characterized as 
a ministerial employee is an issue of first 
impression for this Court. A number of 
courts have concluded that parochial school 
teachers are not ministerial employees for 
pui'Poses of the exception. In contrast, courts 
have found teachers to be ministerial 
employees where the teachers have taught 
religious subjects and/or had a key role in 
the religious mission of the church. 
Of these cases, four present situations 
similar to that here-plaintiff teachers who 
taught primarily secular subjects at a 
religious school and court decisions turning 
on a primary-duties analysis. Two plaintiffs 
were not found to be ministerial employees .. 
Two plaintiffs were found to be ministerial 
employees. 
Perich's daily duties resemble to some 
extent those of the plaintiffs in each of these 
cases, including those in which the courts 
found the plaintiffs' "primary duties" to be 
ministerial in nature. Tipping the scale 
against the ministerial exception in this case 
is that, as the majority points out, there is 
evidence here that the school itself did not 
envision its teachers as religious leaders, or 
as occupying "ministerial" roles. Hosanna-
Tabor's teachers are not required to be 
called or even Lutheran to teach or to lead 
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daily religious activities. The fact that the 
.. duties of the contract teachers are the same 
as the duties of the called teachers is telling. 
This presence (or lack) of a predominantly 
religious yardstick for qualification as a 
teacher is a key factor in decisions finding 
the ministerial exception applicable and 
those finding it inapplicable alike. 
By this measure, even courts that have found 
ministerial plaintiffs who have daily 
schedules that have roughly the same ratio 
of religious to non-religious activities as 
Perich would find that the ministerial 
exception should not apply here. 
For the reasons above, I concur. 
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"High Court to Weigh Bias Exemption 
for Religious Teachers" 
Education Week 
March 28, 2011 
Mark Walsh 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to decide whether a private school teacher 
involved in secular and religious instruction 
falls under a widely recognized exception to 
employment-discrimination laws for 
ministers and other church leaders. 
The appeal by a Lutheran church and 
elementary school in Redford, Mich., was 
joined by a number of religious 
organizations and .$cho1ars, who argued that 
there are widely disparate rulings in the 
lower courts about whether religious-school 
teachers are subject to the "ministerial 
exception" to job-bias laws. 
The exception, recognized by virtually every 
federal circuit court of appeals, bars lawsuits 
that interfere in the relationship between a 
religious organization and employees who 
perfOlID religious functions. It is separate 
from the specific religious exemption in 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which applies to any employee of a religious 
organization, but only with respect to claims 
of religious discrimination. 
The federal appeals courts are split on the 
legal standard to be applied and the scope of 
the employees covered by the ministerial 
exception. 
The case accepted by the Supreme Court, 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (No. 10-553), 
involves Cheryl Perich, a 4th grade teacher 
at the school who got into a dispute over her 
return from a medical leave for narcolepsy 
in the 2004-05 school year. 
Perich was a "called teacher" under the 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, which 
meant she was trained in the church's 
theology and selected for her job by voting 
members of the church. She taught a secular 
4th grade curriculum, but also taught 
religion classes on some days and led 
devotional exercises, among other religious 
duties, according to court papers. 
Amid the dispute over her medica11eave, the 
church rescinded her "call," effectively 
terminating her. She filed a charge of 
discrimination and retaliation with the 
federal Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, which took her side and filed a 
retaliation suit against the church and school 
under the. Americans with Disabilities Act. 
A federal district court ruled for the church, 
but in March 2010, a panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, in Cincinnati, 
ruled 2-1 for the teacher. The court applied a 
"primary duties" test, and held that Perich 
was not subject to the ministerial exception 
because she "spent the overwhelming 
majority of her day teaching secular subjects 
using secular textbooks." The court also said 
that "called" and "lay" teachers at the school 
had primarily the same duties. 
The church and school appealed to the 
~upreme Court with the support of the 
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. 
"The decision below conflicts with this 
court's cases forbidding secular courts from 
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interfering in religious disputes," says the 
brief on the church's behalf, co-written by 
Douglas Laycock, a prominent law and 
religion scholar and a professor at the 
University of Virginia. "The courts here· 
have no business reinstating a commissioned 
minister and called teacher who teaches 
religion and leads children in worship." 
Among the groups filing friend-of-the-court 
briefs on the church's side were the 
Association of Christian Schools 
International, the Council of Hindu Temples 
of North America, and the Union of 
Orthodox Jewish Congregations of North 
America. 
The EEOC filed a brief urging the court not 
to review the case, noting that the 6th 
Circuit had conducted a "fact-intensive" 
review of Perich's duties at the school. 
"The fact that Perich led chapel twice a year 
in rotation with other teachers did not make 
her a minister for·purposes of the ministerial 
exception, the [6th Circuit] court noted," the 
EEOC brief said. 
In a brief filed on. behalf of Perich, her 
lawyer also urged the high court not to take 
the case, saying that religious organizations 
are seeking "wide leeway to avoid the 
federal statutory prohibitions on 
discrimination. " 
The court will hear arguments in the case 
during its term that begins next October. 
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"Perich vs. The Parish: 6th Circuit Says Teacher 
Not Ministerial Employee" 
Michigan Lawyers Weekly 
March 22, 2010 
Brian Frasier 
A parochial school teacher is not a 
ministerial employee and can sue her parish 
employer for violating the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, said the 6th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
The facts are similar to the recent Michigan 
Court of Appeals' decision in Weishuhn v. 
Catholic Diocese of Lansing (see "You're 
fired!," Michigan Lawyers Weekly, Feb. 8, 
2010). In that case, the court said the teacher 
couldn't sue for wrongful termination 
because she was a ministerial employee. 
But the facts of that case are distinguishable 
·because of comments Weishuhn made about 
her personal teaching philosophy in a 
newspaper interview, said Thomas A. 
Cooley Law School professor John Taylor. 
Determining whether a teacher is a 
ministerial employee is not as simple as 
counting the religious classes. 
"It [is] a factor, but not the only factor," he 
said. 
Weishuhn's attorney, Julie A. Gafkay, said 
Weishuhn's personal beliefs are beyond the 
proper analysis. 
Perich not a minister 
In general, the ministerial exception 
prevents courts from interfering in the 
employment relationship between a religious 
institution and its ministerial employees. A 
ministerial employee is determined by a 
primary duties test-the totality of the 
employee's duties and responsibilities, 
position and function. 
In the 6th Circuit case, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission et al. v. Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
School, parochial teacher Cheryl Perich 
began suffering from narcolepsy during the 
summer of 2004. School administrators told 
her that she should take a disability leave of 
absence for the school year, and the 
principal told her she'd still have ajob when 
she was ready to return. 
In January 2005, the school changed its 
policy to "request that employees on 
disability for more than six months [to] 
resign" so the school could fill their . 
positions. When Perich tried to return before 
the end of her six months, she was not 
allowed to do so. 
The court noted that "the overwhelming 
majority of courts" have held that parochial 
school teachers that teach primarily secular 
subjects aren't ministerial employees. 
But, "when courts have found that teachers 
classify as ministerial employees for 
purposes of the exception, those teachers 
have generally taught primarily religious 
subjects or had a central role in the spiritual 
or pastoral mission of the ChU1:ch.," wrote 
Judge Eric L. Clay. 
Using the primary duties test analysis, the 
court detennined Perich was not a 
ministerial employee because she spent six 
hours and 15 minutes of her seven-hour day 
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teaching secular subjects. 
"The fact that Perich participated in and led 
some religious activities throughout the day 
does not make her primary function 
religious," Clay wrote. 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Helene N. 
White wrote that, while she agreed with the 
majority, her analysis of whether Perich was 
a ministerial employee was much closer, 
tipped by the fact that the school did not 
envision its teachers as religious leaders. 
Should personal beliefs matter? 
Taylor said the two rulings are consistent 
because the court didn't base its decision in 
Weishuhn solely on teaching time. 
"I don't think that the Michigan Court of 
Appeals applied a different rule," he said. "I 
just think that there was a different set of 
facts." 
Taylor said that by his count, Perich spent 
about 10 percent of her week teaching 
religious classes, while Weishuhn spent 
about a third of her time teaching religion. 
But the fact that Taylor thought swung 
Weishuhn in favor of the church was an 
interview she gave to The Catholic Times, in 
which she talked about weaving religion into 
any class that she taught. 
"That was the single most crucial difference 
between the two cases and the single most 
crucial factor working against her," Taylor 
said. 
Gafkay disagreed, saying the primary duties 
of both teachers were similar. 
"[Perich] led the class in prayer three times a 
day," she said. "She led chapel two times a 
year. She attended chapel with her class. She 
taught religion four days per week. And, 
she's considered a commissioned minister." 
Gafkay said it wouldn't be fair to hold 
statements made in the newspaper interview 
regarding her personal religious beliefs 
against her because it had nothing to de:> with 
her job duties. 
"Nowhere does [the primary duties] test call 
for looking at the individual beliefs of that 
employee," she said. 
Weishuhn recently appealed the case to the 
Michigan Supreme Court. 
Another impOliant distinction was Hosanna-
Tabor didn't require its teachers to be· 
Lutheran, and all teachers, whether "called" 
or contract teachers, did the same job, said 
Wayne State University School of Law 
professor Kingsley R. Browne. 
He said the rulings were consistent because 
the courts applied the same basic law to each 
set of facts. But Browne agreed that 
consideration of Weishuhn's choice to 
infuse religion to secular classes could tip 
the analysis between similarly situated 
teachers with different philosophies. 
"If you had a case in which you had two 
employees that are suing for the same thing, 
joint plaintiffs, and they testify differently in 
depositions about whether they had· 
incorporated religion into their secular 
classes, that would be a tough call," he said. 
"What's controlling? The way the employee 
does their job, or the way the employer 
contemplated that the job would be 
performed?" 
Attorneys for both Perich and Hosanna-
Tabor did not respond to Michigan Lawyers 
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Weekly's requests for comment. 
Decision in a Nutshell 
The Case: Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, et al., v. Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Church & School. 
The Facts: A parochial teacher was fired 
after becoming ill, even though her doctors 
said she could fully return to work. She sued 
under the Americans With Disabilities Act. 
The Decision: She was not a ministerial 
employee, and her ADA lawsuit is allowed 
to proceed. 
From the Decision: "A religious entity may 
give a preference in employment to 
individuals of the particular religion, and 
may require that . . . employees conform to 
the religious tenets of the organization. 
However, a religious organization may not 
discriminate against an individual who 
satisfies the permitted religious criteria 
because that individual is disabled .... " 
"The governing primary duties analysis 
requires a court to objectively examine an 
employee's actual job function, not her title, 
in determining whether she is properly 
classified as a minister." 
Froin the Concurrence: "Perich's daily 
duties resemble to some extent those of the 
plaintiffs in each of these cases, including 
those in which the courts found the 
plaintiffs' 'primary duties' to be ministerial 
in nature. Tipping the scales against the 
ministerial exception in this case is that, as 
the majority points out, there is evidence 
here that the school itself did not envision its 
teachers as religious leaders." 
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"Hosanna-Tabor Case to Test Our 
Church-State Divide" 
USA Today 
April 25, 2011 
Richard W. Garnett 
The Supreme Court's religious-freedom 
decisions are usually about symbols, speech 
and spending: war memorial crosses in the 
desert and Ten Commandments monuments 
near public buildings, scholarships that 
allow poor kids to attend parochial schools 
. and funding for "faith-based" social 
services, Pledge of Allegiance, and so on .. 
In late March, the justices agreed to review a 
Michigan job-discrimination case with none 
of these familiar eye-catching and attention-
grabbing features. It does involve, however, 
fundamental questions about church-state 
relations and the limits of government 
authority-questions at the core of the First 
Amendment's concerns-and it could prove 
to be among the court's most important 
religious-liberty cases in many years. 
Critics sometimes complain that the court's 
religion-related decisions bog down in 
trivi~-How close are the reindeer and 
snowmen to the Baby Jesus in the holiday 
display?-but this case, Hosanna-Tabor 
Church v. EEOC, is about a big idea, the 
"separation of church and state," that really 
matters. 
The case 
In a nutshell, Hosanna-Tabor is ·a lawsuit 
brought by Cheryl Perich, a former teacher 
at a church-run Lutheran grade school who 
argues that the church violated a federal law 
against disability-based discrimination when 
it rescinded her "call" as a "commissioned 
minister"-and fired her as a third- and 
fourth-grade teacher, after a disability-
related leave of absence. 
A federal trial court in Michigan dismissed 
the teacher's claim, insisting that the 
"ministerial" nature of her position and the 
religious dimensions of the church's 
decision made it inappropriate to apply the 
anti-discrimination law. But the court of 
appeals disagreed and concluded that her 
"primary duties"-as a "commissioned 
minister" at a school that aims to provide a 
"Christ-centered education" from teachers 
who "integrate faith into all subjects"-were 
secular, and not religious. . 
The court gave little weight to the facts that 
the teacher led her students in prayer several 
times a day and taught religion classes four 
days a week, and instead simply compared 
the minutes she spent on religious formation 
with those she spent teaching "secular 
subjects." 
The Supreme Court should reverse this 
decision, and it is important to understand 
why. 
For stmiers, it is well established that a 
"ministerial exception" to job-discrimination 
laws prevents secular courts from jumping 
into religious disputes. that they lack the 
authority to address or the competence to 
solve. The question in the Hosanna-Tabor 
case is not so much whether the exception 
exist~-it does, and it should-as how it 
should be understood and applied. 
As the court of appeals recognized, this 
exception is "rooted in the First 
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Amendment's guarantees of religious 
freedom." Indeed, a religious-liberty 
promise that allowed governments to 
second-guess religious communities' 
'decisions about what should be their 
teachings or who should be their teachers 
would be a hollow one. 
To be clear, the ministerial exception is 
constitutionally required and valuable, but it 
does not rest on assumption that religious 
institutions and employers never behave 
badly. Celiainly, they do. Its premise is not 
that churches are. somehow "above the law." 
They are not, and should not be. Its point is 
not "discrimination is fine, if churches do 
it." It is, instead, that there are some 
questions secular courts should not claim the 
power to answer, some wrongs that a 
constitutional commitment to church-state 
separation puts beyond the law's corrective 
reach, and some relationships-such as the 
one petween a religious congregation and 
the ministers to whom it entrusts not only 
the "secular" education but also the religious 
formation of its members-that government 
should not presume to supervise too closely. 
Out of government's league 
To be sure, not every employee of a 
religious institution IS a "ministerial 
employee," and religious institutions-· like 
all employers-have many legal obligations 
to their employees. Although there are 
difficult questions to be asked, and many 
fine lines to be drawn, when it comes to 
interpreting and applying the First 
Amendment's religious-freedom guarantees, 
it cannot be the role of secular government 
to second-guess the decisions of religious 
communities and institutions about who 
should be their ministers, leaders and 
teachers, any more than they should review 
their decisions about the content of religious 
doctrines. 
Last October, many enjoyed a laugh at the 
expense of Christine O'Donnell, then a 
candidate for one of Delaware's U.S. Senate 
seats, when she questioned the constitutional 
pedigree of the "separation of church and 
state." Her critics were a bit too quick to 
poke fun. In fact, "separation of church and 
state" does not appear in the Constitution. 
Still, and even though it is often distorted 
and misused, the idea is a crucial dimension 
of religious freedom. We wisely distinguish, 
or "separate," the institutions and authorities 
of religion from those of government. We do 
this, though, not so much by building a 
"wall," but by respecting the genuine 
autonomy of these different spheres. We do 
this not to confine religious belief and 
practice but to curb the ambitions and reach 
of governments. 
The Gospel repOlis that Jesus told the 
Pharisees to "render therefore to Caesar the 
things that are Caesar's, and to God ~he 
things that are God's." In a similar vein, our . 
Constitution tells Caesar that he is only 
Caesar, and insists that he not demand what 
is God's. 
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"Should Religions Be Allowed to Discriminate?" 
Washington Post 
April 5, 2011 
Marci A. Hamilton 
Congress and the state legislatures owe it to 
potential employees of religious institutions 
to warn them of their lack of protection from 
invidious discrimination. 
The Supreme Court this week granted 
review on the issue of whether religious 
organizations have a constitutional right to 
discriminate against their employees. That is 
right-there is a legal argument that 
religious organizations should have a 
constitutional right to treat their employees 
in ways no secular organization could. 
Although the lower courts have been 
entertaining arguments in this sphere for 
decades, this is the first time the· Supreme 
Court has waded into what is called the 
"ministerial exception." Don't be misled by 
the name of the doctrine, though. These 
cases do not involve simply ministers, 
priests, or rabbis. Religious organizations 
obviously should have a right to choose their 
clergy according to their own lights. 
The doctrine, though, was extended to 
include others who are not clergy per se, 
e.g., teachers whose role is more secular 
than religious, as in this particular case. 
The case is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 
and involves teacher Cheryl Perich. She 
developed narcolepsy and, therefore, took a 
medical leave. The head of the school 
promised to hold her job for her. When her 
health improved, she retumed to the school, 
but was told she could not come back yet. 
She had to wait until the beginning of the 
next school year. 
She argued that . the school violated the 
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 
- by excluding her on the basis of her illness. 
The church school has responded that it had 
the power to remove her for disobedience to 
its leaders' order to wait until the next year, 
regardless of the ADA. 
- Then, in the courts, the school raised the flag 
of the First Amendment, arguing that she 
was a religious employee and the courts 
should not interfere. She taught secular 
subjects but also some religion classes and 
led the students in prayer. 
In most employment contexts, an employer 
who behaved like the church school in this 
case would be accountable to state and 
federal- anti-discrimination laws protecting 
the sick and disabled. -The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found 
that the First Amendment was not a bar to 
her claims, and, therefore, concluded that 
the church could be liable under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. 
This case reminds me of Lynette Petruska's 
struggles. She was chosen by a Catholic 
university to be its chaplain. There was no 
requirement that the position be held by a 
priest and, therefore, it was open to a 
woman. The school, however, eventually 
shoved Petruska out of her position· to 
replace. her with a man. It was gender 
discrimination. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that she 
had no rights, because the university was 
religious and she was a chaplain, so gender 
discrimination was their right. 
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At this early stage in the case, in this 
column, I will not delve into the niceties of 
the legal doctrine that will be debated at the 
Court: Rather, I want to paint the big picture 
for my readers so that they can understand 
what is happening in this and other related 
cases. 
There are· two sides of this debate. First, 
there are the religious groups, which have 
been trying to construct a moat or a wall 
around 'religious institutions that would 
shield them from accountability for 
discrimination against their employees. 
They are fond of arguing for their 
"autonomy" from the law. They trade on the 
American inclination to trust and revere 
religious institutions. 
On the other side are the employees who 
find themselves shocked by a religious 
institution they intuitively trusted that fires 
them in violation of our shared cultural 
norm against many kinds ·of discrimination. 
Cases have involved racial, gender, and 
disability discrimination. They also have 
involved sexual harassment. For example, 
seminaries have argued that seminarians 
may not bring a sexual harassment claim 
after the seminarian was sexually 
propositioned by superiors. 
This is a clash of old-time First Amendment 
thinking-which treats religious institutions 
as benign institutions that should be left to 
their own devices-and civil rights. 
Americans have an instinct for fairness and 
justice, and assume that if anyone, including 
their religious employer, treats them 
discriminatorily, they should have legal 
recourse. But religious institutions and their 
lawyers sink tremendous resources into 
blocking such legal recourse. (Nevel' 
forget-all those who hold power are likely 
to abuse it in some way, and religious 
institutions are run by humans, not gods.) 
The church in this case is seeking the right 
to exclude the courts from "interfering" with 
their employment decisions. 
If the church school wins this case, which it 
should not, I think that Congress and the 
state legislatures owe it to potential 
employees of religious institutions to warn 
them of their lack of protection from 
invidious discrimination. Most come into 
such institutions expecting that they will 
. receive· better treatment than your average 
corporation. Without such' a warning, 
employees unwittingly place themselves in a 
position of weakness and risk at work. All 
religious institutions should be required to 
include language in their employment 
contracts that states the follOWing: 
This is a religious institution, which treats 
all of its employees as though they are 
religious; You must understand that that 
means that we will take the position if we 
discriminate against you that the federal and 
state anti-discrimination laws cannot apply. 
Therefore, if this institution engages in 
invidious racial, gender, or disability 
discrimination against you, you may have no 
legal recourse. 
This is what is at stake in this case. 
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Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 
10-1293 
Ruling Below: Fox ,Television Stations, Inc. v. F.c.c., 613 F.3d 317 (2nd Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 2011 WL 1527312 (U.S. 2011). 
In both 2002 and 2003, the F.C.C. found expletives uttered by award recipients during the Fox's 
live broadcast of the Billboard Music Awards violated the F.C.C.'s indecency policy. 
Additionally in 2003, several affiliates on the ABC-TV network were fined for airing an episode 
of "NYPD Blue" found to be indecent by the F.C.C. The cases involve separate proceedings that 
were combined in a sole petition to the Court. The F.C.C. indecency policy was originally held to 
be arbitrary and capricious in the first appeal before the Second Circuit. As such, the network's 
constitutional claims were not reached. The Court granted cert and reversed, holding the F.C.C.'s 
indecency policy was not arbitrary and capricious, and remanded, the case for consideration of 
the constitutional claims. In this latest appeal, the Second Circuit found the F.C.C. indecency 
policy to be unconstitutionally vague, resulting in a chilling effect on speech in violation of the 
First Amendment. 
Question Presented: Whether the Federal Communications Commission's current indecency-
enforcement regime violates the First 01' Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., CBS Broadcasting Inc.,WLS Television, KTRK 
Television, Inc., KMBC Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc., ABC Inc., Petitioners, 
v. 
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, United States of America, 
Respondents, NBC Universal, Inc., NBC Telemundo License Co., NBC Television 
Affiliates, FBC Television Affiliates Association, CBS Television Network Affiliates, Center 
for the Creative Community, Inc., Doing Business as Center for Creative Voices in Media, 
Inc., ABC Television Affiliates Association, Intervenors. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second.Circuit 
Filed July 13, 2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
POOLER, Circuit Judge: 
This petition for review comes before us on 
remand from the Supreme Court. Previously, 
we held, with Judge Leval dissenting, that 
the indecency policy of the Federal 
Communications Commission ("FCC" or 
"Commission") was arbitrary and capricious 
under the Administrative Procedure Act 
("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 
444, 462 (2d Cir.2007). The Supreme Court 
reversed, upholding the policy under the 
AP A and remanding for consideration of 
petitioners' constitutional arguments. See 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., -
U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1819, 173 
L.Ed.2d 738 (2009) (Scalia, l). We now 
hold that the FCC's policy violates the First 
Amendment because it is unconstitutionally 
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vague, creating a chilling effect that goes far 
beyond the fleeting expletives at issue here. 
Thus, we grant the petition for review and 
vacate the FCC's order and the indecency 
policy underlying it. 
BACKGROUND 
Section 1464 of Title 18 of United States 
Code provides that "[w]hoever utters any 
obscene, indecent, or profane language by 
means of radio communication shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than two years, or both." In 1960, Congress 
authorized the FCC to impose civil 
forfeitures for violations of Section 1464. It 
was not until 1975, however, that the FCC 
first exercised its authority to regulate 
speech it deemed indecent but not obscene. 
The speech at issue was comedian George 
Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue, a 12-
minute string of expletives broadcast on the 
radio at 2:00 in the afternoon. 
The FCC brought forfeiture proceedings 
against the Pacifica Foundation, the 
broadcaster that had aired the Carlin 
monologue. In finding that Pacifica had 
violated Section 1464, the Commission 
defined "indecent" speech as "language that 
describes, in terms patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community 
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual 
or excretory activities mid organs, at times 
of the day when there is a reasonable risk 
that children may be in the audience." 
Pacifica petitioned for review to the D.C. 
Circuit, which declared the FCC's indecency 
regime invalid. In finding the FCC's order 
both vague and overbroad, the court pointed 
out that the Commission's definition of 
indecent speech would prohibit "the 
uncensored broadcast of many of the great 
works of literature including Shakespearian 
plays and contemporary plays which have 
won critical acclaim, the works of renowned 
classical and contemporary poets and 
writers, and passages from the Bible." Such 
a result, the court concluded, mnounted to 
unconstitutional censorship. 
In a plurality opinion authored by Justice 
Stevens, the Supreme Court reversed. See 
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 98 
S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978). The 
Court limited its review to the question of 
whether the FCC could impose a civil 
forfeiture for the. Carlin monologue and 
declined to address Pacifica's argument that. 
the regulation was overbroad and would 
chill protected speech. In limiting its review, 
the Court stressed the "specific' factual 
context" of the Carlin monologue, focusing 
in particular on Carlin's deliberate and 
repetitive use of expletives to describe 
sexual and excretory activities. 
The Court then went on to hold that the FCC 
could, at least in the situation before it, 
restrict indecent speech in the broadcast 
context that did not meet the legal definition 
of obscenity. Resting on a nuisance 
rationale, the Court first noted that "of all 
forms of communication, it is broadcasting . 
that has received the most limited First 
Amendment protection" because of its 
"uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of 
all Americans." Moreover, the nature of 
broadcast television~as opposed to printed 
materials-made it "uniquely accessible to 
children, even those too young to read." The 
Court, however, "emphasize [ d] the 
narrowness of [its] holding." "[N]uisance 
may be merely a right thing in the wrong 
place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the 
barnyard. We simply hold that when the 
Commission finds that a pig has entered the 
parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power 
does not depend on proof that the pig is 
obscene." 
Justices Powell and Blackmun, who 
concurred in a separate opinion, also made 
clear that the FCC's regulatory authority 
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was limited, stating that the Court's holding 
did not give the FCC "an umestricted 
license to decide what speech, protected in 
other media, may be banned from the 
airwaves in order to protect unwilling adults 
from· momentary exposure to it in their 
homes." Nor,· they explained, did the 
holding "speak to cases involving the 
isolated use of a potentially offensive word 
in the course of a radio broadcast, as 
distinguished from the· verbal shock 
treatment administered by respondent here." 
Finally, they took the FCC at its word that it 
would "proceed cautiously," which they 
reasoned would minimize any chilling effect 
that might otherwise result. 
In the years after Pacifica, the FCC did 
indeed pursue a· restrained enforcement 
policy, taking the position that its 
enforcement powers were limited to the 
seven specific words in the Carlin . 
monologue; No enforcement actions were 
brought between 1978 and 1987. Then, in 
1987, the FCC abandoned its focus on 
specific words, concluding that "although 
enforcement was clearly easier under' the 
standard, it could lead to anomalous results 
that could not be justified." The FCC 
reasoned that under the prior standard, 
patently offensive material was permissible 
as long as it avoided certain words. Th~s, the 
Commission concluded, "made neither legal 
nor policy sense." The Commission instead 
decided to utilize the definition it had used 
in Pacifica, adopting a contextual approach 
to indecent speech. 
Despite its move to a more flexible standard, 
the FCC continued to exercise restraint. In 
particular, it consistently held that a single, 
non-literal use of an expletive was not 
actionably indecent. 
In 2001, in an attempt to "provide guidance 
to the broadcast industry regarding ... [its] 
enforcement policies with respect to 
broadcast indecency," the FCC issued a 
policy statement in which it set forth its 
indecency standard in more detail. Industry 
Guidance on the Commission's Case Law 
Intelpreting J8·USC. § 1464,16 F.C.C.R. 
7999, at ~ 1 (2001) ("Industry Guidance "). 
In· Industry Guidance, the FCC explained 
that an indecency finding involved the 
following two determinations: (1) whether 
the material "describe[s] or depict [ s] sexual 
or excretory organs or activities"; and (2) 
whether the broadcast is "patently offensive 
as measured by contemporary community 
standards for the broadcast medium." The 
FCC further explained that it considered the 
following three factors in determining 
whether a broadcast is patently offensive: 
(1) "the explicitness or graphic nature of the 
description or depiction"; (2) "whether the 
material dwells on or repeats at length" the 
description or depiction; and (3) "whether 
the material appears to pander or is used to 
titillate, or whether the materials appears to 
have been presented for its shock value." 
The Industry Guidance reiterated that under 
the second prong of the patently offensive 
test, "fleeting and isolated" expletives were 
not actionably indecent. 
In 2004, however, the FCC's policy on 
indecency changed. During the 2003 Golden 
.Globe Awards, U2 band member Bono 
exclaimed, upon receiving an award, "this is 
really, really, fucking brilliant. Really, 
really, great." In re Complaints Against 
Various Broadcast Licenses Regarding the 
Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" 
Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, at ~ 3 n. 4 
(2004) ("Golden Globes Order "). In 
response to complaints filed after the 
incident, the FCC declared, for the first time, 
that a single, nonliteral use of an expletive (a 
so-called "fleeting expletive") could be 
actionably indecent. Finding that "the 'F-
Word' is one of the most vulgar, graphic, 
and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in 
the English language," and therefore 
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"inherently has a sexual connotation," the 
FCC concluded that the fleeting and isolated 
use of the word was irrelevant and overruled 
all prior decisions in which fleeting use of 
an expletive was held per se not indecent. 
The FCC also found that the broadcast was 
"profane" within the meaning of Section 
1464, abandoning its previous interpretation 
of the term to mean blasphemy. 
At the same time that the FCC expanded its 
enforcement efforts to include even fleeting 
expletives, the FCC also began issuing 
record fines for indecency violations. While 
the Commission had previously interpreted 
the maximum fines in the statute as applying 
on a per-program basis, it began treating 
each licensee's. broadcast of the same 
program as a separate violation, thereby 
multiplying the maximum fine the FCC 
could order for each instance of indecent 
speech. In addition, Congress amended 
Section 503(b)(2)(c)(ii) to increase the 
maximum fine permitted by a factor of 10-
from $32,500 to $325,000-meaning that 
the fine for a single expletive uttered during 
a broadcast could easily. run into· the tens of 
millions of dollars. 
NBC Universal, Inc. ("NBC"), along with 
numerous other patties, filed petitions for 
reconsideration of the Golden Globes. Order 
before the FCC, raising statutory and 
constitutional challenges to the new policy. 
While the petitions for reconsideration were 
pending, the FCC applied the Golden 
Globes Order policy in IN RE 
COMPLAINTS REGARDING VARIOUS 
TELEVISION BROADCASTS BETWEEN 
FEBRUARY 2, 2002 AND MARCH 8, 2005, 
21 F.C.C. Red. 2664 (2006) ("Omnibus 
Order "), which the Commission stated was 
intended to "provide substantial guidance. to 
broadcasters and the public" about· what· was 
considered indecent under the new policy. In 
. the Omnibus Order (which dealt with many 
more programs than are at issue in the· 
present case), the Commission found four 
programs-the 2002 Billboard Music 
Awards, the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, 
various episodes of ABC's NYPD Blue, and 
CBS's The Early Show-indecent and 
profane under the Golden Globes standard. 
All four programs involved· what could be 
characterized as fleeting expletives. For 
instance, during the 2002 Billboard Music 
Awards, Cher, in an unscripted moment 
from her acceptance speech, stated: "People 
have been telling me I'm on the way out 
every year, right? So fuck 'em." Similarly, 
during the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, 
Nicole Ritchie-on stage to present an 
award with Paris Hilton-made the 
following unscripted remark: "Have you 
ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada 
purse? It's not so fucking simple." Episodes 
of NYPD Blue were found indecent based 
on several instances of the word "bullshit," 
while the CBS's The Early Show was found 
indecent on the basis ofa guest's use of the 
word "bullshitter" to describe a fellow 
contestant on the reality TV show, Survivor: 
Vanuatu. 
In finding these programs indecent and 
profane, the FCC reaffirmed its decision in 
the Golden Globes Order that any use of the 
word "fuck" was presumptively indecent 
and profane, further concluding that any use 
of the word "shit" was also presumptively 
indecent and profane. It also held that the 
four broadcasts in question were "patently 
offensive" because the material was explicit, 
shocking, and gratuitous, notwithstanding 
the fact that the expletives were fleeting and 
isolated. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc. ("Fox"), CBS 
Broadcasting Inc. ("CBS"), and ABC Inc. 
("ABC"), as well as several network 
affiliates, filed petitions for review of the 
Omnibus Order. The FCC moved for a 
voluntary remand, which we granted, so that 
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it could have the 0ppoliunity to address 
petitioners' arguments and could ensure that 
all licensees had a full opportunity to .be 
heard before the FCC issued a final decision .. 
After soliciting public comments, the FCC 
issued a second order on November 6, 2006. 
See IN RE COMPLAINTS REGARDING 
VARIOUS TELEVISION BROADCASTS 
BETWEEN FEBRUARY 2, 2002 AND 
MARCH 8,2005,21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006) 
("Remand Order"). In the Remand Order, 
the FCC reaffinned its finding that the 2002 
and 2003 Billboard Music Awards were 
indecent and profane. However, the FCC 
reversed its finding with respect to The 
Early Show and dismissed the complaint 
against NYPD Blue on procedural grounds. 
In the Remand Order, the FCC rejected the 
petitioners' argument that. non-literal uses of 
expletives were not indecent, reasoning that 
"any strict dichotomy between expletives 
and descriptions or depictions of sexual or 
excretory functions is artificial and does not 
make sense. in light of the fact that an 
expletive's power to offend derives from its 
sexual or excretory meaning." However, the 
Commission did "not take the position that 
any occurrence of an expletive is indecent or 
profane under its. rules,"allowing that 
expletives that were "integral" to an artistic 
work or occurring during a "bonafide news 
interview" might not run afoul of the 
indecency standard. As such, it reversed its 
previous decision concerning the CBS's The 
Early Show because the utterance of the 
word "bullshitter" took place during a bona 
fide news interview. The Commission made 
clear, however, that "there is no outright 
news exemption from our indecency rules." 
Petitioners and intervenors, which 
collectively represented all the major 
broadcast networks as well as local affiliates 
affected by the FCC's indecency policy 
(hereinafter, the "Networks"), returned to 
this Court for review of the Remand Order, 
making a variety of administrative, 
statutory, and constitutional arguments. In a 
2-1 decision (with Judge Leval in dissent), 
we held that the FCC's indecency policy 
was arbitrary and capricious under the AP A. 
Fox, 489 F.3d at 447. We reached this 
decision because we believed that the FCC 
had failed to adequately explain why it had 
changed itsnearly-30-year policy on 
fleeting expletives. Moreover, we noted that 
the FCC's justification for the policy-that 
children could be harmed by hearing even 
one fleeting expletive (the so-called "first 
blow" theory)-bore "no rational connection 
to the Commission's actual policy," because 
the FCC had not instituted a blanket ban on 
expletives. 
Because we . struck down the indecency 
policy on AP A . grounds, we declined to 
reach the constitutional issues in the case. 
We noted, however, that we were "skeptical 
that the Commission [could] provide a 
reasoned explanation for its 'fleeting 
expletive' regime that would pass 
constitutional . muster." We expressed 
sympathy for "the Networks' contention that 
the FCC's indecency test [wa]s unclefined, 
indiscernible, inconsistent, and 
consequently, unconstitutionally vague." We 
were also troubled that the FCC's policy 
appeared to permit it to "sanction speech 
based on its subj ective view of the merit of 
that speech." However, because it was 
unnecessary for us to reach them, we left 
those issues for another day. The FCC 
subsequently filed a writ of certiorari, which 
the Supreme Court granted. 
In a 5--4 decision, the Supreme Court 
reversed our AP A ruling, holding that the 
FCC's "fleeting expletive" policy was not 
arbitrary and capricious because "[t]he 
Commission could reasonably conclude that 
the pervasiveness of foul language, and the 
. coarsening of public entertainment in other 
media such as cable, justifY more stringent 
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regulation of broadcast programs so as to 
give conscientious parents a relatively safe 
haven for their children." 129 S.Ct. at 1819. 
However, the Court declined to address the 
Networks' constitutional arguments, 
"see[ing] no reason to abandon our usual 
procedures in a rush to judgment without a 
lower court opinion," and remanded for us 
to consider them in the first instance. Thus, 
after further briefing by the parties, 
intervenors, and amici, we now turn to the 
question that we deferred in our previous 
decision-whether the FCC's indecency 
policy violates the First Amendment. 
DISCUSSION 
1. 
1 It is well-established that indecent speech 
is fully protected by the First Amendment. 
In most contexts, the Supreme Court has 
considered restrictions on indecent speech to 
be content-based restrictions subject to strict 
scrutiny .... 
... Broadcast radio and television, however, 
have always occupied a unique position 
when' it comes to First Amendment 
protection. The categorization of 
broadcasting as different from all other 
forms of communication pre-dates Pacifica. 
And the Supreme Court has continuously 
reaffirmed the distinction between 
broadcasting and other forms of media since 
Pacifica. However, it was in Pacifica that 
the Supreme Court gave its fullest 
explanation for why restrictions on 
broadcast speech were subject to a lower 
level of scrutiny, relying on the twin pillars 
of pervasiveness and accessibility to 
children. While Pacifica did not specify 
what level of scrutiny applies to restrictions 
on broadcast speech, subsequent cases have 
applied something akin to intermediate 
scrutiny. 
The Networks argue that the world has 
changed since Pacifica and the reasons 
underlying the decision are no longer valid. 
Indeed, we face a media landscape that 
would have been almost unrecognizable in 
1978. 
[Describing the proliferation of cable 
networks and internet media.] 
Moreover, technological changes have given 
parents the ability to decide which programs 
they will pe1mit their children to watch. 
Every television, 13 inches or larger, sold in 
the United States since January 2000 
contains a V -chip, which allows parents to 
block programs based on a standardized 
rating system. Moreover, since June 11, 
2009, when the United States made the 
transition to digital television, anyone using 
a digital converter box also has access to a 
V -chip. In short, there now exists a way to 
block programs that contain indecent speech 
in a way that was not possible in 1978. In 
fact, the existence of technology that 
allowed for household-by-household 
blocking of "unwanted" cable channels was 
one of the principle distinctions between 
cable television and broadcast media drawn 
by the Supreme Court in Playboy. The Court 
explained: 
The option to block reduces the 
likelihood, so concerning to the 
Court in Pacifica, that traditional 
First Amendment scrutiny would 
deprive the Government of all 
authority to address this sort of 
problem. The corollary, of course, is 
that targeted blocking enables the 
Government to support parental 
authority without affecting the First 
Amendment interests of speakers and 
willing listeners-listeners for 
whom, if the speech is unpopular or 
indecent, ,the privacy of their own 
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homes may be the optimal place of 
receipt. 
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815, 120 S.Ct. 1878 
(internal citation omitted). 
We can think of no reason why this rationale 
for applying strict scrutiny in the case of 
cable television would n~t apply with equal 
force to broadcast television in light of the 
V -chip teclmology that is now available. 
Neveliheless, as we stated in our previous 
. decision, we are bound by Supreme Court 
precedent, regardless of whether it reflects 
today's realities. The Supreme Court may 
decide in due course to overrule Pacifica 
and subject speech restrictions in the 
broadcast context to strict scrutiny: This 
Court, however,. is "not at liberty to depart 
from binding Supreme Court precedent 
'unless and until [the] Court reinterpret [ s]' 
that precedent." The Networks, although 
they may wish it otherwise, seem to concede 
that we must evaluate the FCC's indecency 
policy under the framework established by 
the Supreme Court in Pacifica. 
There is considerable disagreement among 
the parties, however, as to what framework 
. Pacifica established. The FCC interprets 
Pacifica as permitting it to exercise broad 
regulatory authority to sanction indecent 
speech. In its view, the Carlin monologue 
was only the most extreme example of a 
hn'ge category of indecent speech that the 
FCC can· constitutionally prohibit. The 
Networks, on the other hand, view Pacifica 
as establishing the li!llit of the FCC's 
authority. In other words, they believe that 
only when indecent speech rises to the level 
of "verbal shock treatment," exemplified by 
the Carlin monologue, can the FCC impose 
a civil forfeiture. Because Pacifica was an 
intentionally narrow opinion, it does not 
provide us with a clear answer to this 
question. Fortunately, we do not need to 
wade into the brambles in an attempt to 
answer it ourselves. For we conclude that, 
regardless of where the outer limit of the 
FCC's authority lies, the FCC's indecency 
policy is unconstitutional because it is 
impermissibly vague. It is to this issue that 
we now turn. 
II. 
It is a basic principle that a law or regulation 
"'is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are. 
not clearly defined. '" A law or regulation is 
impermissibly vague if it does not "give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited." 
The First Amendment places a special 
burden on the government to ensure that 
restrictions on speech are not impermissibly 
vague. However, "'perfect clarity and 
precise guidance have never been required 
even of regulations that restrict expressive 
activity. '" 
The vagueness doctrine serves several 
important objectives in the First Amendment 
context. First, the doctrine is based on the 
principle of fair notice. '" [W]e assume that 
man is free to steer between lawful and 
unlawful conduct and we give him notice of 
what is prohibited so that he may act 
accordingly. '" Notice is particularly 
impOliant with respect to content-based 
speech restrictions "because of [their] 
obvious chilling effect on free speech." 
Vague regulations "'inevitably lead citizens 
to steer far wider of the unlawful zone than 
if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were 
clearly marked.'" Second, the vagueness 
doctrine is based "on the need to eliminate 
the impermissible risk of discriminatory 
enforcement." "A vague law impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to 
[government officials] for resolution on an 
ad hoc and subjective basis .... " Specificity, 
on the other hand, guards against 
subjectivity and discriminatory enforcement. 
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A. 
The. Networks argue that the· FCC's 
indecency test is unconstitutionally vague 
because it provides no clear guidelines as to 
what is covered and thus forces broadcasters 
to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone," 
rather than risk massive fines. In support of 
their position, the Networks rely on the 
Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU. 
Section 223 (a) of the Communications 
Decency Act ("CDA") prohibited 
transmitting "indecent" material to minors 
over the Intemet while section 223 (d) 
prohibited material that "in context, depicts 
or describes, in terms patently offensive as 
. measured by contemporary community 
standards, sexual or excretory activities or 
organs." In addition to finding that the 
statute was not narrowly tailored, the Court 
found the statute unconstitutionally vague 
because· "the many ambiguities conceming 
the scope of its coverage render [ ed] it. 
problematic for purposes of the First 
Amendment." The Court found that the 
statute's use of the "general, undefined 
terms 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' 
cover [ ed] large amounts of nonpomographic 
material with serious educational or other 
value." Because of the "vague contours" of 
the regulation, the Court held that "it 
unquestionably silence [ d] some speakers 
whose messages would be entitled to 
constitutional pf(~tection." The Networks 
argue that since Reno found this indecency 
regulation unconstitutionally vague, the 
FCC'sidentically-worded indecency test for 
broadcasting must fall as well. 
FCC argues the opposite-that Reno 
forecloses a vagueness challenge to the 
FCC's policy. In Reno, the govemment 
argued that the· CDA was "plainly 
constitutional" under the Pacifica decision. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
distinguishing Pacifica on the grounds that 
(1) the FCC is an expert agency that had 
been regulating the radio for decades; (2) the 
CDA was a categorical ban on speech while 
the FCC's indecency regulation designated 
"when-rather than whether-it would be 
permissible to air such a program"; (3) the 
order at issue in Pacifica was not punitive; 
and (4) the broadcast medium had 
traditionally received the most limited First 
Amendment protection. According to the 
FCC, because the Court refused to find 
Pacifica controlling of the constitutional 
challenges to the CDA, we must find Reno 
equally inapplicable here. 
As an initial matter, we reject the FCC's 
argument that Reno forecloses the 
Networks' vagueness challenge. When the 
Supreme Court distinguished Pacifica in 
Reno, it did so with respect to "the level of 
First Amendment scrutiny that should be 
applied to this medium," not to its analysis 
of whether the statute was unconstitutionally 
vague. Broadcasters are entitled to the same 
degree of clarity as other speakers, even if 
restrictions on their speech are subject to a 
lower level of scrutiny. It is the language of 
the rule, not the medium in which it is 
applied, that determines whether a law or 
regulation is impermissibly vague. 
We also reject the Networks' argument that 
Reno requires us to find the FCC's policy 
vague. To be sure, the CDA's definition of 
indecency was almost identical to the 
Commission'S, . and language that is 
unconstitutionally vague in one context 
cannot suddenly become the model of clarity 
in another. However, unlike in Reno, the 
FCC has further elaborated on the definition 
of indecency in the broadcast context. For 
example, the FCC has outlined three factors 
that it purportedly uses to detennine whether 
a broadcast is patently offensive, and has 
declared "fuck" and "shit" presumptively 
indecent. This additional guidance may not 
be sufficient to survive a vagueness 
challenge, but it certainly distinguishes the 
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FCC policy from the one struck down in 
Reno. 
Finally, we reject the FCC's argument that 
the Networks' vagueness challenge is 
foreclosed by Pacifica itself. Pacifica, 
which did not reach the question of whether 
the FCC's policy was unconstitutionally 
vague, was an intentionally narrow opinion 
predIcated on the FCC's "restrained" 
enforcement policy. The FCC's policy has 
now changed and we would be hard pressed 
to characterize it as "restrained." Thus, the 
questions left unresolved by Pacifica are 
now squarely before us, as the Supreme 
Court itself indicated in its opinion above. 
B. 
Having concluded that neither Pacifica nor 
Reno resolves the question, we must now 
decide whether the FCC's indecency policy 
provides a discernible standard by which 
broadcasters can accurately predict what 
speech is prohibited. The FCC set forth its 
indecency policy in its 2001 Industry 
Guidance, in which the FCC explained that 
an indecency finding involved the following 
two determinations: (1) whether the material 
"describe[s] or depict [s] sexual or excretory 
organs or activities"; and (2) whether the 
broadcast is "patently offensive as measured 
by contemporary community standards for 
the broadcast medium." Under the policy, 
whether a broadcast is patently. offensive 
depends on the following three factors: (1) 
"the explicitness or graphic nature of the 
description or depiction"; (2) "whether the 
material dwells on or repeats at length" the 
description or depiction; and (3) "whether 
the material appears to pander or is used to 
titillate, or whether the materials appears to 
have been presented for its shock value." 
Since 2001, the FCC has interpreted its 
indecency policy in a number of decisions, 
including Golden Globes Order and the 
orders on review here. 
The FCC argues that the indecency policy in 
its Industry Guidance, together with its 
subsequent decisions, give the broadcasters 
sufficient notice as to what will be 
considered indecent. The Networks argue 
that the policy is impermissibly vague and 
that the FCC's decisions interpreting. the 
policy only add to the confusion of what will 
be considered indecent. 
We agree with the Networks that the 
indecency policy is impermissibly vague. 
The first problem arises in the FCC's 
determination as to which words or 
expressions are patently offensive. For 
instance, while the FCC concluded that 
"bullshit" in a "NYPD Blue" episode was 
patently offensive, it concluded that "dick" 
and "dickhead" were not. Other expletives 
such as "pissed off," "up yours," "kiss my 
ass," and "wiping his ass" were also not 
found to be patently offensive. The 
Commission argues that its three-factor 
"patently offensive" test gives broadcasters 
fair notice of what it will find indecent. 
However, in each of these cases, the 
Commission's . reasoning consisted of 
repetition of one or more of the factors 
without any discussion of how it applied 
them. Thus, the word "bullshit" is indecent 
because it is "vulgar, graphic and explicit" 
while the words "dickhead" was not 
indecent because it was "not sufficiently 
vulgar, explicit, or graphic." This hardly 
gives broadcasters notice of how the 
Commission will apply the factors in the 
future. 
The English language is· rife with creative 
. ways of depicting sexual or excretory organs 
or activities, and even if the FCC were able 
to provide a complete list of all such 
expressions, new offensive and indecent 
words are invented every day. For many 
years after Pacifica, the FCC decided to 
focus its enforcement efforts solely on the 
seven "dirty" words III the Carlin 
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monologue. This strategy had its 
limitations-it meant that some indecent 
speech that did not employ these seven 
words slipped through the cracks. However, 
it had the advantage of providing 
broadcasters with a clear list of words that 
were prohibited. Not surprisingly, in the 
nine years between Pacifica and the FCC's 
abandonment of this policy, not a single 
enforcement action was brought. This could 
be because we lived in a simpler time before 
such foul language was common. Or, it 
could be that the FCC's policy was 
sufficiently clear that broadcasters knew 
what was prohibited. 
The FCC argues that a flexible standard is 
necessary precisely because the list was not 
effective-broadcasters simply found 
offensive ways· of depicting sexual or 
excretory organs or activities without using 
any of the seven words. In other words, 
. because the FCC cannot anticipate how 
broadcasters will attempt to circumvent the 
prohibition on indecent speech, the FCC 
needs the maximum amount of flexibility to 
be able to decide what is indecent. The 
observation that people will always find a 
way to subvert censorship laws may expose 
a certain futility in the FCC's crusade 
against indecent speech, but it does not 
provide a justification for implementing a 
vague, indiscernible standard. If the FCC 
cannot anticipate what will be considered 
indecent under its policy, then it can hardly 
expect broadcasters to do so. And while the 
FCC characterizes all broadcasters as 
consciously trying to push the envelope on 
what is permitted, much like a petulant 
teenager angling for a later curfew, the 
Networks have expressed a good faith desire 
to comply with the FCC's indecency regime. 
They simply want to know with some 
degree of certainty what the policy is so that 
they can comply with it. The First 
Amendment requires nothing less. 
The same vagueness problems plague the 
FCC's presumptive prohibition on the words 
"fuck" and "shit" and the exceptions thereto. 
Under the FCC's current policy, all variants 
of these two words are indecent unless one 
of two exceptions apply. The first is the 
"bona fide news" exception, which the FCC 
has failed to explain except to say that it is 
not absolute. The second is the artistic 
necessity exception, in which fleeting 
expletives are permissible if they are 
"demonstrably essential to the nature of an 
miistic or educational work or essential to 
informing viewers on a matter of public 
importance." In deciding whether this 
exception applies, the FCC "consider[ s] 
whether the material has any social, 
scientific or artistic value." 
* * * 
There is little rhyme or reason to these 
decisions and broadcasters m'e left to guess 
whether an expletive will be deemed 
"integral" to a program or whether the FCC 
will·consider a particular broadcast a "bona 
fide news interview." 
The FCC created these exceptions because it 
recognized that an outright ban on certain 
words would raise grave First Amendment 
concerns. In the Omnibus Order, the FCC 
"recognize[ d] the need for caution with 
respect to complaints implicating the 
editorial judgment of broadcast licensees in 
presenting news and public affairs 
programming, as these matters are at the 
core of the First Amendment's free press 
guarantee." . Likewise, in applying the 
"mtistic necessity" exception, the FCC noted 
that it was obligated to "proceed with due 
respect for the high value our Constitution 
places on freedom and choice in what the 
people say and hear," particularly with 
respect to speech that has "social, scientific 
or artistic value." It is these same concerns 
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that informed the FCC's original 
"restrained" enforcement policy, which had 
the advantage of prohibiting the most 
egregious instances of indecent speech while 
minimizing the burden on protected speech. 
The FCC's current indecency policy 
undoubtedly gives the FCC more flexibility, 
but this flexibility comes at a price. The 
"artistic necessity" and "bona fide news" 
exceptions allow the FCC to decide, in each 
case, whether the First Amendment is 
implicated. The policy may maximize the 
amount of speech that the FCC can prohibit, 
but it results in a standard that even the FCC 
cannot articulate or apply consistently. Thus, 
it found the use of the word "bullshitter" on 
CBS's The Early Show to be "shocking and 
gratuitous" because it occurred "during a 
morning television interview," before 
reversing itself because the broadcast was a 
"bona fide news interview." In other words, 
the FCC reached diametrically opposite 
conclusions at different stages of the 
proceedings for precisely the same reason-
that the word "bullshitter" was uttered 
during a news program. And when Judge 
Leval asked during oral argument if a 
program about the dangers of pre-marital 
sex designed for teenagers would be 
permitted, the most that the FCC's lawyer 
could say was "I suspect it would." With 
millions of . dollars and core First 
Amendment values at stake, "I suspect" is 
simply not good enough. 
With the FCC's indiscernible standards 
come the risk that such standards will be 
enforced in a discriminatory inanner. The 
vagueness doctrine is intended, in part, to 
avoid that risk. If government officials are 
permitted to make decisions on an "ad hoc" 
basis, there is a risk that those decisions will 
reflect the officials' subjective biases. Thus, 
in the licensing context, the Supreme' Court 
has consistently rejected regulations that 
gIve government officials too much 
. discretion because "such discretion has the 
potential for becoming a means of 
suppressing a particular point of view." 
We have no reason to suspect that the FCC 
is using its indecency policy as a means of 
suppressing particular points of view. But 
even the risk of such SUbjective, content-
based decision-making raises grave concerns 
under the First Amendment. Take, for 
example, the disparate treatment of "Saving 
Private Ryan" and the documentary, "The 
Blues." The FCC decided that the words 
"fuck" and ·"shit" were· integral to the 
"realism and immediacy of the film 
experience for viewers" in "Saving Private 
Ryan," but not in "The Blues." Fox, 489 
F.3d at 463. We query how fleeting 
expletives could be more essential to the 
"realism" of a fictional movie than to the 
"realism" of interviews with real people 
about real life events, and it is hard not to 
speculate that the FCC was simply more 
comfortable with the themes in "Saving 
Private Ryan," a mainstream movie with a 
familiar cultural milieu, than it was with 
"The Blues," which largely profiled an 
outsider genre of musical experience. But 
even if there were a perfectly benign way of 
explaining these particular outcomes, 
nothing would prevent the FCC from 
applying its indecency. policy in a 
discriminatory manner in the future. As the 
Supreme Court explained in Forsyth: 
It is not merely thesporlldic abuse of 
power by the censor but the 
pervasive threat inherent in its very 
existence that constitutes the danger 
to freedom of discussion. 
Accordingly, the success of a facial 
challenge on the grounds that an 
ordinance delegates overly broad 
discretion to the decisionmaker rests 
not on whether the administrator has 
exercised his discretion in a content-
based manner, but whether there is 
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anything in the ordinance preventing 
him from doing so. 
505 U.S. at 133 n. 10, 112 S.Ct. 2395 
(internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
The FCC argues that its context-based 
approach is consistent with, indeed even 
required by, Pacifica. While Pacifica 
emphasized the importance of context in 
regulating indecent broadcasts, it did so in 
order to emphasize the limited scope of its 
holding, finding that the particular "context" 
of the Carlin monologue justified an 
intrusion on broadcasters rights under the 
First Amendment. It does not follow that the 
FCC can justify any decision to. sanction 
indecent speech by citing "context." Of 
course, context is always relevant, and we 
do not mean to suggest otherwise in this 
opinion. But the FCC. still must have 
discernible standards by which individual 
contexts are judged. 
The FCC assures us that it will "bend over 
backwards" to protect editorial jUdgment, at 
least in the news context, but such 
assurances are not sufficient given the 
record before us. Instead, the FCC should 
bend over backwards to create a standard 
that gives broadcasters the notice that is 
required by the First Amendment. 
III. 
Under the current policy, broadcasters must 
choose between not airing or censoring 
controversial programs and risking massive 
fines or possibly even loss of their licenses, 
and it is not surprising which option they 
choose. Indeed, there is ample evidence in 
the record that the FCC's indecency policy 
has chilled protected speech. 
For instance, several CBS affiliates declined 
to air the Peabody Award-winning "9/11~' 
documentary, which contains real audio 
. footage-including occasional expletives-
of firefighters in the World Trade Center on 
September 11 tho Although the documentary 
had previously aired twice without 
complaint, fohowing the Golden Globes 
Order affiliates could no longer be sure 
whether the expletives contained in the 
documentary could be found indecent. In yet 
another example, a radio station cancelled a 
planned reading of Tom Wolfe's novel 1 Am 
Charlotte Simmons, based on a single 
complaint it received about the "adult" 
language in the book, because the station 
feared FCC action. When the program was 
reinstated . two weeks later, the station 
decided that it could only safely. air the 
program during the "safe harbor" period. 
The FCC's application of its policy to live 
broadcasts creates an even more profound 
chilling effect. In the case of the 2003 
Billboard· Music Awards broadcasts, Fox 
had an audio delay system in place to bleep 
fleeting expletives. It also pre-cleared the 
scripts of the presenters. Ritchie, however, 
departed from her script and used three 
expletives in rapid sequence. While the 
person . employed to monitor and bleep 
expletives was bleeping the first, the 
following two slipped through. Even 
elaborate precautions will not protect a 
broadcaster against such occurrences. The 
FCC argues that Fox should simply 
implement a more effeCtive screening 
system, but, short of giving up live 
broadcasting altogether, no system will ever 
be one. hundred percent effective. Instead, 
Fox may decide not to ask individuals with a 
history of using profanity to present at its 
awards shows. But, of course, this will not 
prevent someone who wins an award-such 
as Cher or Bono-from using fleeting· 
expletives. In fact, the only way that Fox can 
be sure that it won't be sanctioned by the 
FCC is by refusing to air the broadcast live. 
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This chilling effect extends to news and 
public affairs programming as. well. 
Broadcasters may well decide not to invite 
controversial guests on totheir programs for 
fear that an unexpected fleeting expletive 
will result in fines. The FCC points to its 
"bona fide news" exception to show that 
such fears would be unfounded. But the 
FCC has made clear that it considers the 
decision to apply this exception a matter 
within its . discretion. Otherwise, why not 
simply make an outright news exception? 
During the previous proceedings before this 
Couti, amicus curiae gave the example of a 
local station in Vermont that refused to ail' a 
political debate because one of the local 
politicians involved had previously used 
expletives on air. The record contains other 
examples of local stations that have forgone 
live programming in order to avoid fines. 
For instance, Phoenix TV stations dropped 
live coverage of a memorial service for Pat 
Tillman, the former football star killed in 
Afghanistan, because of language used by 
Tilliman's family members to express their 
grief. A station in Moosic, Pennsylvania 
submitted an affidavit stating that in the 
wake of the FCC's new policy, it had 
decided to no longer provide live, direct-to-
air coverage of news events "unless they 
affect matters of public safety or 
convenience." If the FCC's policy is 
allowed t6 remain in place, there will 
undoubtedly be countless other situations 
where broadcasters will exercise their 
editorial judgment and decline to pursue 
contentious people or subjects, 01' will 
eschew live programming altogether, in 
order to avoid the FCC's fines. This chill 
reaches speech at the heart of the First 
Amendment. 
The chill of protected speech has even 
extended to programs that contain no 
expletives, but which contain reference to or 
discussion of sex, sexual organs, or 
excretion. For instance, Fox decided not to 
re-broadcast an episode of "That 70s Show" 
that dealt with masturbation, even though it 
neither depicted the act or discussed it in 
specific terms. The episode subsequently 
won an award from the Kaiser Family 
Foundation for its honest and accurate 
depiction of a sexual health issue. Similarly, 
an episode of "House" was re-written after 
concerns that one of the character's 
struggles with psychiatric issues related to 
his sexuality would be considered indecent 
by the FCC. 
As these examples illustrate, the absence of 
reliable guidance in the FCC's standards 
chills a vast amount of protected speech 
dealing with some of the most important and 
universal themes in art and literature. Sex 
and the magnetic power of sexual attraction 
are surely among the most predominant 
themes in the study of humanity since the 
Trojan War. The digestive system and 
excretion. are also important areas of human 
attention. . By prohibiting all "patently 
offensive" references to sex, sexual organs, 
and excretion without giving adequate 
guidance as to what "patently offensive" 
means, the FCC effectively chills speech, 
because broadcasters have no way of 
knowing what the FCC will find offensive. 
To place any discussion of these vast topics 
at the broadcaster's peril has the effect of 
promoting wide self-censorship of valuable 
material which should be completely 
protected under the First Amendment. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we strike down· 
the FCC's indecency policy. We do not 
suggest that the FCC could not create a 
constitutional policy. We hold only that the 
FCC's current policy fails constitutional 
scrutiny. The petition for review is hereby 
GRANTED. 
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"FCC's Rules Against Nudity, Profanity Will Be 
Reviewed" 
Wall Street Journal 
June 28, 2011 
Brent Kendall & Amy Schatz 
The constitutionality of federal rules that 
effectively bar the broadcast of nudity and 
profanity when children are likely to be 
tuned in will be taken up by the Supreme 
Court in its next term, the justices said 
Monday. 
The case, brought by broadcasters seeking to 
overtum the Federal Communications 
Commission's curbs on indecent broadcast 
speech, sets up an oppoliunity for the 
Robelis Court to break new ground on free-
speech rights. 
The Supreme Couli hasn't directly 
addressed the First Amendment issues raised 
by the FCC's longstanding rules against 
broadcast indecency since a 1978 decision 
that allowed the agency to fine a radio 
station for broadcasting a monologue on 
diliy words by the late comedian George 
Carlin. 
A divided couli ruled for the FCC on narrow 
grounds in 2009, finding the agency's 
stepped-up efforts to combat indecency were 
a legally permissible exercise of the 
agency's administrative powers. Now the 
court has indicated it would hear 
broadcasters' arguments that the FCC's 
rules are unconstitutional and no longer 
necessary as cable and broadband have 
broken the hold federally licensed 
broadcasters once had over what Americans 
listen to on the radio and watch on 
television. 
FCC rules prohibit station owners from 
airing indecent content, including images 
and words, between the hours of 6 a.m. and 
10 p.m., when children are more likely to be 
in the audience. Although stations can air all 
of the racy content they want in the late 
evening and early morning hours, they 
generally don't out of concern they might 
offend advertisers and viewers. 
One case before the court involves Fox 
Television broadcasts of the 2002 and 2003 
Billboard Music Awards in which Cher and 
Nicole Richie uttered expletives. Another 
case involves ABC's airing of a 2003 
episode of "NYPD Blue" that depicted a 
woman's naked buttocks. The Supreme 
Couli will consider one appeal that 
consolidates the two cases. 
The FCC found Fox was III violation of 
indecency prohibitions but didn't sanction 
the network. In the "NYPD Blue" case, the 
agency fined 45 ABC network-owned or 
affiliated stations that aired the episode. 
Fox is a division of News Corp., which also 
owns The Wall Street J ournal. "We look 
forward to the Supreme Court's review of 
the significant constitutional issues in the 
case. Weare hopeful that the court will 
ultimately agree that the FCC's indecency 
enforcement practices trample on the First 
Amendment rights of broadcasters," a Fox 
spokesman said Monday. 
An FCC spokesman said the agency "is 
.. hopeful that the Court will affirm the 
commission's exercise of its statutory 
responsibility to protect children and 
families from indecent broadcast 
programming." ... 
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"Justices Agree to Consider F.C.C. 
Rules on Indecency" 
New York Times 
June 27,2011 
Edward Wyatt 
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to 
decide whether the Federal Communications 
Commission's policies banning nudity, 
expletives and other indecent content on 
broadcast television and radio violated the 
Constitution. 
The granting of a hearing in the case, F. C. C. 
v. Fox Television Stations, No. 10-1293, 
puts into question whether the court will 
overturn its landmark 1978 ruling on 
indecency, F. C. C. v. Pacifica Foundation. 
The Pacifica decision, which upheld the 
commission's finding that George Carlin's 
classic "seven dirty words" radio monologue 
was indecent, cemented the F.C.C.'s ability 
to police the public airwaves. 
But in the subsequent 33 years, the media 
landscape has markedly changed, causing 
several justices to question in recent 
decisions whether those standards were still 
relevant in a world of unfiltered cable 
television, Internet, film and radio. 
The case is an appeal by the F.C.C. of a 
ruling in 2010 by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit that said the 
commission's policy against "fleeting 
expletives" and other indecency, which it 
measures on a case-by-case basis, was 
"unconstitutionally vague." 
The Supreme Court reframed the case 
slightly, saying it would hear arguments 
only on whether the F.C.C.'s "indecency 
enforcement regime" violated the free 
speech or due process clauses of the. 
Constitution. 
At issue are two live broadcasts on the Fox 
network of the Billboard Music Awards. In 
the first, in 2002, Cher used an obscenity 
while accepting an award. In 2003, Nicole 
Richie, while presenting an award, used two 
vulgarities in explaining how hard it was to 
remove cow manure from a purse. 
The Supreme . Court will also consider 
whether the appeals court was warranted in 
overturning a fine against ABC stations for 
the 2003 broadcast of an episode of the then-
popular ABC series "NYPD Blue" that 
included a naked woman. 
The Fox case has previously come before 
the court. In 2009, the Supreme Court ruled 
in a 5-4 .decision that the commission had 
followed proper administrative procedures 
when it invoked the ban on expletives 
during certain hours against broadcasters. 
But several justices, including at least one 
on each side of the decision, expressed 
skepticism that the ban on expletives was 
constitutional. 
The Obama administration and the F.C.C. 
asked the Supreme· Court to overturn the 
recent· appeals court decision, saying it 
would keep the agency from effectively 
policing the airwaves. 
"We are pleased the Supreme Court will 
review the lower court rulings that blocked 
the F.C.C.'s broadcast indecency policy," a 
spokesman for the F.C.C. said in a 
statement. "We are hopeful that the court 
will affirm the commission's exercise of its 
statutory responsibility to protect children 
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and families from indecent broadcast 
programming." 
Fox said in a statement that it was "hopeful 
that the court will ultimately· agree that the 
F.C;C.'s indecency enforcement practices 
trample on the First Amendment rights of 
broadcasters." ABC also said it believed that 
the Second Circuit was correct and that the 
Supreme Court should affirm that decision. 
The appeals court ruled that the F.C.C.'s 
policy was inconsistent, in part because the 
. commission ruled that Fox stations violated 
its policy with the language on the awards 
shows while it allowed the use of the same 
language in a broadcast of the film "Saving 
Private Ryan." 
While the Pacifica case gave the F.C.C. the 
authority to regulate indecent speech like the 
Carlin monologue, which made deliberate 
and repetitive use of vulgarities, it left 
uncertain whether the use of an occasional 
expletive could be punished. The F.C.C. 
later said it could, and it has generally ruled 
that broadcasters could not allow indecent 
material from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. All of the 
incidents at issue occurred within those 
protected hours. 
The F.C.C. case was one of 11 that the court 
accepted on Monday for its next term . 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who was a judge 
on the Second Circuit before being 
appointed to the Supreme Court, recused 
. herself from consideration of the F.C.C. 
case. 
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"F.C.C. Indecency Policy Rejected on Appeal" 
New York Times 
July 13, 2010 
Edward Wyatt 
A federal appeals court struck down a 
Federal Communications Commission 
policy on indecency Tuesday, saying that 
regulations barring the use of "fleeting 
expletives" on radio and television violated 
the First Amendment because they were 
vague and could inhibit free speech. 
The decision, which many constitutional 
scholars expect to be appealed to the 
Supreme Court, stems from a challenge by 
Fox, CBS and other broadcasters to the 
F.C.C.'s decision in 2004 to begin enforcing 
a stricter standard of what kind of language 
is allowed on free, over-the-air television. 
The stricter policy followed several 
incidents that drew widespread public 
complaint, including Janet Jackson's breast-
baring episode at the 2004 Super Bowl and 
repeated instances of profanity by 
celebrities, including Cher, Paris Hilton and 
Bono, during the live broadcasts of awards 
programs. The Janet Jackson incident did 
not involve speech but it drew wide public 
outrage that spurred a crackdown by the 
F.C.C. 
In a unanimous three-judge decision, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
New York said that the F.C.C.'s current 
policy created "a chilling effect that goes far 
beyond the fleeting expletives at issue here" 
because it left broadcasters without a 
reliable guide to what the commission would 
find offensive. 
The appeals court emphasized that it was not 
precluding federal regulation of broadcast 
standards. "We do not suggest that the 
F.C.C. could not create a constitutional 
policy," the court said. "We hold only that 
the F.C.C.'s current policy fails 
constitutional scrutiny." 
But if the commission decides to appeal the 
ruling-the latest in a string of court 
decisions questioning its ability to regulate 
media-it almost certainly lUllS the risk that 
the . Supreme Court could reverse 
longstanding precedents· that subject 
broadcast content to indecency standards 
that are not allowed for any other media. 
Julius Genachowski, the chairman of the 
F.C.C., said in a statement that the 
commlSSlOn was "reviewing the court's 
decision in light of our commitment to 
protect children, empower parents, and 
uphold the First Amendment." 
In a statement, Fox said it was extremely 
pleased by Tuesday's decision. "We have 
always felt that ·the government's position 
on fleeting expletives was unconstitutional," 
said the company, a unit of the News 
Corporation. "While we will continue to 
strive to eliminate expletives from live 
broadcasts, the inherent challenges 
broadcasters face with live television, 
coupled with the human element required 
for monitoring, must allow for the 
unfortunate isolated instances where 
inappropriate language slips through." 
The case, known as Fox Television Stations 
Inc. Y. F.c.c., has already been to the 
Supreme Court on a technical matter that did 
not involve its constitutionality. In 2009, the 
justices ruled that the F.C.C.'s indecency 
standard was not "arbitrary and capricious" 
and therefore was allowable. 
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Rodney A. Smolla, a First Amendment 
scholar who is president of Furman 
University in Greenville, S.C., said that the 
Supreme Court had .been clear in ruling that 
when the government created rules about 
what a person could and could not say, "you 
have to be very specific about what is in 
bounds and what is out of bounds." 
"This decision demands of the F.C.C. that it 
regulate with precision and not use general 
terms like 'indecency,'" Mr. Smolla said. 
Before 2004, the F.C.C. consistently held 
that occasional, spontaneous use of certain 
words that were otherwise prohibited did not 
violate its indecency standards. But as 
complaints multiplied over the celebrity 
obscenities and the Janet Jackson episode, 
the F.C.C., under Michael K. Powell, then 
its chairman, tightened its standard and 
Congress increased the potential fine for 
indecency violations tenfold, to up to 
$325,000 per episode. 
Tuesday's decision takes the F.C.C. back to 
.. the Supreme Court;s ruling in 1978 in 
F. C. C. v. Pacifica Foundation, which 
upheld the commission's finding that 
George Carlin's classic "seven dirty words" 
radio monologue, with its deliberate and 
repetitive use of vulgarities over 12 minutes, 
was indecent. At that time, the court left 
open the question of whether the use of "an 
occasional expletive" could be punished. 
In 2009, when the Supreme Court first 
rejected the appeals court's ruling, justices, 
including Clarence Thomas, who was in the 
majority of the 5-4 decision, and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, who dissented, indicated that they 
had questions about the First Amendment 
issues in the F.C.C. indecency policy and 
whether existing standards were still 
. relevant. 
The appeals court picked up on that theme in 
Tuesday's decision, noting that the media . 
landscape was much different in 2010 than it 
was in 1978. 
"Technological changes have given parents 
the ability to decide which programs they 
will permit their children to watch," the 
appeals court said. Noting that it was bound 
by the Supreme Court's Pacifica decision, 
the court said that it nevertheless wondered 
why broadcasters were still subject to 
restrictions that, in the case of cable 
television, would be found to violate the 
First Amendment. 
Ted Lempert, president of Children Now, 
said that while the court's decision was 
troubling, it also emphasized the need for 
clarity about broadcast standards. "It's of 
concern because the F.C.C. has been a 
critical protector of children's interests when 
. it comes to media,". he said, adding that he 
expects that the commission will try to 
construct a more targeted approach to 
keeping indecency off the airwaves at times 
when children are likely to be watching. 
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'''Fleeting Expletive' Ban Lifted" 
SCOTUSblog 
July 13, 2010 
Lyle Denniston 
Reacting to a Supreme Court order to take a 
new look at "indecency" on radio and TV, 
the Second Circuit Court suggested on 
Tuesday that constitutional law on free 
speech may need to be updated for the 
Digital Age, especially now that "new 
offensive and indecent words are invented 
every day." Ev~n so, applying First 
Amendment doctrine as it now exists, the 
three~judge panel struck down the Federal 
Communications Commission's ban on the 
day and evening broadcast of even single 
"fleeting expletives." If the Obama 
Administration plans to continue defending 
the ban, the case could be on its way back to 
the Supreme Court. 
In a 32-page opinion that makes liberal use 
of the actual four-letter versions of the "F-
Word" and "S-Word" and variations of 
them, the Circuit Court said the FCC's six-
year-old ban' is unconstitutionally vague, 
because it is littered with exceptions that 
make it unclear to broadcasters what is 
allowed and what is not. The case is Fox 
. Television Stations, et al., v. FCC (lead 
Circuit Court docket is 06-1760). With 
"massive fines" and free speech rights 
vitally at stake, the Court said, the broadcast 
industry is taking the option of censoring 
itself-including its news programs-to 
avoid violating the policy. 
The Circuit Court looked back, quite 
skeptically, at the Supreme Court's 1978 
Supreme Court ruling that first upheld FCC 
authority to regulate "indecent" radio or TV 
broadcasts (FCC v. Pacifica Foundation), 
and noted that broadcasters and the FCC are 
still in dispute about just how much 
authority the Commission has under that 
ruling. But the Circuit Court said it need not 
resolve that dispute, since it found that the 
current policy adopted in 2005 simply fails a 
traditional . First Amendment test for 
vagueness. 
The panel, in an opinion written by Circuit 
Judge Rosemary S. Pooler and joined by 
Circuit Judge Peter W. Hall and Senior 
Circuit Judge Pierre N. Leval, readily 
accepted the broadcast networks' argument 
that "the world has changed" since the 
Pacifica decision. It commented: 
"We face a media landscape that would have 
been almost unrecognizable in 1978. Cable 
television was still in its infancy. The 
Internet was a project run out of the 
Department of Defense with several hundred 
users. Not only did Youtube, Facebook, and 
Twitter not exist, but their founders were 
either still in diapers or not yet conceived. In 
this environment, broadcast television 
undoubtedly possessed as 'l..miquely 
. pervasive presence in the lives of all 
Americans. ' 
"The same cannot be said today. The past 
thirty years has seen an explosion of media 
sources, and broadcast television has 
become only one voice in the chorus. Cable 
television is almost as pervasive as 
broadcast-almost 87 percent of households 
subscribe to a cable or satellite service-and 
most viewers can alternate between 
broadcast and non-broadcast channels with a 
click of their remote control.. .. The internet, 
too, has become omnipresent, ofering access 
to everything from viral videos to feature 
films and, yes, even broadcast television 
programs." 
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It went on to note that technological change 
has given parents clear control over what 
their children can see and hear on television. 
Noting that the Supreme Court had 
considered such changing circumstances in 
deciding to give cable TV full, rather than 
qualified, First Amendment protection from 
government regulation, the Circuit Court 
said it could "think of no reason why this 
rationale for applying strict scrutiny in the 
case of cable television would not apply 
with equal force to broadcast television" in 
light of the parental control technology now 
available. 
Still, it conceded that, as a lower federal 
court, it was bound by Supreme Court 
precedent, "regardless of whether it reflects 
today's realities. The Supreme Court may 
decide, in due course, to overrule Pacifica 
and subj ect speech restrictions in the 
broadcast context to strict scrutiny." But it 
has not done so yet, so, the panel said, it was 
bound not to anticipate such a change. 
But, rather than sort out just what Pacifica 
means in the present communications 
environment, the panel simply resOlted to 
vagueness doctrine, and found that the 
Commission had been unable to show, with 
any clarity, just what is now banned, and' 
what is now allowed, on radio and TV in 
either entertainment or news progra!.111.lling. 
. It thus nullified the policy outright. 
The Circuit Court had the case retumed to it 
by the Supreme Court in April last year in a 
5-4 decision. The majority ruled then that 
the FCC's ban on "fleeting expletives" did 
not violate the federal statutes under which 
the FCC operates. But that ruling· did not 
resolve the broadcast industry's 
constitutional challenges to the ban, leaving 
that to the Second Circuit in the first 
instance, leading to Tuesday's ruling. 
. The FCC now has the option of seeking en 
banc review by the full Second Circuit, or of 
taking the case on to the Supreme Court, if it 
wishes to try to resurrect the ban. 
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"Supreme Court Rulesthat Government Can 
Fine for 'Fleeting Expletives'" 
Washington Post 
April 29, 2009 
Robert Barnes 
The Supreme Court said yesterday that the 
Federal Communications Commission may 
penalize even the occasional use of certain 
expletives on the airwaves but left for 
another day the question of whether such a 
policy is constitutional. 
The court's narrow ruling said the FCC-
prompted by Cher's use of the F-word 
during a 2002 live broadcast and similar 
remarks by what Justice Antonin Scalia 
called "foul-mouthed glitteratae from 
Hollywood"-was justified in changing its 
policy in 2004 to fine broadcasters up to 
$325,000 every time certain words are 
allowed on the air. 
"The commission could reasonably conclude 
that the pervasiveness of foul language, and 
the coarsening of public entertainment in 
other media such as cable, justify more 
stringent regulation of broadcast programs 
so as to give conscientious parents a 
relatively safe haven for their children," 
Scalia wrote for the five-member 
conservative majority. 
Fox Television Stations and other networks 
had challenged FCC's actions under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. They said the 
agency did not adequately explain why it 
changed its policy, which previously held 
that one-time utterances of expletives did 
not constitute a violation of FCC rules. 
The networks also challenged the rule under 
the First Amendment,' but, like the U.S. 
C<?urt of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
New York, the Supreme Court did not rule 
on the question of constitutionality. 
"Whether [the policy] is unconstitutional 
will be determined soon enough, perhaps in 
this very case," Scalia wrote in sending the 
case back to the appeals court. In the 
meantime, any suppressed "references to 
excretory and sexual material surely lie at 
the periphery of First Amendment concern." 
The Parents Television Council, which had 
. strenuously lobbied the commission to adopt 
the tougher stance, called the ruling "an 
incredible victory for families." It called on 
the FCC to "use today's opinion to . . . rule 
on the merits of the tens of thousands of 
indecency complaints currently awaiting 
review at the Commission." 
Fox said it was disappointed but "optimistic 
that we will ultimately prevail when the 
First Amendment issues are fully aired 
before the courts." 
. Jqstices Clarence Thomas, who aligned with 
the majority, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who 
dissented, expressed constitutional concerns. 
Thomas said he was "open" to reviewing the 
court's decisions that gave the FCC 
constitutional authority to police the 
airwaves, and Ginsburg said there is "no 
way to hide the long shadow the First 
Amendment casts over what the commission 
has done." 
The lingering constitutional question and 
instability at the FCC make it unclear how 
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the· commission will react to the decision. 
Two seats on the five-member agency are 
empty, and Julius Genachowski, President 
Obama's nominee to head the FCC, has not 
been confirmed by the Senate. Genachowski 
seems not to take as high· an interest in 
violations of indecency rules as the previous 
chairman, Kevin Martin, who made the 
crackdown a priority. 
But Jessica Zufolo, an analyst at the research 
firm Medley Global Advisors, said 
Genachowski will hear from members of 
Congress who strongly support rules on 
broadcast indecency. 
"Congress is very buillish on upholding the 
FCC's indecency rules, so we expect a 
tremendous amount of pressure on the FCC 
in the aftermath of this decision," Zufolo 
said. 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. joined 
Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Samuel A. 
Alito Jr., Thomas and Scalia in the majority 
that upheld the FCC's action in the case, 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations. Six of the 
nine justices wrote separate, occasionally 
biting opinions to explain their decisions and 
criticize the others. 
The court made it through an hour of oral 
arguments in the fall and yesterday's 
decision announcement without using the 
offending words. But Scalia yesterday 
recounted some of the events that led to the 
FCC's change of policy by substituting what 
he said "we will call the F-word and the S-
word." 
First, there was Cher, who responded to her 
critics aftel.' winning an award at the 2002 
Billboard Music Awards by saying, to use 
Scalia's alternative, "So F 'em." Celebrity 
Nicole Richie complained on air that getting 
the S-word out of a Prada purse was not so 
"F-ing simple," Scalia recalled. 
Those and other incidents-such as Janet 
Jackson's exposed breast during the 2004 
Super Bowl halftime show, not an issue in 
this case-outraged the public. 
But the appeals couli struck the agency's 
toughened rules, saying it had failed to 
"articulate a reasoned basis" for the policy 
change. 
Scalia and the majority disagreed, saying the 
commission was fulfilling its mission from 
Congress to patrol the airwaves for 
descriptions or depictions of sexual or 
excretory functions, whether used literally or 
as expletives. 
"Programming replete with one-word 
indecent expletives will tend to produce 
children who 'use (at least) one-word 
indecent expletives," Scalia wrote. 
But Justice Stephen G. Breyer said the 
agency does not have "the freedom to 
change major policies on the basis of 
nothing more than political considerations or 
even personal whim." His dissent was joined 
by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. 
Souter and Ginsburg. 
It has been 30 years since the court 
considered the afternoon radio broadcast of 
comedian George Carlin's "Filthy Words" 
monologue and decided that the government 
can police the nation's airwaves without 
violating the First Amendment. 
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Knox v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 1000 
10-1121 
Ruling Below: Knox v. California State Employees Ass'n, Local lOOO, Servo Employees Int'l 
Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 628 FJd 1115 (9th Circ. 2010) cert. granted, 10-1121,2011 WL 863866 
. (U.S. JlU1e 27, 2011). 
Plaintiffs in this case represent two classes: those who objected to the lU1ion's 2005 Hudson 
notice and those.that did not [unions must explain basis for assessment and the right to object]. 
. After issuing their 2005 Hudson notice, lU1ion officials voted to approve a special assessment to 
fund a "Political Fight Back Fund" to combat against what the union perceived as potentially 
unfavorable contemplated government action. Plaintiffs filed suit claiming the assessment and 
the subsequent fee increase violated their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In 2007 
the district court found for the plaintiffs, holding that an additional Hudson notice should have 
been provided. In 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The cOUli applied a balancing test under 
Hudson, balancing the union's interest in avoiding free rider issues against the employees' 
interest in avoiding compelled subsidy of speech. 
Questions Presented: (1) Maya State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
condition employment on the payment of a special lU1ion assessment intended solely for political 
and ideological expenditures without first providing a notice that includes information about that 
assessment and provides an opportunity to object to its exaction? (2) Maya State, consistent with 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, condition continued public employment on the payment 
of union agency fees for purposes of financing political expenditures for ballot measures? 
Dianne KNOX; William L. Blaylock; Robert A. Conover; Edward L. Dobrowolslti, Jr.; 
Karyn Gil; Thomas Jacob Hass;·Patrick Johnson; Jon Jumper, On Behalf of Themselves 
and the Class They Seek to Represent, Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1000, SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL -CIO - CLC, Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
Steve Westly, Controller,State of California, Defendant. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Filed December 10,2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citation omitted.] 
THOMAS, Circuit Judge: 
This appeal presents the question of whether 
a union is required, pursuant to Chicago 
Teachers Union V. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 
106 S.Ct. 1066, 89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986), in 
addition to an annual fee notice to 
nonmembers, to send a second notice when 
adopting a temporary, mid-term fee 
increase. Under the circumstances presented 
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by this case, we conclude that a. second 
notice is not required, and we reverse the 
judgment of the district court. 
I 
A 
Congress has long recognized the 
. "important contribution of the union shop to 
the system of labor relations." The Supreme 
Court has underscored this Congressional 
policy by enforcing the right ofa union, as 
the exclusive collective bargaining 
representative of its employees, to require 
nonunion employees to pay a fair share of 
the union's costs. However, the Supreme 
Court has also recognized the First 
Amendment limitation on collection of fees 
from dissenting employees for the suppOli of 
ideological causes not germane to the 
union's duties as collective-bargaining 
agent. 
In Hudson, the Supreme Court established 
certain procedural safeguards to balance 
these interests by requiring "an adequate 
explanation of the basis for the fee, a 
reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge 
the amount of the fee before an impartial 
decisionmaker, and an escrow for the 
amounts reasonably in dispute while such 
challenges are pending." Notices issued 
pursuant to this language have become 
known as "Hudson notice[s]." 
After receiving a Hudson notice, "the 
nonunion employee has the burden of 
raising an objection, but '" the union retains 
the burden of proof' as to the appropriate 
proportion of fair share fees. It is the 
policies underlying Hudson. that inform the 
determination of whether a Hudson notice is 
adequate: "Basic considerations of faimess, 
as well as concem for the First Amendment 
rights at stake, . . . dictate that the potential 
objectors be given sufficient information to 
gauge the propriety of the union's fee." 
B 
This appeal involves the adequacy of a 
Hudson notice given by SEIU Local 1000 
(the "Union"), the exclusive bargaining 
agent for Califomia state employees. The 
Union and the State of Califomia have 
entered into a series of Memoranda of 
Understanding controlling the terms and 
conditions . of employment for employees, 
including a provision requiring that all State 
employees in these bargaining units join the 
Union as formal Union members, or if 
opting not to join, pay an "agency" or "fair 
share" fee to the Union for its 
representational efforts on their behalf. The 
agency fee is calculated as a percentage of 
the Union dues paid by members of the 
Union. 
The Union issues a Hudson notice to all 
nonmembers every June. The 
constitutionally required notice is meant to 
provide nonmembers with an adequate 
explanation of the basis of the agency fee. 
The notice contains information regarding 
the Union's expenditures from the most 
recently audited prior year, broken down by 
maj or category of expense and then, within 
each category, allocated between 
"chargeable" and "non-chargeable" 
classifications. "Chargeable" expenses are 
those that are "germane" to the union's 
representational functions, and can be 
charged to all nonmembers of the union. 
"Non-chargeable" expenses are those 
unrelated to the union's representational 
functions, such as partisan political 
expenditures or purely ideological issues. 
The union may charge nonmembers for non-
chargeable expenses, but the nonmember 
has the option to object, and only be charged 
a reduced agency fee based upon the percent 
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of the union's total expenditures that can be 
classified as "chargeable." In addition, the 
nonmember is not charged for certain union-
sponsored benefits, such as a credit union 
credit card, that are not available to 
nonmembers. 
The financial information in the notice 
forms the basis for calculating the fee to be 
paid by nonmembers during the ensuing fee 
year. The notice also provides that for thirty 
days after the notice is issued, nonunion 
employees can object to the collection ofthe 
full agency fee, and elect instead to only pay 
a reduced rate during the upcoming fee year 
based on the percentage ratio of chargeable 
expenditures to total expenditures. During 
that thirty day period, nonmembers can 
challenge the Union's calculation of its 
chargeable and non-chargeable expenses, to 
be resolved by an impartial decision maker. 
A given agency fee is in effect from July 1 
through June 30 of the following year (the 
"fee year"), at which point the agency fee 
set forth in the Union's next Hudson notice 
goes into effect. The 2005 Hudson notice set 
the agency fee to be paid by nonunion 
employees as 99.1% of the Union dues. The 
reduced agency fee of 56.35% of Union 
dues would be charged to nonmembers who 
objected to paying the full agency fee, and 
who requested a· reduction pursuant to the 
procedures and deadlines outlined in the 
notice. The notice explicitly stated dues and 
fees were subject to change without further 
notice to fee payers. 
During the summer of 2005, the legislative 
bodies within the Union debated and 
approved a temporary assessment (also 
referred to as a dues and fees increase) equal 
to .0025, or .25% of Union members' gross 
wages. The increase took effect at the end of 
September 2005 and terminated at the end of 
December 2006, and was expected to raise 
$12 million for the Union. 
Specifically, on July 30, 2005 the Union's 
Budget Committee proposed an emergency 
temporary assessment to create what· was 
termed in the agenda item introducing it as a 
"Political Fight Back Fund." This agenda 
item stated the Fund "will be used for a 
broad range of political expenses" in 
response to several "anti-union" 
propositions on the November 2005 special 
election ballot in California, and that the 
fund "will not be used for regular costs of 
the union-such as office rent, staff salaries 
or routine equipment replacement." On 
August 27, 2005 Union delegates voted to 
implement the temporary dues increase. On 
August 31, 2005, the Union sent a letter to 
all members and agency fee payers stating 
that they were subject to the new increase, 
and that the fund would be used. "to defeat 
Propositions 76 and 75," other future attacks 
on the Union pension plan, and other 
activities. 
The Union material indicated that the fund 
would be used for political activities. Yet, in 
response to inquiries, the Union specifically 
stated it intended to split the increase 
"between political actions and collective 
bargaining actions." Further, not all of the 
political activities fell into the "non-
chargeable" category. The assessment itself 
included no spending limitations, and the 
money was actually used for a range of 
activities, both political and not, and both 
chargeable and not. Pursuant to the increase, 
the Controller began collecting additional 
fees from Plaintiffs at the end of September 
2005. 
Plaintiffs represent two classes of nonunion 
employees, those who objected. to the 
Union's 2005 Hudson notice ("objectors") 
and those who did not ("nonobjectors") 
(collectively "Plaintiffs"). Plaintiffs initiated 
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this action in November 2005, alleging the 
assessment violated their First, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs filed for summary 
judgment, and the Union filed a cross-
motion for partial summary judgment. The 
district court granted Plaintiffs' motion in its 
entirety, and partially granted and partially 
denied the Union's motion. This timely 
appeal followed. 
We review de novo a district cOUli's grant of 
summary judgment on the sufficiency of the 
Hudson notice. On review, we must 
determine, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving patiy, 
whether there at'e any genuine issues of 
material fact and whether the district court 
correctly applied the relevant substantive 
law. 
II 
A 
In reviewing the adequacy of the Hudson 
notice, we employ our usual standard of 
review, as dictated by Hudson. In that case, 
the . Supreme COUli articulated the legal 
standard to be applied in this analysis as a 
balancing test, stating that "[t]he objective 
must be to devise a way of preventing 
compulsory subsidization of ideological 
activity by employees who object thereto 
without restricting the Union's ability to 
require every employee to contribute to the 
cost of collective-bargaining activities." 
The Plaintiffs argue we should abandon the 
balancing test established in Hudson, in 
favor of strict scrutiny review. They argue 
that this case involves compelling their 
speech on political issues, and that therefore 
the government-mandated speech cases, and 
their application of strict scrutiny should 
apply .... We disagree. 
First, Hudson itself articulated the legal 
standard to be applied, and we are not free to 
rej ect the balancing test mandated by the 
Supreme Court. 
Second, we articulated the test in Grunwald 
v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 
994 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir.l993). We noted in 
that case that in challenges to the First 
Amendment procedure used by unions, the 
union need not employ procedures that 
"would minimize fmiher the burden on 
agency fee payers." "The test, after all, is 
not whether the union and the [employer] 
have come up with the system that imposes 
the least burden on agency fee payers, 
regardless of cost (a test no system could 
possibly satisfy); rather we inquire whether 
the system reasonably accommodates the 
legitimate interests of the union, the [public 
employer] and nonmember employees." 
Therefore, we will apply the normal Hudson 
balancing and reasonable accommodation 
test we have used in the past when deciding 
challenges to Hudson notice procedures .. 
B 
Applying the balancing test, we conclude 
that the Union did not violate the Hudson 
requirements. The Supreme COUli in Hudson 
recognized the impossibility of determining 
the chargeability of a union's anticipated 
expenditures at the outset of the fee year, 
and specifically approved calculating the 
present year's objector fee based on the 
prior year's total expenditures. The Supreme 
Court explained, "We continue to recognize 
that there are practical reasons why absolute 
. precision in the calculation of the charge to 
nonmembers cannot be expected or required. 
Thus, for instance, the Union cannot be 
faulted for calculating its fee on the basis of 
its expenses during the preceding year." 
Hudson thus struck a balance between the 
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rights and burdens III this context, 
acknowledging that a union is not 
constitutionally required to take any and all 
steps demanded by fee payers to insure that 
its annual fee notice accurately predicts its 
actual spending in the upcoming year. 
Use of the prior year method is a practical 
necessity because, for large public sector 
unions, the Hudson notice must be based on 
audited financial statements, with the 
union's chargeable percentage calculation 
verified by an independent auditor, and the 
union must send its fee payers the 
independent auditor's report with its Hudson 
notice. The audit requirement renders. 
impossible any method of determining the 
charge ability of the upcoming fee year's 
expenditures other than basing it on the prior 
year's actual expenditures, because one 
cannot audit anticipated future expenditures. 
Until the money has been spent, the auditor 
cannot determine whether the expenditures 
which the union claims it made for celiain 
expenses were actually made for those 
expenses. 
The inevitable effect of the Hudson "prior 
year" method is a lag of at least one year 
between the time when a union incurs 
expenditures and when the audited ratio of 
its chargeable expenditures· to total 
expenditures is applied to calculate the 
objectors' fee for the next year. Fluctuation 
is inherent in such a method: in each year, 
objectors may be "underpaying" or 
"overpaying" fees when compared to the 
chargeable percentage of the union's actual 
expenditures in that year because under 
Hudson's "prior year" method the fee is 
based upon the chargeable percentage of the 
prior year's actual expenses, but the 
inevitable effect of the Hudson method is 
that these over-and undercharges even out 
over time. The Hudson notice can never be 
more than a prediction, which will 
inevitably be incorrect as to the union's 
actual expenditures. The Hudson notice is 
not, and cannot be expected to be, p!ore than 
that. 
C 
The district court faulted the Union for· 
failing to make an accurate prediction in its 
June 2005 Hudson notice of its actual. 
expenditures in the remainder of that fee 
year due to the subsequent enactment of the 
temporary increase. Yet, under the normal 
Hudson procedure, any payments over and 
above the Union's actual chargeable 
expenditures in the 2005 fee year would be 
incorporated into the rate for the next fee 
year. The Supreme Comi has determined 
that this is sufficiently accurate to comply 
with the constitutional restrictions. There is 
no principled distinction to be drawn 
between the paradigmatic Hudson procedure 
and the one employed here. 
Indeed, in the usual Hudson notice situation, 
the actual chargeable percentage of a 
union's actual spending in any given year, as 
well as the precise dollar amount of dues 
and fees, will likely vary from the prior 
year's figures set forth in the applicable 
Hudson notice. The Plaintiffs allege the 
Union did not provide a procedure that 
would avoid the risk that nonmembers' 
funds from the special assessment would be 
used, even temporarily, to finance 
nonchargeable activities, but merely offered 
dissenters the possibility of a rebate. 
Therefore, the Plaintiffs reason, the 
procedure is unconstitutional. This 
construction takes the central Hudson 
concepts completely out of context and 
applies them in a way that would not only 
invalidate the fee increase, but would 
invalidate the very procedural system 
decreed by the Supreme Court in Hudson. 
Plaintiffs appear to argue that because the 
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assessment was to be used for "purely" 
political reasons, it could not be 
constitutionally collected from nonmembers 
in the first place, and that any collection and 
then later incorporation of the non-
chargeable amount into a future agency fee 
objector rate would be tantamount to an 
impermissible rebate of the earlier fee. Yet, 
the Union had already reduced the fee for 
objecting nonmembers, and has 
demonstl;ated that the assessment was not 
purely non-chargeable, nor intended to be 
so. Fmiher, the record belies the asseliion 
that the charges were used "purely" for non-
chargeable expenses. 
The section of Hudson discussing rebates 
did not condemn the advance reduction 
procedure the Union used here, but rather a 
"pure rebate" system where the union 
collects a fee that is equal or nearly equal to 
full dues, and then pi'ovides a rebate of the 
non-chargeable portion to objectors only at 
the end of the fee year. Here the Union 
charged objectors only 56.35% of the 
temporary increase, the chargeable 
percentage set forth in the June 2005 notice, 
rather than 100% of the increase followed 
by a later rebate. 
Additionally, the district court's direction 
that a union must issue a second Hudson 
notice when it intends "to depart drastically 
from its typical spending regime and to 
focus on activities that [are] political or 
ideological in nature," is practically 
unworkable. Union spending may vary 
substantially from year to year-in one year 
there may be a new collective bargaining 
agreement negotiated, resulting in a high 
chargeable percentage for objectors that is 
followed by an election year that results in a 
low chargeable percentage for objectors. In 
fact, for example, the chargeable percentage 
for 2006, the· year incorporating the fee 
increase spending, was higher than that for 
the 2005 Hudson notice .. 
Hudson's prior year method assumes and 
accepts that . a union has no "typical. 
spending regime," and that even though 
spending might vary dramatically, a single 
annual notice based upon the prior year's 
audited finances is constitutionally 
sufficient. Otherwise, a union's Hudson 
notice for an upcoming pmiisan political 
election year, following a negotiating year, 
could not be based upon the union's actual 
total expenditures in the previous year 
because the union would intend in the 
coming fee year to "depmi drastically from 
its previous spending regime and to focus on 
activities that are political or ideological in 
nature. " Yet, this is the system set out by 
Hudson, and no following case has 
questioned its continuing vitality. The fact 
that a projection of expenditures may differ 
from actual expenditures should surprise no 
one. The key analytic point for Hudson 
purposes is that proper notice is given and 
subsequent adjustments made. 
The district court's conclusion was also at 
odds with our precedent. The district court 
required the Union to come up with a system 
that imposes the least burden on agency fee 
payers. However,the legal requirement for 
unions in this situation is to establish a 
system that merely "reasonably 
accommodates the legitimate interests of the 
union, the [public employer] and 
nonmember employees[.]" ... The 2005 
notice satisfied the standards established by 
Hudson. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Davenport 
v. Washington Education Ass 'n, 551 U.S. 
177, 127 S.Ct. 2372, 168 L.Ed.2d 71 (2007), 
does not lead us to a contrary conclusion. In 
Davenport, the Supreme Court held the 
.Hudson requirements outline a minimum set 
of procedures by which a public sector 
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union in an agency shop relationship could 
meet its constitutional requirements, and that 
state legislatures may place limitations on a 
union's entitlement to fees above those laid 
out in Hudson. Davenport· arose in the 
context of the state of Washington enacting 
legislation requiring unions to give all 
nonmembers the objector fee rate unless 
they affirmatively agreed to be charged for 
non-chargeable activities (in contrast to the 
California rule where silence equals consent, 
rather than dissent). Davenport held that 
while the "silence equals consent rule" is 
constitutional, it is also constitutional for a 
state to make a "silence equals dissent" rule. 
Under Davenport, it is state legislatures, 
rather than courts, that have the power to 
implement higher standards. This holding 
does not alter our conclusion in this case that 
the 2005 notice was adequate to cover the 
subsequent dues increase, as Davenport does 
not speak to such a situation. 
III 
The Union's notice in this case complied 
with the Hudson procedural requirements. 
Therefore, we reverSe the district court, and 
remand with instructions to deny the 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 
We also reverse the denial of defendant's 
motion for partial summary judgment 
regarding the consent of nonobjectorsunder 
California law, and remand with instructions 
to grant the motion. We reverse the award of 
nominal damages to Plaintiffs.' 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
. WALLACE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
I dissent from the majority's opinion 
because it is not faithful to the principles 
guiding the Court's decision in Chicago 
Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 
106 S.Ct: 1066,89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986). The 
majority begins from an inaccurate account 
of the interests at stake, and applies the 
procedures set forth in Hudson without due 
attention to the distinguishing facts of this 
case. The result is contrary to well-
established First Amendment principles. 
1. 
I begin with the legal authorization for the 
. agency shop system because it provides the 
framework for my evaluation of the issues in 
this case, and because I am of the view that 
the majority's opmlOn presents an 
incomplete account of the relevant legal 
principles. 
A. 
The National Labor Relations Act allows the 
states to regulate their labor relationships 
with public sector employees. Many states, 
including California, allow public-sector 
unions and government employers to enter 
into "agency-shop" arrangements. 
Defendant SEIU Local 1000 (Union) is the 
designated bargaining representative for 
California state employees, pursuant to such 
an agency-shop arrangement. The Union is 
legally obligated to represent equally all 
employees in the bargaining unit. The Union 
levies a fee on every employee whom it 
represents in collective bargaining, even if 
the employee refuses to join the Union. The 
fees paid by bargaining unit employees who 
are not members ofthe Union are commonly 
known as "agency fees" or "fair share fees." 
Plaintiffs in this case are eight nonmembers 
of the Union, . representing a class of 
approximately 28,000 public employees, 
who are required to pay an agency fee. 
Agency-shop arrangements present First 
Amendment concerns. These concerns are 
particularly sharp in the public sector: 
"agency-shop arrangements in the public 
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sector raise First Amendment concerns 
because they force individuals to contribute 
money to unions as a condition of 
government employment." The Court 
explained in Davenport that "[r]egardless of 
one's views as to the desirability of agency-
shop agreements, . . . it is undeniably 
unusual for a government agency to give a 
private entity the power, in essence, to tax 
government employees." 
Despite the infringement of First 
Amendment rights engendered by the 
agency-shop arrangement, the Supreme 
Court has deemed such arrangements to be 
constitutionally permissible in principle. The 
Court has determined that agency-shop 
arrangements are "justified by the 
government's interest in promoting labor 
peace and avoiding the 'free-rider' problem 
that would otherwise accompany union 
reco gnition. " 
Importantly, however, a union "[may] not, 
consistently with the Constitution, collect 
from dissenting employees any sums for the 
suppOli of ideological causes not germane to 
its duties as collective-bargaining agent." 
Instead, nonmembers may only be 
compelled to contribute a fair share of costs 
germane to collective bargaining. As a 
corollary; nonmembers have a constitutional 
right to "prevent the Union's spending a pmi 
of their required service fees to contribute to 
political candidates and to express political 
views unrelated to its duties as exclusive 
bargaining representative." "The amount at 
stake for each individual dissenter does not 
. diminish this concern. For, whatever the 
amount, the quality of respondents' interest 
in not being compelled to subsidize the 
propagation of political 01' ideological views· 
that they oppose is clear." 
B. 
In addition, procedural protections are 
constitutionally required in connection with 
a union's assessment and collection of an 
agency fee. In Hudson, the Court considered 
whether a union's procedure for the 
collection of agency fees adequately 
protected the distinction between germane 
collective bargaining costs and 
nonchargeable political expenditures. The 
Court explained that procedural protections 
were constitutionally required in this context 
for two reasons: 
First, although the government 
interest in labor peace is strong 
enough to support an "agency shop" 
notwithstanding its limited 
infringement on nonunion 
employees' constitutional rights, the 
fact that those rights are protected by 
the First Amendment requires that 
the procedure be carefully tailored to 
minimize the infringement. Second, 
the nonunion employee-the 
. individual whose First Amendment 
rights are being affected-must have 
a fair opportunity to identify the 
impact of the governmental action on 
his interests and to assert a 
meritorious First Amendment claim. 
Hudson, 475 U.S. at 302-03, 106 S.Ct. 1066. 
The Court held that, "[s]ince the agency 
shop itself is 'a significant impingement on 
First Amendment rights,' ... the government 
and union have a responsibility to provide 
procedures that minimize that impingement 
and that facilitate a nonunion employee's 
ability to protect his rights." 
In Hudson, the defendant, a teacher's union, 
had implemented a fair share fee calculated 
as the proportion of chargeable expenditures 
in the preceding fiscal year, that is, those 
expenses related to collective bargaining and 
contract administration. The union also 
established a procedure for .the consideration 
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of nonmembers' objections. The union 
failed, however, to provide nonmembers 
with any explanation of how the fair share 
fee was calculated or explanation of the 
union's procedures. The Court held that the 
union's procedure was inadequate for three 
reasons: "because it failed to minimize the 
risk that nonunion employees' contributions 
might be used for impermissible purposes, 
because it failed to provide adequate 
justification for· the advance reduction of· 
dues, and because it faIled to offer a 
reasonably prompt decision by an impartial 
decisionmaker. " 
First, the procedure at issue in Hudson was 
constitutionally deficient because it merely 
offered dissenters the possibility of a rebate; 
it failed to minimize the possibility that 
dissenters' funds would be used for an 
improper purpose in the first place. The 
Court stressed that the union should not be 
permitted to exact an agency fee from 
dissenters "without first establishing a 
procedure which will avoid the risk that 
their funds will be used, even temporarily, to 
finance ideological activities unrelated to 
collective bargaining." 
Second, the union's procedures were held 
constitutionally deficient because employees 
had not been provided with sufficient 
information about the basis of the 
proportionate share: "[b ]asic considerations 
of fairness, as well as concern for the First 
Amendment rights at stake, also dictate that 
the potential objectors be given sufficient 
information to gauge the propriety of the 
union's fee." In Abood, the Court had stated 
that it was a union's duty to provide "the 
facts and records from which the proportion 
of political to total union expenditures can 
reasonably be calculated." The Court went 
further in Hudson, holding that the union 
was required to provide this information 
without awaiting an objection. 
Third, Hudson held that there must be a 
dispute resolution procedure. The Court 
stated that a union must provide both "a 
reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge 
the amount of the fee" as well as "a 
reasonably prompt decision by an impartial 
decisionmaker." The procedure at issue in 
Hudson was inadequate· because it was 
controlled by the union and did not provide 
for an impartial decisionmaker. The Court 
further held that a union must provide an 
"escrow for the' amounts reasonably in 
dispute while such challenges are pending." 
Drawing on these considerations, Hudson 
outlined three requirements for a union's 
collection of an agency fee: (1) "an adequate 
explanation of the basis for the fee," (2) a 
"reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge 
the amount of the fee before an impartial 
decisionmaker," and (3) "an escrow for the. 
amounts reasonably in dispute while such 
challenges are pending." 
C. 
Surprisingly, in the case before us the 
majority characterizes the Hudson "test" as a 
"balancing test" or "reasonable 
accommodation test." The majority chooses, 
moreover, to highlight the Union's interests, 
stating that Congress has recognized the 
"important contribution of the union shop to 
the system of labor relations," and that· 
"[t]he Supreme Court has underscored this 
Congressional policy by enforcing the right 
of a union, as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of its employees, 
to require nonunion employees to pay a fair 
share of the union's costs." 
The majority puts its finger on the wrong 
side of the scale. A union has no "right" to 
the collection of agency fees, and Hudson 
does not call for merely a "reasonable 
accommodation" of employees' 
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constitutional rights. From the framework 
described above, I view the Union's 
procedures much differently than the 
majority. I fear that the majority's account 
of the interests at stake, compounded by its 
view of the operative legal test, invites 
confusion. Indeed, it tampers with vitally 
important First Amendment principles. 
1. 
I cannot begin from the proposition that we 
are required to balance the "rights" of the 
Union against the rights of the employees it 
represents. While the majority insists that 
the only way "to faithfully characterize the 
procedures set out in Hudson ". is to 
"balance" the Union's "right" to collect 
agency fees against the first amendment 
rights of non-union employees,it is the 
majority that is unfaithful to Hudson and her 
progeny. The Union's collection of fees 
from nonmembers is authorized by an act of 
legislative grace, not by any inherent "right" 
of the Union to the possession of 
nonmembers' funds. This should be clear to 
all. In Davenport, the Court explained that 
its agency-fee cases "were not balancing 
constitutional rights in the manner [the 
union] suggests, for the simple reason that 
unions have no constitutional entitleinent to 
the fees of nonmember-employees." Along 
similar lines, the Second Circuit ha$ held 
that it is error to approach the agency-fee 
issue "with a balancing test in which the cost 
to the union and the practicality of the 
procedures were to be weighed against the 
dissenters' First Amendment interests." 
Davenport considered a Washington state 
law prohibiting labor unions from using the 
agency-shop fees of nonmembers for 
election-related purposes unless the 
nonmember affirmatively. consented. The 
Comi considered whether this restriction on 
a union's spending of agency fees, as 
applied to public-sector labor unions, 
violated the First Amendment. The Court 
emphatically determined that the restriction 
did not: "[t]he notion that this modest 
limitation upon an extraordinary benefit 
violates the First Amendment is, to say the 
least, counterintuitive." The union had no 
right to the funds; instead, "[w]hat matters is 
that public-sector agency fees are in the 
union's possession only because 
Washington and its union-contracting 
government agencies have compelled their 
employees to pay those fees." 
Viewed properly, the collection of agency 
fees is authorized by legislative policy 
considerations pertaining to labor relations. 
There ate several justifications foran agency 
shop, but only one is implicated in this case: 
to prevent free-riding by nonmembers who 
benefit from the union's collective 
bargaining activities. Political and 
ideological expenditures fall outside "the 
reasons advanced by the unions and 
accepted by Congress why authority to make 
union-shop agreements was justified." 
Thus, the majority is mistaken. The Union's 
interest in this case is not a "right" to 
nonmembers' funds. The Union's interest 
lies in receiving a fair contribution to its 
collective bargaining expenses. The Union 
has no legitimate interest, however, in 
collecting agency fees from nonmembers to 
fill its political war-chest. 
2. 
The majority describes Hudson as a 
"reasonable accommodation test." The 
majority points to the following statement 
·from Hudson: "[t]he objective must be to 
devise a way of preventing compulsory 
subsidization of ideological activity by 
employees who object thereto without 
restricting the Union's ability to require 
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every employee to contribute to the cost of 
collective-bargaining activities." The 
majority also states that a union need not 
take "any and all steps demanded by fee. 
payers." The majority looks to our decision 
in Grunwald v. San Bernardino City Unified 
School District, which stated: "[t]he test ... 
is not whether the union and the [ employer] 
have come up with the system that imposes 
the least burden on agency fee payers, 
regardless of cost." 994 F.2d 1370, 1376 n. 7 
(9th Cir.1993). 
But there is a wide gap between taking "any 
and all steps demanded by fee payers"-that 
is, a least-restrictive means test-and what 
the majority endorses. While Hudson does 
not require a union to adopt procedures that 
impose the least intrusive burden on fee 
payers possible, the majority affords the 
union undue leniency. The majority ignores 
Hudson's instruction that, because 
employees' First Amendment interests ·are 
implicated by the collection of an agency 
fee, "the procedure [must] be carefully 
tailored to minimize the infringement." To 
eliminate any doubt, in the footnote 
appended to this statement, the Court cites 
several cases· holding that when First 
Amendment rights are implicated, the 
government must avoid burdening those 
rights. 
Hudson emphasized, moreover, that 
"procedural safeguards often have a special 
bite in the First Amendment context." In the 
agency fee context, Hudson described the 
goal . of procedural protections as to 
"minimize the risk that nonunion 
employees' contributions might be used for 
impelmissible purposes" even temporarily, 
and to "facilitate a nonunion employee's 
. ability to protect his rights[.]" I therefore 
conclude that the majority's "reasonable 
accommodation test" is misguided and is 
inconsistent with case law· that we are 
required to follow. 
II. 
The Union's procedures in this case should 
be evaluated in light of the principles set 
forth in Hudson and the legitimate interests 
at stake. As the majority has already set 
forth the facts of this case in some detail, I 
recite them only where partiCUlarly relevant 
to my views or where additional detail is 
warranted. I also seek to draw more 
attention to the well-reasoned decision of the 
district court. 
A. 
* * * 
In the Summer of 2005, shortly after the 
expiration of the period for objection to the 
June 2005 Hudson notice, the Union's 
legislative bodies began discussing a 
temporary dues increase. The proposal was 
described as an "Emergency Temporary 
Assessment to Build a Political Fight-Back 
Fund." The agenda for a July 30, 2005 
Council Meeting described the purpose of 
the assessment as follows: "[t]he funds from 
this emergency temporary assessment will 
be used specifically in the political arenas of 
California to defend and advance the 
interests of members of Local 1000. " 
The agenda continued to describe: 
These temporary emergency 
assessments are made necessary by 
. political attacks on state employees 
and other public workers launched 
by Governor Schwarzenegger and 
his allies which threaten the wages, 
benefits and working conditions of 
Local 1000 members, and undermine 
the services they provide to the 
people of California. 
The Union contemplated that the "Political 
Fight~Back Fund" would not be used for the 
"regular costs of the union ... such as office 
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rent, staff salaries or routine equipment 
replacement." Instead, the Fund would be 
used "for a broad . range of political 
expenses." 
The Union approved the temporary 
assessment at the end of August 2005. The 
Union's yearly Hudson notice had been 
issued in June 2005, and that notice did not 
mention the possibility of the later-enacted 
temporary assessment. After passage of the 
temporary assessment, the Union sent a 
letter to members and nonmembers, dated 
August 31, 2005, informing them that 
"Local 1000 delegates voted 
overwhelmingly for a temporary dues 
increase to create a Political Fight-Back 
Fund." The letter stated that the funds 
collected from the dues increase would be 
used for several political purposes: (1) to 
defeat two propositions appearing on the 
November 2005 ballot (Propositions 75 and 
76); (2) to "defeat another attack on [the] 
pension plan" in June 2006; and (3) "[i]n 
November 2006 ... to elect a governor and 
legislature who support public employees 
and the services [they] provide." The letter 
explained that the $45 per month cap on 
dues would not apply to the temporary 
assessment. For sake of clarity, I point out 
that this letter did not constitute "notice" as 
contemplated in Hudson. The letter did not 
provide an explanation for the basis of the 
additional fees being imposed, and it did not 
provide nonmembers with an opportunity to 
object to the additional fees. 
After receiving the Union's letter, some 
nonmembers attempted to object to the 
temporary assessment. For example, 
plaintiff Dobrowolski contacted the Union 
to lodge his objectiontothe "Political Fight-
Back Fund." He was told, in effect, that 
there was nothing he could do about it; he 
. was not allowed to object. The Union 
thereafter sent a letter to nonmembers, like 
plaintiff Dobrowolsld, who attempted to 
object to the increase in fees. That letter, 
dated October 27, 2005, stated in part: 
The Union. has received your 
objection to the dues increase. We 
understand that you are a political 
objector and a fee payer in the Union 
and that you have raised an objection 
to paying this increase because you 
believe the money will be directed 
solely to political activities by the 
Union. We understand your 
frustration about paying a little more 
to the Union when you have not seen 
a new contract with a pay increase. 
However, we hope that by explaining 
the Union's position concerning this 
dues and fees increase, you will 
better understand our position .... 
When we have a· campaign that is 
split between political actions and 
colle~tive bargaining actions the 
Union is required by law to annually 
audit the expenditures for those 
activities; the Union will fully 
comply with this requirement. 
However, the Supreme Court has 
stated that this audit must occur at 
the end of the fiscal year in which 
the activities take place, because next 
year's objecting fee-payer rate must 
be based on that audit. 
This campaign will entail much 
workplace organizing divided over 
two fiscal years. At the end of each 
year, the Union's expenses for these 
activities will be audited, and the 
amount of expense which is not 
germane to collective bargaining will 
be used to set the objecting fee-payer 
rate for the next year. Presently you 
are an objecting fee-payer who pays 
the audited rate for this year. Next 
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year, you will be able to exercise 
your objection again and pay the 
audited rate set for that year, based 
on the Union's expenditures this 
year. That rate will fully account for 
any political actions of the nature to 
which you have objected. 
The temporary assessment took effect at the 
end of September 2005. At that time, the 
Controller of the . State of California, 
defendant Steve Westly, began deducting 
. the additional fees automatically from all 
nonmember employees' paychecks. 
Although the assessment was "temporary," 
it was certainly not of short duration, lasting 
from September 2005 until the end of 
December 2006. 
B. 
* * * 
There are several important features of the 
district court's [grant of] summary judgment 
[in plaintiffs' favor]. First, the district court 
addressed the burden imposed by the 
temporary special assessment. The Union 
argued that nonmembers who had objected 
to the June 2005 Hudson notice were 
assessed only a 14.09% increase in the 
deduction from the objector's salary. The 
district court opined that the figure was 
"somewhat misleading" because it ignored 
the fee increase imposed on nonunion 
employees who had not objected to the 
Union's June 2005 Hudson notice. The 
district court indicated that the Union's 
quantification of the temporary assessment 
was misleading in other respects as well, and 
that the actual increase in fair share fee for 
nonmembers ranged, on average, from 25% 
to 33%. The district court deemed this "a 
material change in the amount of funds 
nonunion employees were required to 
contribute to Union expenditures." The 
district couli concluded, "the fair share fees 
paid by both objectors and nonobjectors 
actually increased by a much greater margin 
than Defendants would like to suggest." 
Second, the district court discussed the 
characterization of the temporary special 
assessment. Plaintiffs asserted that the fund 
was intended solely for political and 
ideological purposes. The Union 
characterized the assessment as "an ordinary 
dues and fees increase" because, in 
retrospect, some of the expenses funded 
through the temporary assessment were 
eventually . deemed chargeable to 
nonmembers. The district court thought the 
Union's position "def [ied] logic." The 
Union had described the proposed 
assessment as a political fund, and 
specifically stated that the fund was not to 
be used for regular costs. 
Third, taking all of the above together, the 
district court concluded that the June 2005 
notice did not provide potential objectors 
with sufficient information to gauge the 
propriety of the Union's fee, in light of the 
temporary special assessment. The June 
2005 Hudson notice could not provide 
adequate notice as to the temporary 
assessment because it relied on categories 
that were not relevant to the temporary 
assessment. According to the Union's 
statements, the temporary' special 
assessment was intended for a specific 
purpose and would not be used for regular 
expenses. The district court pointed out that, 
"after implementing the increase, the Union 
took the position that nonunion employees 
had already been given an opportunity to 
make an informed decision as to the 
Assessment by means of the 2005 Hudson 
notice. The Union now turns a blind eye to 
the inconsistency inherent in asking non-
union employees to compare apples, in the 
form of the prior year's financials, to 
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oranges, in the form of a new Assessment." 
Finally, the district court concluded that the 
appropriate remedy was a second Hudson 
notice, relying on Wagner v. Professional 
Engineers in California Government, 354 
F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir.2004). This 
remedy had to be made available to 
nonmembers regardless of whether they had 
objected to the June 2005 Hudson notice, 
because: "[i]n order for any nonunion 
employees' failure to object to have any 
legal significance, the 2005 Hudson Notice 
must have been valid and sufficient to cover 
the Assessment." The district court held that 
objectors to the second Hudson notice would 
be entitled to a refund, with interest, of any 
withheld amounts. 
III. 
In this case, the Union failed to protect . 
adequately the First Amendment rights of 
nonmembers from whom it collected an 
agency fee. In collecting agency fees from 
nonmembers,the Union is subject to 
constraints that are both procedural and 
substantive in nature. Procedurally, the 
Union did not provide nonmembers with 
sufficient information to gauge the propriety 
of the agency fee. The Union's June 2005 
Hudson notice was insufficient in light of 
the temporary assessment. Notably, the 
Union adopted no other procedures to 
protect nonmembers' First Amendment 
rights upon imposition of the temporary 
assessment. Nonmembers were provided no . 
additional notice, opportunity to object, 
dispute resolution procedure, and so forth. 
Compounding these procedural failures, 
there is a substantive problem. The 
temporary assessment is suspect, because it 
was instituted shortly after the June general 
Hudson notice and was explicitly and 
exclusively intended to fund the Union's 
political activities. The temporary 
assessment was a special purpose fund that 
would not be used for regular Union costs 
and therefore represented a departure from 
the Union's typical spending regime. I do 
not believe the Union sufficiently minimized 
the risk that nonmembers' funds would be 
used to subsidize political and ideological 
activities in light of these circumstances. 
A. 
I first consider the adequacy of the Union's 
June 2005. Hudson notice in light of the 
temporary assessment. ... 
* * * 
The Union submits that the Supreme Court 
has approved the retrospective method by 
which it calculates the yearly agency fee: a 
"look-back" procedure, by which the Union 
sets the agency fee for the upcoming year 
according to the proportion of chargeable 
versus nonchargeable expenditures' in the 
prior year. However, the Union's June 2005 
Hudson notice was not adequate to provide 
an explanation of the basis for the agency 
fee extracted from nonmembers' paychecks 
for the temporary assessment. To reiterate 
the obvious, the June 2005 Hudson notice 
provided no information regarding the 
temporary assessment, as it was enacted 
subsequently, in August 2005. The Union 
would respond that the notice was adequate 
to cover such future contingencies. How 
could that be? The temporary special 
assessment resulted in approximately a 25% 
increase in fair share fees-a fairly 
substantial increase. Because the temporary 
. assessment was exempted from the dues 
cap, higher-earning employees might 
experience an effective Qr actual increase 
that was even greater. Moreover, while the 
assessment was "temporary," it was in effect 
for the bulk of the 2005 fee year, from the 
end of September 2005 until commencement 
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of the next fee year in July 2006. 
The district court further held that the fee 
increase was material, and I agree. The 
temporary special assessment might 
therefore have affected a fee payer's 
decision to object pursuant to the June 2005 
Hudson notice. Indeed, because the Union 
refused to give nonmember employees· an 
opportunity to object when information 
about the temporary assessment was 
disclosed, these nonmembers were 
essentially left in the "dark" about the nature 
of the agency fee during the time period in 
which they were required to file objections. 
In other words, even though the special 
assessment significantly altered the 
magnitude and intended use of the agency 
fee, the Union and the majority believe that 
nonmember employees were required to 
object before the material information was 
revealed. Such an approach simply cannot 
be reconciled with the procedures set forth 
in Hudson. 
The Union would respond, I venture, by 
asserting that the temporary assessment did 
not alter the agency fee as a percentage of 
total union dues. The June 2005 Hudson 
notice disclosed that the agency fee was 
99.1 % of membership dues, and that the 
objectors' agency fee was 56.35% of 
membership dues. The temporary 
assessment did not affect these percentages. 
But such an argument rests on the faulty 
premise that, if nonmembers' fees remain 
constant as a percentage of members' dues 
through a given fee year, any absolute 
increase in fees is protected from scrutiny by 
the yearly Hudson notice, that is, that the 
proportionate share is what matters, and 
because this was not altered there can be no 
constitutional violation. 
I am not convinced that the proportionate 
share is all that matters in evaluating the 
adequacy of a Hudson notice. From the 
standpoint of a potential objector, the 
magnitude of the increase in fees imposed 
by the temporary assessment could very well 
be material. This increase, as an absolute 
amount, could affect a· nonmember's 
decision to object or not to object even if the 
percentage fee remained static. And these 
nonmembers are the ones whose First 
Amendment rights are in jeopardy-not the 
Union's. Moreover, the temporary 
assessment was exempted from the cap on 
dues. Thus, even though the fair share fee 
remained constant as a basic percentage 
under the temporary assessment, because the 
assessment was exempted from the $45 per 
month cap on dues, some employees would 
in fact experience a proportionately greater 
share in monthly fee deductions. This is 
inconsistent with a static-percentage 
justification for the Union's failure to 
provide additional notice regarding the 
temporary assessment. 
Furthermore, by exempting the temporary 
assessment from the cap, the Union acted 
contrary to the June 2005 Hudson notice. 
The June 2005 Hudson notice, stated: 
"currently 1.0% of monthly gross salary and 
are presently capped at a maximum of $45 
per month." Exceptions from the cap, or the 
elimination of it, was not contemplated in 
the June 2005 Hudson notice. The Union's 
June 2005 Hudson notice also stated: 
"[d]ues are subject to change without further 
notice to fee payers." I cannot put much 
weight in this sweeping reservation of 
assumed authority; in any event, the notice 
did not disclose that the cap could be 
eliminated. For these additional reasons, I 
conclude that the temporary. assessment 
might be a material factor in a nonmembers' 
decision to object. 
I conclude that the Union's June 2005 notice 
did not fulfill its obligations under Hudson. 
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The purpose of a Hudson notice is to enable 
informed consent or objection. The Union's 
.June 2005 Hudson notice was inadequate to . 
provide fee payers with a basis on which to 
adjudge the propriety of the Union's agency 
fee, and to decide whether or not to object. 
Because the Union's June 2005 Hudson 
notice was inadequate, an employee's failure 
to object to it does not constitute an effective 
waiver, an abandonment of a known right. 
Until Hudson's requirements are satisfied, 
employees must be afforded subsequent 
opportunities to object. 
The June 2005 Hudson notice was not 
adequate to provide notice as to the 
temporary assessment for an additional 
reason, which walTants separate attention. 
The temporary assessment was a special 
purpose fund. The Union envisioned the 
temporary assessment as a political 
fundraising vehicle, to build a "Political 
Fight-Back Fund." The Union contemplated 
that the temporary assessment would 
provide a distinct source of capital for 
political activities and that it would not be 
used for the regular expenses of the union. 
Recognizing the unique character of the 
temporary assessment has two implications. 
First, the June 2005 Hudson notice could not 
be adequate to enable nonmembers' 
informed objection to the agency fee. The 
June 2005 Hudson notice contemplated 
ordinary expenditures; the temporary special 
assessment stood apart from that. As the 
district court stated, the union asked 
nonmembers to compare "apples, in the 
form of the prior year's financials, to 
oranges, in the form of a new [a]ssessment, 
an [a]ssessment which was not to be utilized 
for Union operations but was instead 
earmarked for discrete political purposes." 
Even if agency fees remained constant as a 
percentage of total member dues, 
nonmembers might well object to paying 
increased fees for purely political purposes; 
for example, they might object in light bfthe 
depmiure from the Union's normal spending 
regime. 
Second, as a substantive matter, the Court 
has repeatedly stressed that a union m~y 
extract from nonmembers "only those fees 
and dues necessary to performing the duties 
of an exdusive· representative of the 
employees in dealing with the employer on 
labor~management issues." In Lehnert, the 
Court outlined a framework for evaluating 
whether an activity was germane to a 
union's role as exclusive bargaining agent: 
"chargeable activities must (1) be 'germane' 
to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be 
justified by the government's vital policy 
interest in labor peace and avoiding 'free 
riders'; and (3) not significantly add to the 
burdening of free speech that is inherent in 
the allowance of an agency or union shop." 
To protect the distinction between 
chargeable and non-chargeable activities, a 
union is required to adopt procedures that 
minimize the risk that nonmembers will be 
compelled to subsidize political or· 
ideological activities with which they do not 
agree. In Hudson, the Court explained, 
"[t]he Union should not be permitted to 
exact a service fee from nonmembers 
without first establishing a procedure which 
will avoid the risk that their funds will be 
used, even temporarily, . to finance 
ideological activities unrelated to collective 
b<,!rgaining. " 
The temporary assessment was 
contemplated as a political fundraising 
vehicle; it therefore cannot be justified by 
the interest in preventing nonmembers from 
free-riding on the Union's collective 
bargaining efforts. The temporary 
assessment clearly burdened the speech of 
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nonmembers. But the Union undertook no 
efforts, in connection with the imposition of 
the temporary assessment, to minimize the 
impact on nonmembers' First Amendment 
rights. Taking these considerations together, 
I conclude that, in connection with the 
imposition and collection of the temporary 
assessment, the Union did not fulfill its 
obligation to be mindful of nonmembers' 
First Amendment rights. 
The Union and the majority seek to evade 
the fact that the temporary assessment was· 
enacted to fund pciliticalactiviiies by 
arguing that the fund was ultimately used for 
some expenses that were chargeable to 
nonmembers. I agree with the district court's 
assessment of the Union's post hoc 
rationalization: "[fJollowing the union's 
logic it should be required only to show that 
some small fraction of this fund was used 
for chargeable purposes in order to justify 
subverting its Hudson responsibilities." The 
district court further reasoned that, even if 
the temporary assessment was not intended 
solely for politiqal purposes, it was indeed 
intended predominantly for political 
purposes. As such, the district court 
continued, "it is clear that the Union's intent 
was to depart drastically from its typical 
spending regime and to focus [the temporary 
special assessment funds] on activities that 
were political or ideological in nature." 
In sum, the Union's procedures were not 
adequate under the circumstances. The June 
2005 Hudson notice was inadequate to 
provide nonmembers with sufficient 
information . from which to evaluate the 
propriety of the Union's agency fee. After 
enacting the temporary special assessment, 
the Union made no effort whatsoever to 
minimize the infringement of nonmembers' 
rights. The Union dId not provide notice 
regarding the temporary assessment; the 
Union also did not provide nonmembers 
with an opportunity to object to the 
temporary assessment. The Union did not 
provide a procedure for resolving disputes 
and did not place disputed amounts in 
escrow. Indeed, when nonmembers 
attempted to object to the temporary 
assessment, they were refused a forum for 
their dispute and were never provided with 
the opportunity to obtain the decision of a 
neutral hearing officer. 
IV. 
This brings me to the crux of the Union's 
arguinent: that Hudson approved· calculating 
an agency fee as the proportion of 
chargeable to nonchargeable expenses in the 
prior fiscal year. The Union asserts that the 
prior-year method is virtually required here, 
as it is a large public sector union and must 
calculate its agency fee on the basis of 
audited financial reports. Because of the 
audit requirement, moreover, the Union 
asserts that it could not prospectively 
apportion the temporary assessment between 
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses. 
The majority agrees that the Union complied 
with its obligations. The majority recites that 
"absolute" precision cannot be expected or 
required in the calculation of an agency fee, 
and that the Union cannot be "faulted" for 
calculating its agency fee on the basis of the 
prior fiscal year's expenditures. Further, the 
majority states that the Union could not 
deviate from the prior-year method of 
calculating the agency fee with respect to 
the special assessment. The majority 
explains that the prior-year method makes 
lag inherent; in any given year, an objector 
might be "underpaying or overpaying," but 
"the inevitable effect of the Hudson method 
is that these over- and undercharges even 
out over time." 
This strikes me as a strange argument when 
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dealing with a First Amendment challenge. 
First, the Hudson notice procedure is not per 
se adequate to protect the rights of 
nonmembers in all situations. Instead, 
where, as here, there is a substantial 
deviation from the normal Hudson process, 
adaptation is required. Second, the prior-
year calculation method does not establish 
the adequacy of the June 2005 Hudson 
notice nor does it demonstrate that the 
Union's procedures were adequate when 
viewed as a whole. 
A. 
We should not measure the Union's conduct 
by the discrete Hudson procedures alone. 
Hudson establishes a floor. In Davenport, 
the Court stressed, "we have described 
Hudson as 'outlin[ing] a minimum set of 
procedures by which a [public-sector] umon 
in an agency-shop relationship could meet 
its requirement under Abood. '" 
Here, the temporary assessment was not like 
the Union's ordinary dues and not like the 
facts presented in Hudson. Several features 
of the special assessment distinguish this 
case. The temporary assessment was 
imposed mid-year and not in the normal 
course of the Hudson process. The 
temporary assessment imposed a material 
increase in agency fees over those 
contemplated in the Hudson notice, and was 
exempt from the dues cap (which was 
inconsistent with· the Hudson notice). 
Hudson did not consider a fee increase 
outside of a normal periodic notice process. 
Likewise, Hudson' did not contemplate a 
special-purpose assessment, as here. Even 
assuming the Union did here what was done 
in Hudson, it could not be sufficient to 
satisfy its duties in light of the unique 
circumstances of this case. 
I cannot agree with the proposition that the 
Union's June 2005 Hudson notice satisfied 
the Union's obligations to nonmembers until 
issuance of the next yearly Hudson notice. 
The Union's mid-year conduct cannot be 
insulated from scrutiny. Rather, there must 
be some limitation on a union's imposition 
of fee increases between Hudson annual 
notices. 
B. 
The Union contends that it complied with 
the procedures set forth in Hudson, because 
the . Court approved the calculation of an 
agency fee based on the proportion of the . 
prior year's chargeable to nonchargeable 
expenditures. Indeed, in a footnote, the 
Court stated that a union "cannot be faulted 
for calculating its fee on the basis of its 
expenses during the preceding year." The 
Union represents, furthermore, that its hands 
were tied with regard to the temporary 
assessment, because it is required to base its 
agency fee calculation on audited financial 
statements. 
The prior-year calculation method used here 
does not satisfy all of the Union's 
obligations, however. The Union's 
allocation of expenses as chargeable or 
nonchargeable presents a distinct issue in the 
adequacy of its Hudson notice. Thus, even if 
the Union "cannot be faulted" for relying on 
prior-year expenditures in calculating the 
agency fee, it is not relieved from its other 
Hudson obligations. The Union must still 
provide adequate . notice to enable an 
informed decision, an opportunity to lodge 
objections, a prompt hearing on objections 
by a neutral decisionmaker, and escrow of 
any amounts in dispute. Even if we look 
only to compliance with Hudson, therefore, 
the Union still falls short of the mark. 
I recognize that the Union, in relying on 
prior-year expenditures as the basis for its 
agency fee, is subject to an audit 
requirement. In my view, application of the 
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audit requirement relates to the appropriate 
remedy in this case, a question we do not 
reach. A district court, with a proper record, 
could evaluate the audit requirement in light 
of the temporary assessment. Indeed, the 
purpose of an audit is to verify that a union 
.hactually spent the amount of money. it 
claims; the audit is not intended to verify the 
union's allocation as a "legal, not an. 
accounting, decision regarding the 
appropriateness of the allocation of expenses 
to the chargeable and non-chargeable 
categories." In any event, the audit 
requirement does not relate to the other 
Hudson protections impli.cated by this case, 
and is ultimately of limited help to the 
Union. Even a temporary violation of the 
First Amendment is a significant violation. 
v. 
The majority construes the issue in this 
appeal as "whether a union is required ... to 
send a second notice when adopting a 
temporary, mid-term fee increase." By 
framing narrowly the issue in this case, the 
majority shifts attention to the remedy 
adopted by the district court. But the district 
court's remedy is only one consideration in 
this case-one we do not even reach-and 
should not be set up as a strawrnan for 
attack. 
In this case, the Union's provision of an 
annual Hudson notice was insufficient to 
enable nonmembers to protect their First 
Amendment rights upon imposition of the 
temporary assessment. The Union, 
furthermore, made no effort to minimize the 
infringement of nonmember's First 
Amendment rights despite substantially 
increasing the fees extracted from their 
paychecks. I believe that the majority's 
opinion does not carry out the principles of 
Hudson. I therefore dissent. 
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"U.S. Supreme Court to Decide Constitutionality of 
Special Union Fees" 
Lawyers Weekly USA 
June 28, 2011 
Pat Murphy 
The u.s. Supreme Court will decide 
whether a state may constitutionally 
condition employment on the payment of a· 
special union "political action" assessment 
without first providing notice and the 
opportunity to object. 
In Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson (475 
U.S. 292), the Court recognized certain 
procedural safeguards for the First 
Amendment rights of nonunion employees 
who are required to bear a fair share of 
union costs. The procedural safeguards 
include so-called Hudson notices, by which 
unions must explain the basis for a particular 
assessment and the right to object. 
This case addresses a special assessment 
made by Service Employees International 
Union, Local 1000, which is the exclusive 
bargaining agent for. California state 
employees. Under an agreement between the 
state and the union, all employees within the 
covered bargaining units must pay a fair 
share of the cost of representation, including 
nonmembers. 
In August 2005, the union approved a 
special assessment to pay political expenses 
for the defeat of celiain anti-union ballot 
propositions. 
A class of nonumon employees sued, 
alleging that the special assessment violated 
their First Amendment rights because it was 
made without the required Hudson notices. 
But the 9th Circuit decided that Hudson 
notices sent in June 2005 in conjunction 
with the union's assessment of annual dues 
satisfied constitutional requirements. 
"The district court faulted the union for 
failing to make an accurate prediction in its 
June 2005 Hudson notice of its actual 
expenditures in the remainder of that fee 
year due to the subsequent enactment of the 
temporary increase .... 
"Yet, under the normal Hudson procedure, 
any payments over and above the union's 
actual chargeable expenditures in the 2005 
fee year would be incorporated into the rate 
for the next fee year. The Supreme COUli 
has determined that this is sufficiently 
accurate to comply with the constitutional 
restrictions," the cOUli said. 
A decision from the Supreme Court IS 
expected next term. 
Knox v. Service Employees International 
Unioll, Local 1000, No. 10-1121.Certiorari 
granted: June 27, 2011. Ruling below: 628 
F. 3d. 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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"U.S. SC Will Hear Case Involving Union Fees" 
Legal Newsline 
June 28, 2011 
Jessica M. Karmasek 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
review an appeals court's ruling that a union 
is not required, in addition to an annual fee 
notice to members, to send a second notice 
when adopting a temporary, mid-term fee 
Increase. 
In its Dec. 10 decision, the Ninth Circuit 
COUli of Appeals reversed the judgment of a 
district court in Knox v. California State 
Employees Association, Local 1000, 
Service Employees International Union. 
. The appeals court argued that the district 
court's direction that a union must issue a 
second notice when it intends "to depart 
drastically from its typical spending. regime 
and to focus on activities that (are) political 
or ideological in nature" is "practically 
unworkable. " 
"Union spending may vary substantially 
from year to year-in one year there may be 
a new collective bargaining agreement 
negotiated, resulting in a high chargeable 
percentage for objectors that is followed by 
. an election· year that results in a low 
chargeable percentage for objectors," the 
court wrote. 
The National Right to Work Legal Defense 
Foundation, who represented Dianne Knox 
and the class of plaintiffs in the case, argues 
that the appeals court's ruling "effectively 
forces nonunion California state employees 
to fund union political activism." 
The foundation, based in Springfield, Va., is 
a nonprofit organization that provides free 
legal aid to employees whose human or civil 
rights have been violated by "compulsory 
unionism abuses," according to its website. 
Pointing to a separate Supreme COUli 
decision, the foundation argues that public 
employees forced to pay union dues as a 
condition of employment must be notified of 
how much their dues' are spent on union 
activities unrelated to collective 
bargaining-such as members-only events 
and political activism-and given a chance 
to opt out of paying for the activities~ 
However, CSEA union officials issued a 
"special assessment" in 2005 to raise money 
from all state employees for a union political 
fund, regardless of their membership status. 
Nonunion employees were not given a 
chance to opt out, the foundation says. 
In 2007, the district court ruled that the 
CSEA had to provide a notice to nonunion 
employees about the assessment, allow them 
to opt out of paying into the fund, provide a 
refund of monies spent on union boss 
politics and pay interest from dates of the 
deduction to nonmembers who chose to opt 
out. The Ninth Circuit reversed that ruling. 
Subsequently, in March, attorneys with the 
legal foundation filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari for the plaintiffs with the nation's 
high court. 
On Monday, the Court included the case on 
its list of certiorari granted. 
Mark Mix, president of the National Right to 
Work Legal Defense Foundation, said he 
was happy the Court decided to review the 
case. 
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"Allowing the Ninth Circuit's ruling to stand 
would further undermine state employees' 
First Amendment rights and encourage 
union bosses to extract more forced dues 
from nonunion workers as a condition of 
employment," he said in a statement. 
The foundation has posed two questions ,to 
the Comi: 
• Maya State, consistent with the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, condition 
employment on the payment of a special 
union assessment intended solely for 
political and ideological expenditures 
without first providing a notice that includes 
information about that assessment and, 
provides an opportunity to object to its 
exaction? 
• Also, maya State, consistent with the First 
, , 
and Fourteenth ,Amendments, condition 
continued public employment on the 
payment of union agency fees for purposes 
of financing political expenditures for ballot 
measures? 
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"Unions and Forced Political Speech" 
National Review Online 
June 1,2011 
Frank Miniter 
The Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) is being dragged to the Supreme 
Court for alleged First Amendment 
infringements. In Knox v. SEIU, Local 
1000, the Court will decide· whether the 
union forced non-members to pay for 
political speech and failed to give proper 
notice. 
This court fight began .in 2005. Before 
Arnold Schwarzenegger became another 
fallen star left blushing on the society pages, 
he took on the unions; he scared them so 
much, in fact, that SEIU, Local 1000 
decided to garnish the wages of California's 
public employees-including 28,000 public 
workers who were not union members-as 
an "Emergency Temporary Assessment to 
Build a Political Fight-Back Fund." This 
political war chest paid for political ads and 
other efforts to defeat Proposition 75, a 
measure that would have restricted the use 
of union dues for political purposes, and 
Proposition 76, which would have imposed 
a cap on state spending. 
If you're wondering how a union can take 
money . from people who are not union 
members, then you need an introduction to 
modern union rules in states without strong 
right-to-work laws-that is, laws that allow 
workers to refuse to pay union dues or join 
unions (though even then they are still 
covered by the union contract). Like 25 
others, California is not a right-to-work 
state. As a result, those who have the 
privilege to work in unionized shops, or for 
the state of California itself, have to fund 
whatever union is recognized as their 
"monopoly bargaining representative." So 
though the 28,000 state employees 
represented in the class-action suit were not 
members of SEIU, Local 1000, they had to 
pay SEIU 99.1 percent of full union dues. 
The other 0.9 percent was knocked off 
because that's what the union spends on 
members-only benefits. In addition, non-
members could pay a reduced fee of 56.35 
percent-funding only the union expenses 
that are "chargeable" to non-members 
against their will under Supreme Court 
precedent-if they formally objected. 
According to the Court, non-members 
cannot be forced to fund political 
'activities-and under Chicago Teachers 
Local No.1 v. Hudson, unions cannot collect 
money from non-members unless they first 
provide a breakdown of the fees and offer a 
chance to object. This is called a "Hudson 
notice," and unions typically provide them 
annually. 
So when SEIU, Local 1000-after sending 
out its Hudson notice for the year-decided 
to take an additional portion of all 
employees' paychecks for political ads, it 
was standing on dubious ground. Even those 
who objected had to pay 56.35 percent of 
the new fees-a number calculated based on 
the previous year's budget, not on where 
these new funds would actually be spent. 
And though the union did send out a letter 
explaining the new charge, it did not provide 
a new Hudson notice. Eight plaintiffs filed a 
class-action suit. 
U.S. District Court Judge Monison C. 
England Jr. quickly issued a temporary 
restraining order that prevented the state 
controller from further garnishing the 
employee's salaries to fund the political ads, . 
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but then the judge lifted the order and 
refused to issue a permanent injunction. 
After Governor Schwarzenegger lost the 
votes on his referenda-partly because of 
ads paid for in this way-. the plaintiffs 
appealed their case with the help of the 
National Right to Work Legal Defense 
Foundation. They won a lower"court 
decision, but the SEIU appealed the cas~ to 
the Ninth Circuit. 
The lawsuit went before a three"judge panel 
at the Ninth Circuit, which voted 2" 1 in 
favor of the .8EIU. How did the Ninth 
Circuit justify permitting a Union to garnish 
non"members' wages to fund ideological 
ads? 
SEIU, Local 1000, claimed its "Political 
Fight"Back Fund"-the fund it had 
originally said, in the summer of 2005, was 
designated "for a broad range· of political 
expenses, including television and radio 
advertising, direct mail, voter registration, 
voter education, and get out the vote 
activities"-was actually used for a variety 
of expenditures, not just political speech. 
The two"judge majority at the Ninth Circuit 
overlooked SEIU's Orwellian rewriting of 
fact. 
Judge Sidney R. Thomas wrote for the 
majority at the Ninth Circuit that the 
"Supreme Court has underscored . 
Congressional policy by enforcing the right 
of a union, as the exclusive collective" 
bargaining representative of its employees, 
to require nonunion employees to pay a fair 
share of the union's costs." He found that 
"the Union material indicated that the fund 
would be used for political activities. Yet, in 
response to inquiries, the Union specifically 
stated it intended to split the increase 
'between political actions and collective 
bargaining actions.' Further, not all of the 
political activities fell into the 'non" 
chargeable' category." 
He also noted that the practice of calculating 
. the rate for objectors based on the previous 
year's expenditures is allowed by Supreme 
Court precedent-ignoring the special 
circumstance that this money was collected 
specifically for the purpose of political 
activity. 
. James Young, the staff attorney for the 
National Right to Work Legal Defense 
Foundation who litigated the case before the 
Ninth Circuit and will likely argue the case 
before the U.S. Supreme COUli, said, "The 
First Amendment protects free speech and 
the freedom of association. In Knox, the 
union forced public employees to pay an 
'emergency fee' that their own materials 
said was for political ads· and other 
expenditures. This is unconstitutional, as it 
is forced speech. The Ninth Circuit got it 
wrong." 
To prove his point, Young points to the 
aforementioned case Chicago Teachers 
Local No. 1 v. Hudson, which held that "the 
constitutional requirements for the Union's 
collection of agency fees include an 
adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, 
a reasonably prompt opportunity to 
challenge the amount of the fee before an 
impartial decision maker, and an escrow for 
the amounts reasonably in dispute while 
such challenges are pending." 
In his dissent, the third judge on the Ninth 
Circuit panel, J. Clifford Wallace, wrote, "I 
dissent from the majority's opinion because 
it is not faithful to the principles guiding the 
[U.S. Supreme] Court's decision in Chicago 
Teachers Union v. Hudson." Wallace quoted 
another Supreme Court case, Davenport v. 
Wash. Education Association, which held 
that "regardless of one's views as to the 
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desirability of agency-shop agreements ... it 
is undeniably unusual for a government 
agency to give a private entity the power, in 
essence, to tax government employees." 
Finally, Wallace pointed out the obvious 
constitutional infringement when he wrote, 
"The Union's interest lies in receiving a fair 
contribution to its collective bargaining 
expenses. The. Union has no legitimate 
interest, however, in collecting agency fees 
from nonmembers to fill its political war-
chest." 
No kidding. 
Seen from a broader perspective, if unions in 
non-right-to-work states are allowed by the 
Supreme Court to tap the salaries of non-
members for political advocacy, then those 
members have lost not only their right to 
free speech, but also their Fifth Amendment 
right to property. 
So as the Left has been wildly claiming that 
Wisconsin's Scott Walker, New Jersey's 
Chris Christie, and Ohio's John Kasich are 
attacking public employees' rights, SEIU 
has been actually guilty of this charge. After 
all, there is no constitutional right to 
collectively bargain, but there are individual 
. rights to free speech and association. 
The Supreme Court must rule in favor of the 
plaintiffs in Knox and force SEIU, Local 
1000, to return the monies it garnished from 
their· wages. It wouldn't be the first time 
they've overruled the Ninth Circuit. 
Hopefully, the U.S. Supreme 
return First Amendment 
California's public employees. 
COUli will 
rights to 
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Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper 
10-1024 
Ruling Below: Cooper v. F.A.A., 596 F.3d 538 opinion amended and superseded on denial of 
reh'g, 622 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. granted, 10-1024, 2011 WL 516398 (U.S. June 20, 
2011). 
Plaintiff Stanmore Cooper applied for and received FAA medical certification to fly 5 times 
between 1994 and 2004. Each time plaintiff Cooper did not disclose he had been diagnosed with 
HIV and was on antiretroviral medications. In 1995 Cooper qualified for Social Security long-
term disability benefits after disclosing his HIV status to the SSA. Cooper received benefits 
through August 1996. From 2002 to 2005 Cooper was investigated in connection with Operation 
Safe Pilot culminating in 3 indictments for making false statements to a government agency. In 
.2006 Cooper pled guilty to one count of making and delivering a false official writing. Cooper 
filed suit in 2007 claiming the interagency exchange of his medical records violated the Privacy 
Act and caused him to suffer embarrassment and emotional distress. The district cOUli ruled for 
the government. The court found no issue of triable fact as to whether the government had failed 
in its record keeping duties but also found that the term "actual damages" in the Privacy Act was. 
ambiguous. The court applied the canon of sovereign immunity finding that due to the 
ambiguity, the government did not clearly consent to be sued for the kind of damages put forth 
by Cooper. In 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the only plausible reading of the 
term "actual damages" included Cooper's damages and thus the sovereign immunity canon was 
inapposite. 
Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff who alleges only mental and emotional injuries can 
establish "actual damages" within the meaning of the civil remedies provision of the Privacy 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A). 
Stanmore Cawthon COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; Social Security Administration; VRW 
United States Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Filed February 22,2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge: 
The Privacy Act of 1974,5 U.S.C. § 552a et 
seq. (the Act), prohibits federal agencies 
from disclosing "any record which is 
contained in a system of records by any 
means of communication to any person, or 
to another agency" without the consent of 
"the individual to whom the record 
pertains," unless the disclosure falls within 
one or more enumerated exceptions to the 
Act. The Act also creates a private cause of 
action against an agency for its wilful or 
intentional violation of the Act that has "an 
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adverse effect on an individual," and allows 
for the recovery of "actual damages" 
sustained as a result of such a violation. 
Plaintiff Stanmore Cawthon Cooper claims 
to have sustained actual damages as the 
result of an interagency exchange of 
information performed as part of a joint 
criminal investigation by Defendants 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
Social Security Administration (SSA), and 
Department of Transportation (DOT) 
(collectively, the Government). Cooper 
seeks actual damages for nonpecuniary 
InJUrIes, such as humiliation, mental 
anguish, and emotional distress, as a result 
of the unauthorized interagency disclosure 
of his medical information; he does not 
claim any pecuniary or out-of-pocket losses. 
Because Cooper seeks damages only for 
nonpecuniary injuries, the district court . 
granted summary judgment to the 
Government,' after holding that the Act 
allows recovery only for pecuniary damages. 
We hold that actual damages under the Act 
enco,mpasses both pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary damages. We reverse and 
remand to the district court. 
1. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
A. Medical Celiificates and Disability. 
Benefits 
Cooper first obtained a private pilot 
celiificate in 1964 and has been flying 
airplanes intermittently ever since. To 
operate an aircraft lawfully, one must be 
issued a pilot certificate and a valid airman 
medical certificate. The FAA requires that a 
pilot periodically renew his or her medical 
celiificate to ensure that the pilot satisfies 
current FAA medical requirements. The 
medical certificate renewal application 
requires an applicant to disclose any 
illnesses, disabilities, or surgeries the 
applicant has had during his or her lifetime, 
and to identify any medications being taken 
at the time of application. 
Cooper was' diagnosed with HIV in 1985. 
He knew he would not qualify for a renewal 
of his medical certificate if he disclosed his 
medical condition because, at that time, the 
FAA did not issue medical celiificates to 
individuals with HIV who were taking 
antiretroviral medications. Accordingly, 
Cooper grounded himself and chose not to 
renew his medical certificate. 
In 1994, however, Cooper applied for and 
received a medical certificate from the FAA, 
but without disclosing that he had HIV or 
was taking antiretroviral medication; Cooper 
renewed his medical certificate again in 
1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004, each time 
knowingly withholding required information 
about his medical condition. Cooper 
explains that he chose to withhold that 
information because of the "social stigma" 
associated with HIV and his sexual 
orientation. Cooper feared that lmowledge of 
his status as a gay man with HIV would 
result in discrimination against him in 
employment, housing, and public 
accommodation. As a result, he disclosed his 
sexual orientation and medical condition 
only to close friends and family. 
In August 1995, after his symptoms 
worsened, Cooper applied to the SSA for 
long-term disability benefits under Title II of 
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et 
seq. Cooper disclosed his HIV status to the 
SSA, comfOliable in his understanding that, 
the medical information disclosed in his 
application would be held confidential and 
would only be used by the SSA for its 
determination of Cooper's eligibility for 
disability benefits. Cooper qualified for the 
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benefits, which he received from August 
1995 to August 1996. 
B. Operation Safe Pilot 
In 2002, the Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) for the DOT and the OIG for the 
SSA, who are charged with investigating 
crimes related to their respective agencies, 
collaborated to investigate a California pilot 
who had consulted two different sets of 
doctors in a scheme to obtain simultaneously 
medical certifications to fly from the FAA 
and disability benefits from the SSA. From 
this investigation grew "Operation Safe 
Pilot," a joint criminal investigation 
conducted by the DOT-OIG and SSA-OIG 
that sought to uncover efforts by medically 
unfit individuals to obtain FAA 
certifications to fly. Operation Safe Pilot 
was initially proposed as a nationwide 
endeavor, but was ultimately approved as a 
regional project, limited to Northern 
California. 
In July 2002, the FAA, which is part of the 
DOT, provided the DOT-OIG with the 
names and other identifying information for 
active. celiified pilots. In November 2003, 
the DOT-OIG sent the SSA-OIG 
information relating to approximately 
45,000 pilots in Northern California, 
consisting of the pilots' names, dates of 
birth, social security numbers, and genders. 
The SSA-OIG cross-checked the DOT-
OIG's information· against the information 
in the SSA-OIG's databases, and in March 
or April 2004, the SSA-OIG provided the 
DOT-OIG with three separate spreadsheets 
summarizing its analysis: (1) a spreadsheet 
listing the names and social security 
numbers for the 45,000 pilots; (2) a 
spreadsheet listing pilots who had received 
Title II benefits; and (3) a spreadsheet listing 
pilots who had received Title XVI benefits. 
SSA-OIG and DOT-OIG agents then 
examined the spreadsheets to identify entries 
suggesting fraud. 
C. The Investigation and Prosecution of 
Cooper· 
Upon review of the spreadsheets, the agents 
identified Cooper as a person of interest 
because the agencies' compiled data 
revealed that· Cooper was certified to fly by 
the FAA, yet had received disability benefits 
from the SSA. Acting on that information, 
the agents acquired Cooper's medical file 
from the FAA, which revealed that Cooper 
had never disclosed his HIV to the FAA, 
and his disability file from the SSA, which 
contained information relating to Cooper's 
HIV. 
In January 2005, the agents conduCted a 
series of meetings with FAA Flight 
Surgeons to obtain their views as to whether 
the pilots identified by the investigation, 
including Cooper, had falsified their medical 
certificate applications and if so, whether . 
that falsified information was material to the 
FAA's decision to certify the pilots. After 
reviewing Cooper's FAA medical file and 
SSA disability file, the FAA Flight Surgeons . 
concluded that the FAA would not have 
issued Cooper an unrestricted medical 
celiificate had it known of his HIV. 
At that point,· the agents arranged an 
interview with Cooper to ask him about his 
medical certificate applications. In March 
2005, the agents met with Cooper, at which 
time he confessed to having intentionally 
withheld his medical condition from the 
FAA. That same month, the FAA issued an 
emergency order revoking Cooper's pilot 
certificate due to his misrepresentations to 
the FAA. 
In August 2005, Cooper was indicted on 
three counts of making false statements to a 
364 
government agency under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 
In 2006, he pleaded guilty to one count of 
making and delivering a false official 
writing, a misdemeanor under 18 U.S.C. § 
1018. He was sentenced to two years of 
probation and fined $1,000. 
D. The District Court's Decision 
In March 2007, Cooper filed a lawsuit in the 
Northern District of California against the 
Government. Cooper alleged that the FAA, 
DOT, and SSA willfully or intentionally 
violated the Act by conducting their 
interagency exchange of his records. He 
claims that this unlawful disclosure caused 
him "to suffer humiliation, embarrassment, 
mental anguish, fear of social ostracism, and 
other severe emotional distress." 
In spring 2008, both parties moved for 
summary judgment. The district court 
concluded there was no genuine issue of 
material fact that the Government had failed 
to uphold its record-keeping obligations 
under the Act, but that there was a triable 
issue of fact as to whether the Government's 
violation was intentional or willful. 
However, because the district· court found· 
the term "actual damages" to be ambiguous, 
. and construed the waiver of sovereign 
immunity strictly in favor of the 
Government, . it ruled against Cooper, 
. holding that due to the strictly nonpecuniary 
nature of his damages, there was no genuine 
issue of material fact as to his having 
suffered actual damages under the Act. The 
district court never reached the issue of 
whether the Government's failure to comply 
with the Act proximately caused an adverse 
effect on Cooper. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. We review a district court's grant of 
summary judgment de novo. Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to 
Cooper, we determine "whether there are 
any genuine issues of material fact and 
whether the district court correctly applied 
the substantive law." 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Act forbids federal agencies from 
disclosing an individual's records without 
that individual's written consent, unless the 
disclosure falls within one of the Act's 
narrow exceptions. Congress passed the Act 
'''to protect. the privacy of individuals 
identified in information systems maintained 
by Federal agencies'" by regulating "'the 
collection, maintenance, use, and 
dissemination of information by such 
agencies.'" To that end, the Act furnishes 
federal agencies with "detailed instructions 
for managing their records and provides for 
various sorts of civil relief to individuals 
aggrieved by failures on the Government's 
part to comply with the [Act;s] 
requirements. " 
If a federal agency fails to comply with the 
Act's record-keeping requirements, an 
individual may file a civil action against the 
agency in district court if the unauthorized 
disclosure has "an adverse effect" on the 
individual. If the individual demonstrates 
. "that the agency. acted in a manner which 
was intentional or willful," the individual 
can recover "actual damages sustained by 
the individual as a result of the" agency's 
violation of the Act, "but in no case shall a 
person entitled to recovery receive less than 
the sum of $1,000." Thus, to prevail on a 
claim under the Act, a plaintiff must prove 
that: (1) the government agency failed to 
uphold its record-keeping obligation; (2) the 
agency acted intentionally or willfully in 
failing to execute its responsibility; (3) the 
failure proximately caused an adverse effect 
on the· plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff 
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sustained actual damages. 
In light of the ruling of the district court, the 
sole issue before us on appeal is the meaning 
of "actual damages" as used in the Act. The 
Supreme Court has not expressly addressed 
the issue. In Doe v. Chao, the' Court held 
that the Act requires proof of "some actual 
damages" to recover the Act's minimum 
statutory damages of $1,000. 540 U.S. at 
627, 124 S.Ct. 1204. But the Court did not 
address "the precise definition of actual 
damages," though it recognized the disparate 
views of Courts of Appeals on the question. 
In Fitzpatrick v. IRS, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that actual damages "permits recovery 
only for proven pecuniary losses and not for 
generalized mental lllJunes, loss of 
reputation, embarrassment or other non-
quantifiable injuries." In Johnson v. IRS, the' 
Fifth Circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion, holding that "the term 'actual 
damages' under the Act does indeed include 
damages for physical and mental injury for 
which there is competent evidence in the 
record." 
Unlike the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, we have not previously decided the 
meaning of actual damages under the Act. 
A. Intrinsic Sources 
Declaring the meaning of actual damages is 
a matter of statutory interpretation. "The 
purpose of statutory construction is to 
discern the intent of Congress in enacting a 
. particular statute." 
Our search for Congress's intent begins with 
. "the plain meaning of the language in 
. question." If the relevant language is plain 
and unambiguous, our task is complete. To 
discern the text's plain meaning, "words will 
be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning." 
Unfortunately, there is no ordinary or plain 
meaning of the term actual damages because 
it is a legal term of art. As a result, ordinary 
dictionaries are of no assistance in clarifying 
the plain meaning of the term. Neither the 
American Heritage Dictionary of English 
Language nor Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary contains an entry 
for actual damages. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "actual 
damages" as "[a]n amount awarded to a 
complainant to compensate for a proven 
injury or loss; damages that repay actual 
losses." Unfortunately, that definition sheds 
little light on the type of injury or loss 
Congress intended plaintiffs to be able to 
prove under the Act. Simply because a 
statute authorizes the recovery of damages 
to compensate for injuries does not mean 
that the statute authorizes the recovery of 
damages for any type ofloss. 
The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, III 
Fitzpatrick and Johnson, agreed that the 
meaning of the term actual damages is 
ambiguous. In Fitzpatrick, the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded there is "no consistent 
legal interpretation" of actual damages, and 
observed that "courts have used 'actual 
damages' in a variety of circumstances, with 
the interpretation varying with the context of 
use." In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit concluded 
that "the term 'actual damages' has no plain 
meaning or consistent legal interpretation." 
Similarly, we have recognized the shifting 
sense we have attributed to the term. The 
term is "chameleon," as its meaning changes 
with the specific statute in which it is found. 
Since there is no plain meaning to the term 
actual damages, as used in the Act, we next 
consult the term in its statutory context, 
looking to the language of the entire statute, 
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its stmcture, and purpose. 
Congress articulated a clear purpose behind 
the Act, stating that "the right to privacy is a 
personal and fundamental right protected by 
the Constitution of the United States." To 
protect that right, Congress passed the Act 
"to provide certain safeguards for an 
individual against an invasion of personal 
privacy by requiring federal agencies ... to . 
. . be subject to civil suit for any damages 
which occur as a result of willful or 
intentional action which violates any 
individual's rights under this Act." 
Congress's intent that the Act offer relief in 
the form of "any damages" resulting from a 
violation of one's right of privacy begs the 
question of what types of injuries typically 
result from the violation of such a right. The 
Supreme Court has observed that "[i]n the 
'right of privacy' cases the primary damage 
is the mental distress from having been 
exposed to public view." The related 
common-law t011 of def~mation also 
provides monetary relief for nonpecuniary 
harms. In defamation cases, the Supreme 
Court has stated that "the more customary 
types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory 
falsehood include impairment. of reputation 
and standing in· the community, personal 
humiliation, and mental anguish and 
suffering." Accordingly, in her dissent in 
Doe v. Chao, Justice Ginsburg, commenting 
on the Act's purpose of providing relief for 
"any damages," stated "Act violations 
commonly cause fear, anxiety, or other 
emotional distress-in the Act's parlance, 
'adverse effects [,] ", and that in such cases, 
"emotional distress is generally the only 
harm the claimant suffers." One can readily 
envision circumstances in which these types 
of injuries might flow from the disclosure of 
one's confidential medical records, which 
often contain some of the most sensitive and 
intimate information about one's physical, 
mental, and emotional well-being, and 
sexual orientation. Given the nature of the 
injuries that most frequently flow from 
privacy violations, it is difficult to see how 
Congress's stated goal of subjecting federal 
agencies to civil suit for any damages 
resulting from a willful or intentional 
violation of the Act could be fully realized 
unless the Act encompasses both pecuniary 
and nonpecuniary injuries . 
Congress signaled its intent, tlu'oughout the 
Act, to extend monetmy recovery beyond 
pure economic loss. The Act obligates 
agencies to maintain a records system that 
"shall establish appropriate 
administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards to insure the security and 
confidentiality of records and to protect 
against any anticipated threats or hazards to 
their security. or integrity which could result 
In substantial harm, . embarrassment, 
inconvenience, or unfairness to any 
individual on whom information is 
m~intained." Further, the Act provides a 
civil remedy for an agency's failure "to 
maintain any record concerning any 
individual with such accuracy, relevance, 
timeliness, and completeness as is necessary 
to· assure fairness in any determination 
relating to the . . . character . . . of . . . the 
individual that :may be made on the basis of 
such record." Congress's use of language to 
ensure that a federal agency's record-
keeping practices do not result in 
embarrassment or harm to one's character 
bolsters a construction of actual damages 
that reaches nonpecuniary damages. 
Further, a contrary reading of the Act seems 
unreasonable in light of how we and other 
courts have constmed the term "adverse 
effect." The Act provides actual damages for 
intentional or wilful violations that have an 
adverse effect on an individual. Our circuit 
and at least seven others have recognized 
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that a nonpecuniary harm, such as emotional 
distress, may constitute an adverse effect 
under the Act. Even the Eleventh
c 
Circuit 
aclmowledged in Fitzpatrick that 
humiliation or an emotional injury can 
qualify as an adverse effect. To recognize 
that the Act entitles one to actual damages 
for an adverse effect related to one's mental 
or emotional well-being, or one's character, 
as we and other circuits have previously 
done, while holding that one injured under 
the Act cannot recovel~ actual damages for 
nonpecumary injuries, would be an 
unreasonable construction of the Act. 
Indeed, such a reading would essentially 
render the provision of actual damages 
meaningless in cases where the plaintiff s 
injury relates to his or her character, or 
mental or emotional health, even though 
such cases are common under the Act. 
B. Extrinsic Sources 
The parties in this case have argued at length 
about how the Act's legislative history 
. supports their respective positions on the 
meaning of actual damages. 
The statutory text itself is the "authoritative 
statement" of a statute's meaning. However, 
courts can and do consult extrinsic 
materials, such as legislative history, for· 
guidance in construing an ambiguous 
statute. But courts resort to extrinsic 
materials "only to the extent they shed a 
reliable light on the enacting Legislature's 
understanding of otherwise ambiguous 
terms." 
In this case, the Act's legislative history is 
not a reliable source for the meaning of 
actual damages because both sides of the 
argument can readily. find support for their 
respective positions in that history. 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that in 
Fitzpatrick and Johnson, the Eleventh and 
Fifth Circuits conducted their own thorough 
reviews of the legislative history of the Act, 
only to arrive at diametrically opposing 
constructions of the same term. For these 
reasons, we decline to wade through the 
"murky, ambiguous, and contradictory" 
legislative history of the Act in the vain 
hope of finding clear guidance concerning 
the meaning of the term "actual damages." 
Moreover, legislative history is of no help to 
us in construing the scope of the 
Government's waiver of sovereign 
immunity at issue in this case, because "the 
'unequivocal expression' of elimination of 
sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an 
expression in statutory text. If clarity does 
not exist there, it cannot be supplied by a 
committee repoli. " 
However, one extrinsic source that does 
shed some reliable light on the meaning of 
the term actual damages in the Act is the 
. Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 
U.S.C: § 1681 et seq. In 1970, only four 
years before Congress passed the Act, 
Congress enacted the· FCRA with the 
express purpose of requiring 
consumer reporting agencies [to] 
adopt reasonable procedures for 
meeting the needs of commerce for 
consumer credit, personnel, 
insurance, and other information in a 
manner which is fair and equitable to 
the consumer, with regard to the 
confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, 
and proper utilization of such 
information in accordance with the 
requirements of this subchapter. 
15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). 
In enacting the FCRA, Congress recognized 
that this country's banking system has 
produced a complex system of credit 
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reporting, involving consumer reporting 
agencies gathering and evaluating a wide 
range of personal and sensitive information, 
such as "credit worthiness, credit standing, 
credit capacity, character, and general 
. reputation of consumers." Congress passed 
the FCRA to ensure that "consumer 
reporting agencies exer~ise their grave 
responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, 
and a respect for the consumer's right to 
priwlcy." To that end, the FCRA prohibits 
credit reporting agencies from releasing 
consumer credit repOlis except as provided 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a). 
Thus, not only did Congress enact the Act 
and the FCRA within a few years of each 
other,. but they were passed to address an 
identical concern growing out of closely 
analogous circumstances. In· both cases, 
Congress acknowledged that vast databases 
of personal information are being gathered 
by agencies-in one case, federal agencies, 
and in the other, credit reporting agencies-
and sought to circumscribe these agencies in 
the manner they gather, maintain, and use 
that sensitive information. Ultimately, 
Congress passed both laws with the purpose 
of protecting an individual's right of privacy 
from being violated by the disclosure of 
private information. 
Further, the Act and the FCRA provide 
similar remedies. The FCRA creates a 
private right of action for injured consumers 
to recover any "actual damages" caused by 
an agency's negligent or willful violation of 
the FCRA. Most importantly, we have held 
that actual damages under the FCRA 
encompass damages for emotional distress. 
Other courts have held similarly. 
"[W]hen Congress uses the same language 
in two statutes having similar purposes, 
particularly when one is enacted shortly 
after the other, it is appropriate to presume 
that Congress intended that text to have the 
same meaning in both statutes." The 
presumption is appropriate in this case. 
Therefore, our construction of the identical 
language in the FCRA, a statute closely 
analogous in purpose and time as the Act, is 
a reliable extrinsic source that buttresses a 
construction of the Act to mean that actual 
damages encompass both pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary damages. . 
Having reviewed the text, purpose, and 
structure of the Act, as well as how actual 
damages has been construed in other closely· 
analogous federal statutes, we hold that 
Congress intended the term actual damages 
in the Act to encompass both pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary injuries. 
C. Sovereign Immunity Canon 
The district court held that the term actual 
damages is ambiguous and, consequently, 
applied the sovereign immunity canon in the 
Government's favor, construing actual 
damages narrowly to encompass only 
pecuniary damages.. Our finding of clear 
congressional intent in the statute itself-its 
purpose, structure, and language-and 
external suppOli in the language and 
construction of the FCRA mandates reversal 
of the district court's decision. 
The sovereign immunity canon holds that 
"[a] waiver of the Federal Government's 
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally 
expressed in statutory text." To the extent 
there are any ambiguities in the statutory 
text, those ambiguities must be strictly 
construed in favor of the sovereign. 
Therefore, "[t]o sustain a claim that the 
Government is liable for awards 
of[ nonpecuniary] monetary damages, the 
waiver of sovereign immunity must extend 
unambiguously to such monetary claims." 
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Cooper argues that the canon applies only 
where the initial waiver of immunity is in 
question. Because the Act expressly 
authorizes a private cause of action against 
the Government for damages, Cooper 
contends that the canon is of no use in 
construing the meaning of actual damages. 
Cooper's position is not supported by 
applicable case law. In United States v. 
Nordic Village, Inc., the Court applied the 
. sovereign immunity canon to hold that 11 
U.S.C. § 106(c) does not waive the federal 
government's sovereign immunity from an 
action seeking monetary recovery in 
bankruptcy. The Court acknowledged that § 
. 106(c)'s companion provisions, § 106(a) and 
§ 106(b), plainly waive immunity with 
regard to monetary relief, and that § 1 06( c) 
waives immunity as to some fOlID of relief 
(e.g., declaratory relief). Despite the waiver, 
the Court did not limit its application of the 
sovereign immunity canon; it proceeded to 
analyze the canon as to the scope of the 
waiver. Because the language of § 1 06( c) 
was "susceptible of at least two 
interpretations that do not authorize 
monetary relief," the Court applied the 
canon to hold that § 1 06( c) "fails to establish 
unambiguously that the waiver extends to 
monetary claims," and ruled in the 
government's favor. Thus, the sovereign 
immunity canon remains relevant and 
applicable beyond the initial waiver of 
sovereign immunity for purposes of gauging 
the scope of the waiver. 
Applying the canon to this case, if actual 
damages is susceptible of two plausible 
interpretations, then the sovereign immunity 
canon requires the court to construe the telID 
narrowly in favor of the Government, 
holding that nonpecuniary damages are not 
covered. For the reasons explained above in 
Part lILA-B, we conclude that when read in 
connection with the text of the entire Act, 
the Act's remedial scheme, and its 
underlying purpose of providing relief for 
"any damages" resulting from a violation of 
the privacy interests protected by the Act, 
the term actual damages is unambiguous. 
Given Congress's clear intent to' furnish 
monetary relief for some injuries that are 
nonpecuniary in nature, and are proximately 
caused by an agency's wilful or intentional 
violation of the Act, we do not deem a 
construction that limits recovery to 
pecuniary loss plausible. 
The district court erred by failing to consider 
the full panoply of sources available to it for 
evaluating the scope of the Government's 
waiver of sovereign immunity under the 
Act. Rather, the district court relied on the 
sovereign immunity canon: alone, to the 
exclusion of the traditional tools of statutory 
construction. "The sovereign immunity 
canon is just that-a canon of construction. It 
is a tool for interpreting the law, and. we 
have never held that it displaces the other 
traditional tools of statutory construction." 
Moreover, the scope of a waiver of 
sovereign immunity can be ascertained only 
by reference to the congressional policy 
underlying the statute. 
Congress enacted the Act to secure a· 
citizen's "right to privacy[, which] is a 
personal and fundamental right protected by 
the Constitution of the United States." 
"Rights, constitutional and otherwise, do not 
exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to 
protect persons from injuries to particular 
interests, and their contours are shaped by 
the interests they protect." In connection 
with compensating constitutional injuries 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, another federal 
statute that seeks to provide compensation 
for injuries resulting from government 
. misconduct, the Supreme Court has stated, 
"to further the purpose of § 1983, the rules 
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governing compensation for injuries caused 
by the deprivation of constitutional rights 
should be tailored to the interests protected 
by the particular right in question[.]" 
Similarly, to achieve the policy underlying 
the Act, the privacy right should be tailored 
to the particular interests implicated by the 
Act. Those interests will, in most cases, 
result in injuries that go beyond mere 
financial loss (e.g., embarrassment, mental 
anguish, emotional distress). In light of the 
inherently noneconomic interests central to 
the Act, we cannot plausibly construe actual 
damages under the Act to exclude 
nonpecuniary damages. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Applying traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation, we hold that in using the term 
actual damages, Congress clearly intended 
that when a federal agency intentionally or 
willfully fails to uphold its record..:keeping 
obligations under the Act, and that failure 
proximately causes an adverse effect on the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to recover 
for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary 
injuries. As a result, we reverse and remand 
to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
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Stanmore Cawthon COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; Social SecurityAdministration; United 
States Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees. 
. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Filed February 22,2010; Amended September 16, 2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
ORDER 
The opinion filed February 22, 2010, and 
published at 596 F.3d 538, is hereby 
amended by deleting footnote 2 (and 
renumbering succeeding footnotes) on pages 
2825-26 of the slip opinion (also found at 
596 FJd 538,543-44). 
With this amendment, the panel votes to 
deny the petition for panel rehearing. Judge 
M. Smith votes to deny the petition for . 
rehearing en banc, and Judges Bright and 
Hawkins so recommend. 
The full court was advised of the petition for 
rehearing en banco After a request for a vote 
by an active judge, a vote was taken, and a 
majority of the active judges of the court 
failed to vote for a rehearing en banco 
. The . petitions for panel rehearing and 
rehearing en banc are DENIED. Further 
petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc 
shall not be entertained. 
MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge, 
concuning in the order denying rehearing en 
banc: 
I write to respond briefly to the dissent filed 
with this order. 
The Privacy Act (Act) unequivocally waives 
sovereign immunity. Under the Act, if a 
"court determines that [an] agency acted in a 
manner which was intentional or willful, the 
United States shall be liable to the 
individual in an amount equal to the sum of. 
. . actual damages . sustained by the 
individual as a result of the refusal· or . 
failure" to comply with the Privacy Act. In 
light of that unconditional waiver, we 
appropriately followed Justice Cardozo's· 
admonition: '''The exemption of the 
sovereign from suit involves hardship 
enough, where consent has been withheld. 
We are not to add to its rigor by refinement 
of construction, where consent has been 
announced. ", 
Our dissenting colleague mistakenly asserts 
that our opinion waives the sovereign 
immunity of the United States. In fact, 
Congress did so. Thus, the issue in this case 
is not the existence of a waiver, but rather 
the scope of that express waiver, as 
contemplated in the Act. To that end, we 
correctly construed the waiver to allow the 
recovery of nonpecuniary damages, based 
upon clear congressional intent. 
I 
The sovereign immunity canon requires that 
governmental waivers of sovereign 
immunity be "unequivocally expressed." 
The canon has clearly been satisfied in this 
case. The Act categorically waives the 
federal government's immunity from suit 
and indisputably authorizes the recovery of 
"actual damages." The government's 
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· surrender to liability for damages is in the 
plain text of the Act itself, leaving us only to 
construe the scope of that surrender. 
To construe the scope of this waiver, the 
panel followed controlling precedent 
directing the panel to look to the policies or 
objectives underlying the Act. 
II 
The dissent wrongly concludes that the 
comi's observation that the term "actual 
damages," standing alone, is ambiguous 
necessarily means that the Act does not 
waive sovereign immunity for nonpecuniary 
damages. Our jurisprudence has clarified 
that "[r]ather than focusing just on the word 
or phrase at Issue, this court looks to the 
entire statute to determine Congressional 
intent." "Thus, the structure and purpose of 
a statute may also provide guidance in 
determining the plain meaning of its 
provisions. " 
Accordingly, we looked to several sources 
manifesting the Act's overall objective. We 
noted the Act's preambular statement of 
purpose, wherein Congress stated that "[t]he 
purpose of this act is to provide certain 
safeguards for an individual against an 
invasion of personal privacy by requiring 
federal agencies ... to ... be subject to civil 
suit for any damages which occur as a result 
of willful or intentional action which 
violates any individual's rights under this 
Act." We highlighted the Act's requirement 
that agencies maintain records "to protect 
against any anticipated threats or hazards ... 
which could result in . . .. embarrassment." 
We also observed the Act provides a remedy 
for an agency's violation that inhibits a fair 
determination relating to one's "character." 
Such sources provided helpful guidance in 
discerning Congress's remedial aim in 
enacting the Act. 
Understanding that "statutory language 
cannot be construed in a vacuum," the panel 
construed the term "actual damages" in its 
proper context, to conclude that it 
unequivocally encompasses nonpecuniary 
damages. When a statute is ambiguous, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity is useful as 
"a tool· for interpreting the law." When a 
statute is not ambiguous, however, "[t]here 
is no need for us to resort to the sovereign 
immunity canon." Because "there [was] no 
ambiguity left for us to construe," the 
application of the sovereign immunity canon 
was unnecessary in this case. 
Further, "[t]he sovereign immunity canon is 
just that-a canon of construction. It is a tool 
for interpreting the law, and we have never 
held that it displaces the other traditional 
tools of statutory construction." Based upon 
the clear congressional intent as to the scope 
of "actual damages" under the Privacy Act, 
this court properly concluded that the 
government could not "carry the day by 
invoking general maxims of judicial policy." 
III 
The dissent misconstrues the relationship 
between the requirement of showing an 
"adverse . effect" and that of "actual 
damages." In Doe v. Chao, the Court held 
that "an individual subjected to an adverse 
effect has injury enough to open the 
courthouse door." A majority of the circuits 
in this country, including our own, has held 
that mental distress 0'1' emotional harm IS 
sufficient to constitute an adverse effect. 
Under the dissent's view, a plaintiff is 
entitled to establish standing for an injury 
under the Act that results in a nonpecuniary 
harm, but is not entitled to seek actual 
damages for such a nonpecuniary injury. 
Such a construction of the Act would clearly 
frustrate the intent of Congress. In contrast, 
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our opinion is tme to the overall objective of 
the Act, allowing a plaintiff who 
demonstrates a nonpecuniary adverse effect 
to have the opportunity to recover 
nonpecuniary damages, to the extent the 
plaintiff can proffer the requisite degree of 
competent evidence that there is a real and 
tangible nonpecuniary injury. Our opinion is 
also consistent with the familiar mle of 
statutory constmction that remedial 
legislation should be constmed broadly to 
effectuate its purposes. 
IV 
Controlling precedent in cases such as 
Franchise Tax Board, Hopi Tribe, and Town 
& Country, requires us to constme the scope 
of the Act's unequivocal waiver of 
sovereign immunity in light of the 
underlying congressional policy, and with 
the purpose of achieving the remedial goal 
of that waiver. The multiple sources the 
panel consulted reveal a clear and focused 
intent on the part of Congress to grant 
complete relief to those injured by willful 
violations of the Act. Given that intent, . 
Congress's provision that the federal 
government be liable for "actual damages" 
constitutes an unequivocal expression of the 
federal government's waiver of its . own 
sovereign immunity for nonpecuniary 
injuries. The panel concluded there was no 
other plausible explanation for this 
unqualified language. 
In conclusion, our dissenting colleague 
reminds us that "[0 Jnly Congress has the 
keys to unlock our country's Treasury." But 
Congress used its keys and opened that door 
for plaintiffs injured by willful violations of 
the Act when it expressly gave plaintiffs the 
right to sue the government for actual 
damages. A court must not act "as a self-
constituted guardian of the Treasury [to J 
import immunity back into a statute 
designed to limit it." 
V 
The panel's decision is compelled by the 
precedents of the Supreme Court and this 
court for constming the scope of a waiver of 
sovereign immunity, and the court properly 
denied rehearing this case en banco 
O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
from the order denying rehearing en banc, 
joined by KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, and 
GOULD, TALLMAN, BYBEE, 
CALLAHAN, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, 
Circuit Judges: 
The Supreme Court has consistently held 
that the sovereign immunity of the United 
States may be waived only by an 
unequivocal expression in statutory text. 
Today, our court neglects this principle by 
leaving in place a decision that the term 
"actual damages" in the Privacy Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A), is sufficient to deem 
sovereign immunity waived for 
nonpecuniary damages, even though the 
opinion itself admits that the term is not 
defined in the statute, has no plain meaning, 
has no fixed legal meaning, and indeed, is a 
"chameleon." Cooper V. FAA, 596 F.3d 538, 
544-45 (9th Cir.2010). Even more troubling, 
the opinion relies on· abstract legislative 
intent and an interpretation of the Privacy 
Act that the Supreme Court recently rejected 
in Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 124 S.Ct. 
1204, 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004). The effect 
of today's order is to open wide the United 
States Treasury to a whole new class of 
claims without warrant. In so doing, we 
exacerbate a circuit split that had been 
healing under the strong medicine of recent 
sovereign immunity jurispmdence.1 Hence, 
it is most unfortunate that we did not rehear 
this case en banco 
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I 
'''A waiver of the Federal Government's 
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally 
expressed in statutory text, and will not be 
implied. Moreover, a waiver of the 
Government's sovereign immunity will be 
strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in 
favor of the sovereign." "[T]he 'unequivocal 
expression' of elimination of sovereign 
immunity that we insist upon is an 
expression in statutory text." "A statute's 
legislative history cannot supply a waiver 
that does not appear clearly in any statutory 
text. ... " 
A 
Here, the court all but admits that the 
statutory term "actual damages" does not 
unequivocally express a waiver for 
nonpecuniary damages. According to our 
court's opinion, "there is no ordinary or 
plain meaning of the term actual damages." 
Cooper, 596 F.3d at 544 (emphasis added). 
Indeed, definitional analysis "sheds little 
light on the type of injury or loss Congress 
intended plaintiffs to be able to prove." In 
addition, the court concedes that two other 
circuits "agree[ ] that the meaning of the 
term actual damages is ambiguous." It also 
states that "we have recognized the shifting 
sense we have attributed to the term." The 
term, the court concludes, is a '" chameleon, ' 
as its meaning changes with the specific 
statute." Our court's own rationale, 
therefore, indicates that the statute does not 
waive sovereign immunity for nonpecuniary 
damages. 
B 
Notwithstanding such textual infirmities, the 
opinion resorts to the "clear purpose behind 
the [Privacy] Act" purportedly embodied in 
the Act's preamble, the way that Congress 
"signaled its intent" in the Act's 
recordkeeping provision, and the 
"presumption" that Congress intended the 
Act to mirror the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 
But the proper conclusion to draw from the 
sources on which the court relies, if any can 
be drawn at all, is precisely the opposite of 
that drawn by the court. Assuming that 
recourse to a preamble is appropriate in the 
circumstances of this case, the Act's 
preamble uses the term "any damages," not 
the narrower term "actual damages." That 
the preamble differs from the operative 
provision indicates a difference in meaning, 
not, as the court concludes, an equivalence 
in meaning. In addition, the recordkeeping 
provision requires . agencies to prevent 
"embarrassment" but, notably, does not state 
that such harm is compensable. Finally, the 
court's intuiting of congressional intent from 
our interpretation of the term "actual 
damages" in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
conflicts with the statement mere pages 
earlier that the meaning of the term "actual 
damages" varies from statute to statute. 
Although my colleague's concurrence insists 
that the majority opmlOn "correctly 
construed the waiver to allow the recovery 
of nonpecuniary damages," Concurrence at 
1019, the opinion itself concedes that if the 
term "actual damages is susceptible of two 
plausible interpretations, then the sovereign 
immunity canon requires the court to 
construe the. term narrowly in favor of the 
Government [and] hold[ ] that nonpecuniary 
damages are not covered." The language 
used in the preamble and. recordkeeping 
provision, and the various ways the term is 
used in other statutes, make evident that it is 
indeed susceptible to an alternative plausible 
interpretation. By its own logic, the court 
should have construed the term narrowly. 
C 
. But it is the court's recourse to the Privacy 
Act's standing provision that is the most 
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troubling, because it conflicts with the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the very 
provision of the Privacy Act at issue in this 
case. In Doe v. Chao, the Court 
distinguished standing to sue under the 
Privacy Act (which extends to all who suffer 
an "adverse effect") from the right to 
damages. The Court stated that the term 
"adverse effect" has the "limited but specific 
function" of "identifying a potential plaintiff 
who satisfies the injury-in-fact and causation 
requirements of Article III standing." "That 
is, an individual subjected to an adverse 
effect has injury enough to open the 
courthouse door, but without more has no 
cause of action for damages under the 
Privacy Act." Here, the cOUli jumbles the' 
two concepts, interpreting the term "actual 
damages" broadly with respect to the type of 
damages available simply because the term 
"adverse effect" is interpreted broadly with 
respect to standing. Not appropriate, said the 
Supreme Court quite clearly in Doe. 
II 
It is apparent that this case involves an 
. important question of federal law. "It is 
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to 
be amenable to the suit of an individual 
without its consent." Sovereign immunity 
allows for majoritarian democracy, 
preventing the discouragement by courts of 
government action. We ignore at our peril 
the well-established clear statement rule for 
waivers of sovereign immunity, which. puts 
Congress, not the courts, in charge. 
Concern over the impact of a waiver of 
sovereign immunity is particularly 
appropriate in this case. Even the dissent in 
Doe, which sought to expand damages under 
the Privacy Act, admitted that by its 
enactment "Congress did not want to saddle 
the Government with disproportionate 
liability." Congress was prescient. Because 
more and more government records are 
accessible online through the Internet, they . 
are easier to share. The proliferation of 
electronic records raises the stakes of a 
broader waiver of sovereign immunity, 
increasing the fiscal exposure of the United 
States to the tune of a $1000 minimum 
statutory award per claim. Only Congress 
has the keys to unlock our country's 
Treasury. The role of the cOUlis is to ensure 
that Congress has used them in each case. 
III 
For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent 
from the order denying rehearing en bane. 
* * * 
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"Supreme Court to Review Pilot's Privacy Suit" 
San Francisco Chronicle 
June 21, 2011 
Bob Egelko 
The U:.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
hear the Obama administration's request to 
dismiss a lawsuit by a San Francisco pilot 
against federal agencies that disclosed his 
HIV -positive status during a fraud 
investigation, a case that could determine 
the scope of a post-Watergate privacy law. 
At issue in Stan Cooper's case is whether 
agencies that reveal an individual's medical 
records or other private information can be 
sued for causing emotional distress. The 
Obama administration argued that the 1974 
Privacy Act allows damages only for 
financial losses, which C()oper did not claini 
in his suit. 
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in 
San Francisco ruled in February 2010 that 
Cooper could seek damages for emotional 
harm. The Supreme Court granted review of 
the administration's appeal Monday and will 
hear the case in the term that begins in 
October. The issue of whether plaintiffs can 
seek damages for emotional harm under the 
Privacy Act has divided the nation's appeals 
courts in other cases. 
Cooper's lawyer, James Wood, said the case 
would affect the continuing vitality of a law 
that was passed in response to revelations of 
break-ins and surveillance of private citizens 
during President Richard Nixon's 
administration. 
"More often than not, . embarrassment and 
humiliation are the only damages," Wood 
said. "Unless these are compensable, it's a 
free license to the government" to break the 
law. . 
Cooper, a small-plane pilot, started flying in 
1964 but gave up his license after he was 
diagnosed HIV-positive in 1985, when FAA 
rules still denied licenses to anyone with the 
AIDS virus. 
Cooper reapplied for a license in 1994 
without disclosing his condition. His health 
briefly worsened in 1995 and he applied for 
Social Security benefits, with the assurance 
that his medical records would remain 
confidential. Although the FAA repealed its 
HIV ban several years later, the agency 
revoked Cooper's license in 2005 after 
obtaining his medical records from the 
.Social Security Administration. The FAA's 
investigation was part of "Operation Safe 
Pilot," which examined records of 47,000 
Northern California pilots to see if they had 
committed fraud in obtaining Social 
Security benefits or a pilot's license. 
Cooper pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor 
charge in 2006 and was fined $1,000. The 
FAA restored his license later that year. 
The Supreme Court case is FAA vs. Cooper, 
10-1024. 
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"Emotional Injury as Privacy Harm" 
Harvard Law Blog: Info/Law 
June 21,2011 
William McGeveran 
Perhaps lost in all the understandable 
attention to yesterday's Supreme Court 
decision in the Wal-Mart class action case, 
the Court also granted cert. in a potentially 
significant privacy law case, FAA v. 
Cooper. 
. . . The formal question presented in the 
case IS: 
Whether a plaintiff who alleges only 
mental and emotional injuries can 
establish "actual damages" within 
the meaning of the civil remedies 
provision of the Privacy Act, 5 
U.S.C. 552a(g)(4)(A). 
The Privacy Act concerns the federal 
government's handling of personal 
information, and it includes restrictions on 
the ability of one federal agency to provide 
that information to other agencies. Cooper, 
an airline pilot, had HIV and concealed it 
when he renewed the medical certifications 
required for his pilot's license. When his 
condition deteriorated he applied for 
disability from the Social Security 
Administration, which later provided 
information about Cooper's HIV status to 
the FAA in an investigation. Cooper alleged 
that action violated the Privacy Act, but he 
did not claim damages related to the loss of 
his license and his job, presumably because 
his own concealment of his HIV status was a 
federal crime (for which he was convicted 
and put on probation). 
An injured plaintiff can· recover "actual 
damages" for "intentional or willful" 
violations of the Privacy Act. But what are 
"actual damages" in this context? Do they 
include the emotional halm Cooper claims 
he suffered? In this case, the Ninth Circuit 
said it might. The Fifth Circuit has reached 
the same conclusion previously, but the 
Sixth and Eleventh. Circuits have made the 
opposite determination. Now the Supreme 
Court will sort it out. 
This gets very complicated, not only 
because of the· ephemeral nature of many 
privacy hal'ms, but also because this case 
involves hotly contested issues of sovereign 
immunity. Under a well-established rule, the 
government can be sued for damages only 
when Congress clearly says so in a statute. 
In essence, the Ninth Circuit decision in 
Cooper said that the Privacy Act clearly 
allows private lawsuits, and that the nature 
of the damages available was a distinct 
question. The government responds that 
even the· Ninth Circuit found "actual 
damages" a nebulous concept, so it could 
hardly qualify as the type of "clear 
statement" necessary to subject the 
government to liability. 
This dispute could yield a relatively nalTOW 
and technical decision. On the other hand, 
combined with the COU1i's earlier decision 
limiting the availability of Privacy Act 
damages awards in Doe v. Chao, it could 
remove one of the last meaningful potential 
penalties for violations of the Act. Or, if the 
Court makes more expansive statements, 
those could provide precedent for arguments 
either supporting or opposing the award of 
compensatory damages for the emotional 
harm caused by privacy violations beyond 
just the nalTOW confines of the Privacy Act. 
* * * 
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"Gay Pilot Wins New Hearing 
on Privacy Act Damages" 
Leonard Link (Blog) 
February 23,2010 
Professor Arthur S. Leonard 
A unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled on 
Feburary 22 that Stanmore Cawthon Cooper, 
a gay pilot whose Social Security Disability 
medical file was unlawfully shared by the 
Social Secwity Administration with 
investigators from the Federal Aviation 
Administration and the Depatiment of 
TranspOliation, was entitled to seek damages 
for non-pecuniary injudes under the federal 
Privacy Act. The ruling in Cooper v. FAA, 
2010 Westlaw 597486, reverses a 
determination by U.S. District Judge· 
Vaughn Walker (N.D.Cal.) that the statute's 
authorization of damages for ."actual 
injuries" must be narrowly construed to be 
limited only to pecuniary losses resulting 
from a violation ofthe statute. 
Cooper, who had a pilot's license beginning 
in 1964, learned he was HIV+ in 1985, but 
decided not to disclose this to the FAA, 
because he was worried about 
confidentiality concerning his sexual 
orientation and HIV status. He actually 
allowed his medical certification from the 
FAA to lapse at one point, knowing that the 
agency was grounding pilots· who were· 
taking anti-retroviral medications. In 1994, 
he reapplied for a medical certificate from 
the FAA, but did not disclose his HIV status 
or medication situation on the application, 
and a new celiificate was issued. However, 
his HIV-related symptoms worsened and in 
1995 Cooper applied to the Social Security 
Administration for disability benefits, which 
were awarded to him from August 1995 to 
August 1996. Cooper did not notify the FAA 
about this development concerning his 
health. 
In July 2002, the FAA launched an 
investigation into possible fraud by pilots 
failing to disclose adverse health 
information to the agency. They launched a 
data matching program in Northem 
Califomia, where they sent a list of all 
holders of active FAA medical 
certifications, together with their social 
security numbers, to the Social Security 
Administration,. which then reported back to 
them all of the pilots on the list who had 
sought disability benefits from the agency. 
Cooper's name was on the list. He was 
subsequently confronted with this, and pled 
guilty to a count of making and delivering a 
false official writing, a misdemeanor for 
which he was fined $1,000. Upset that the 
Social Security Administration had 
disclosed medical information to the FAA 
that was supposed to be confidential, Cooper 
launched this lawsuit, and won a ruling from 
the district court that the agencies had 
violated the Privacy Act by failing to obtain 
his authorization to disclose his Social 
Security medical records. But Judge Walker, 
as noted above, refused to award damages, 
since Cooper's lllJurleS were entirely 
psychological (emotional distress, etc.). 
The court of appeals found that there is a 
split of circuit authority on the question 
whether non-pecuniary lllJunes are 
compensable under the ·Privacy Act, but that 
it was a question of first impression for the 
9th Circuit. The panel unanimously 
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concluded that in light of the purpose and 
function of the statute, it was clear that such 
injuries should be compensable. Indeed, 
elsewhere in the statute in relating the 
legislative purposes, the law mentions 
compensating "all injuries," and there is a 
clear recognition in other federal privacy 
statutes and in the Supreme Court's 
constitutional privacy jurisprudence that. 
frequently the main injury resulting from a 
breach of privacy is embarrassment· or 
emotional distress. Consequently, it would 
be unreasonable to construe the statute to 
deny compensation for such injuries. The 
case was remanded to Judge Walker for a 
determination whether the disclosure caused 
any non-pecuniary injuries to Cooper that 
should be compensated. If any qualifying 
injury is shown, the statute authorizes 
damages of at least $1,000. 
Given the split of circuit authority, it is 
possible that the government will seek en 
banc review and/or an appeal to the 
Supreme Court. Cooper is represented on 
the appeal by Raymond A. Cardozo, Tiffany 
Renee Thomas, James M. Wood and David 
J. Bird from the firm of Reed Smith LLP. 
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"The Nature of Privacy Harms: Financial and 
Physical Harm vs. Emotional and Mental Harm" 
Concurring Opinions 
. January 15,2010 
Daniel Solove 
The 9th Circuit is hearing an interesting case 
involving the Privacy Act-Cooper v. 
Federal Aviation Administration, No. C 
071383' VRW (N.D. Cal. 2008). The 
F ederal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
shared information about pilot Stanmore 
Cooper's HIV positive status with other 
government agencies. The district court 
found this information sharing to be 
improper under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 
552a: 
Because DOT-OIG . transmitted 
Cooper's records to another agency 
without his prior consent and this use 
does not fall within the routine use or 
another exception to 5 USC § 
552a(b), the DOTOIG's use of 
Cooper's record was unlawful under 
5 USC § 552a(b). 
However, the fact that an agency violates the 
Privacy Act does not mean that a plaintiff 
can obtain redress. In a decision I find 
wrongheaded-both as a matter of statutory 
interpretation as well as normative policy-
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the 
Privacy Act requires that a plaintiff prove 
actual damages before being able to get 
monetary relief under the Act. See Doe v. 
Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004). The Supreme 
Court reached this conclusion even though 
the Privacy Act has a liquidated damages 
provision: 
[T]he United States shall be liable to 
the individual in an amount equal to 
the sum of . . . actual damages 
sustained by the individual as a result 
of the refusal or failure, but in no 
case shall a person entitled to 
recovery receive less than the sum of. 
$1,000. 
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4). 
In order to receive the liquidated damages of 
$1000, plaintiffs must first demonstrate they 
are "entitled to recovery" and prove actual 
damages. 
. I believe the holding in Chao is misguided 
because the very function of a liquidated 
damages provision is to address difficulties 
in proving harm. Privacy Act violations 
often involve harms that are not akin to 
traditional types of injuries. Privacy harms 
caused by misuse or improper dissemination 
of information are more abstract in nature 
and often can't be directly linked to 
financial losses or physical 1l1Jury. 
Nevertheless, they are harms, and without a 
way for plaintiffs to recover damages for 
such . harms, there is not a sufficient 
incentive for plaintiffs to bring Privacy Act 
lawsuits and for' agencies to follow the 
Privacy Act. 
Unfortunately, until Congress amends the 
Privacy Act to more clearly establish that 
liquidated damages can be recovered 
without proof of actual . damages, plaintiffs 
must establish actual damages. 
The issue in Cooper is what kind of 
damages can constitute actual damages. Can 
emotional/mental damages alone constitute 
actual damages? 
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There's a circuit split on the issue. As the 
district court noted: 
Two circuits that have addressed the 
. definition of actual damages in the 
context of the Privacy Act exaIl1ined 
the statute's legislative history to 
reach different conclusions. In 
Fitzpatrick v. Internal Revenue 
Service, the Eleventh Circuit focused 
. on the evolution of the Privacy Act's 
. damages provisions and noted that 
while early versions of the 
legislation included provisions for 
punitive damages and general 
damages, these damages provisions 
were not included in the version that 
became law. The court found support 
in the legislative history for a narrow 
reading of actual damages and held 
that '''actual damages' as used in the 
Privacy Act permits recovery only 
for proven pecuniary losses and not 
for generalized mental injuries, loss 
of reputation, embarrassment or 
other non-quantifiable injuries." 
In Johnson v. Department of 
Treasury, the Fifth Circuit reached 
the opposite conclusion. The court. 
noted that one of the Privacy Act's 
stated purposes is requiring federal 
agencies to "be subject to civil suit 
for any damages which occur as a 
result of willful or intentional" 
violation." After a lengthy analysis 
of the legislative history, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff 
there could recover for proven 
mental injuries. 
The district court III Cooper sided with 
Fitzpatrick, reasoning that the Act was 
. ambiguous about what actual damages 
constituted and such ambiguity should be 
resolved in favor of the govemment. 
I disagree. If Doe v. Chao is combined with 
a rule that actual damages must involve 
physical injury or financial loss, then it 
becomes extremely difficult for plaintiffs to 
recover under the Privacy Act. There will be 
a large group of cases where plaintiffs suffer 
Privacy Act violations butcan't get damages 
because privacy hanns are often emotional 
hanns. When they wrote their seminal 
article, The Right to Privacy, inspiring a 
significant development of privacy law, 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
recognized that privacy was an "injury to the 
feelings" and that the law at the time (1890) 
had evolved sufficiently to redress su.ch 
harms that did not constitute physical 
injuries or financial loss. 
It would certainly be ironic if the Privacy 
Act wouldn't recognize the nature of most 
privacy harms. Agencies could violate the 
. Privacy Act, improperly sharing and 
disseminating information, and in a large 
number of cases, then be able to argue that 
there's no harm. Why should Congress have 
bothered to pass the Privacy Act limiting 
such practices and providing plaintiffs with 
a remedy if in many of these cases there 
would be no cognizable harm and plaintiffs 
won't be able to recover any damages? It 
seems like a wrongheaded interpretation to 
me. 
If we must live with Doe v. Chao, at the 
very least, to avoid making a total mockery 
of the Privacy Act, emotional/mental harm 
must be sufficient to establish actual injury. 
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